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SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

IN recent years many scattered attempts have been made to apply physiology and psychology to economic processes. Business men by scientific observation and experiment have brought criticism to bear upon the traditional and empirical modes of organizing and conducting businesses. The more or less hand-to-mouth methods which were possible in small businesses where the manager was owner, and could keep a close personal supervision of his employees and all their work, were found increasingly unsuitable to modern types of large capitalist business. It was necessary to devise regular methods for correlating the work of the different departments, and for enabling a single central purpose to operate by complex delegation through several grades of subordinate officials with automatic checks and registers. More accurate methods of book-keeping, especially of cost-taking, were devised; experiments were made in bonuses, profit-sharing, fines, pace-making and various modifications of the wage-systems applied to evoke more energy, skill, or care from the workers and officials; hours of labour and shift-systems were subjected to measured tests. Still more recently the detailed technology of manual and mental labour has been made material of physiological and psychological investigation. Scientific Management has become a conscious art. Business colleges in America and Germany give courses of instruction in this art, and a new profession has arisen of expert advisers who are called in as specialists to diagnose the deficiencies or wastes of industrial or financial power in particular businesses and to prescribe remedies.

Economic progress, regarded from the standpoint of the business man, consists in getting a given quantity of saleable goods turned out at a lower cost of production. That cost of production consists of the salaries and wages paid to various grades of employees for mental and manual labour, cost of materials and power, standing expenses for maintenance of plant and premises, including replacement and insurance, and interest upon capital. Anything that reduces any one of these costs, without a corresponding increase of another, is profitable, from the standpoint of the individual employer, or of all employers in the trade, if it be generally adopted,

or of the consuming public, if it wholly or partly goes to them in lower selling prices. Where the reduction of costs simply takes the shape of reduced wages for the same work, however, it causes no net increase of concrete wealth, but merely distributes the same amount (or less by reason of reduced efficiency of labour) in a different manner. Such a reduction cannot then be regarded as economic progress from the national standpoint.

But every other reduction of cost carries with it *prima facie* evidence of a net increase of concrete wealth. Inventions of machinery, improved chemical or other treatment of materials, better business organization and subdivision of labour, improved skill and energy in employees, better book-keeping, credit, marketing arrangements,—all such technical improvements promote the increase of concrete wealth. In all these ways many great advances have been made in various industries. But, alike in invention and in organization, too much has been left to chance, or to the pressure of some emergency, too little is the result of ordered thought. Business has been conducted too much in the spirit of an art, too little in that of applied science. The modern tendency is to introduce the exacter methods of science. The modern large manufacturing or mining enterprise employs expert engineers and chemists, not only to test and control the operation of existing processes, but to invent new and cheaper ways of carrying out a process, to discover new products and new uses for by-products. It employs expert accountants to overhaul its book-keeping and finance and to suggest improvements. Initiative and economy are to be studied, evoked and applied along every path.

But until lately the detailed organization of labour and its utilisation for particular technical processes had received little attention in the great routine industries. Even such technical instruction as has been given to beginners in such trades as building, engineering, weaving, shoe-making, etc., has usually taken for granted the existing tools, the accepted methods of using them and the material to which they are applied. To make each sort of job the subject-matter of a close analysis and of elaborate experimenting, so as to ascertain how it could be done most quickly and accurately and with the least expenditure of needless energy, comes as a novel contribution of business enterprise. To get the right man to use the right tools in the right way is a fair account of the objects of Scientific Management. At present a man enters a particular trade partly by uninstructed choice, partly by chance, seldom because he is known by himself and his employer to have a natural or acquired aptitude for it. He handles the tools that are traditional and are in general use, copying the ways in which others use them, receiving chance tips or suggestions from

a comrade or a foreman, and learning from personal experience how to do the particular work in a way which appears to be least troublesome, dangerous, or exhausting. Both mode of work and pace are those of prevailing usage, more or less affected by machinery or other technical conditions.

The scientific manager discovers enormous wastes in this way of working. Part of the waste he finds due to improper tools and improper modes of working, arising from mere ignorance; part he attributes to systematic or habitual slacking, more or less conscious and intentional on the part of the workers. The natural disposition of the worker to "take it easy" is supplemented by a belief that by working too hard he deprives some other worker of a job. Scientific Management, therefore, sets itself to work out by experiment the exact tool or machine appropriate to each action, the most economical and effective way by which a worker can work the tool or machine, and the best method of selecting workers for each job and of stimulating them to perform each action with the greatest accuracy and celerity. By means of strictly quantitative tests it works out standard tools, standard methods of work and standard tests for the selection, organization, stimulation, and supervision of the workman.

In his exposition of this economy [Scientific Management] Mr. Taylor takes as his simplest illustration of choice of tools the "art" of shovelling. Left to himself, or working with a gang, the shoveller will use a shovel whose weight, size, and shape have never been considered in relation to the particular material it has to move or the sort of man who has to use it. "By first selecting two or three first-class shovellers, and paying them extra wages for doing trustworthy work, and then gradually varying the shovel load and having all the conditions accompanying the work carefully observed for several weeks by men who were accustomed to experimenting, it was found that a first-class man would do the biggest day's work with a shovel load of about 21 pounds."¹ As a result of this discovery, instead of allowing each shoveller to choose his own shovel, the company provided eight or ten different kinds of shovels accommodated to the weight of different materials and to other special conditions. Again, thousands of stop-watch observations were made to discover how quickly a labourer, provided with his proper shovel, could push the shovel into the materials and draw it out properly loaded. A similar study was made of "the time required to swing the shovel backward and then throw the load for a given horizontal distance, accompanied by a given height." With the knowledge thus obtained it was possible for the man directing shovellers, first to teach them the exact method

i. "The Principles of Scientific Management," p. 65.

of using their strength to the best advantage, and then to assign the daily task by which they can earn the bonus paid for the successful performance of this task. For though the skilled director can prescribe the right tool and the right method, he cannot get the required result without the willing co-operation of the individual worker. For this purpose a bonus is applied, the size of which is itself a subject of scientific experiment. The relation of this bonus to the ordinary day or piece wage will vary with the various types of work and workers. In the Bethlehem Steel Works it was found that the best effect in stimulating energy was got by a bonus of about 60 per cent. beyond the wages usually paid. "This increase in wages tends to make them not only thrifty but better men in every way; they live rather better, begin to save money, become more sober, and work more steadily. When, on the other hand, they receive much more than a 60 per cent. increase of wages, many of them will work irregularly and tend to become more or less shiftless, extravagant, and dissipated. Our experiments showed, in other words, that it does not do for most men to get rich too fast."¹

Considering that it was claimed that the result of this new plan of work was to raise the average daily output per man from 16 to 59 tons, and to secure an annual saving in the labour-bill amounting to between \$75,000 and \$80,000, it would have been interesting to follow the effects of a rapid advance of wealth upon the dividend-receivers who gained so disproportionate a share of the advantages of the new economy.

So far as the selection and adaptation of tools to the special conditions of the work are concerned, there exists no opposition between the business and the human economy. If a shoveller can shovel more material without greater exertion by using a particular shovel, the system which ensures his using this shovel is beneficial to everybody, assuming that he gets some share of the value of the increased output. When we turn from a simple tool to more elaborate machinery, it becomes evident that quantitative testing is capable of achieving enormous technical economies. Mr. Taylor describes the gains in the output of metal-cutting machines made by means of such economies. "Its pulling power at the various speeds, its feeding capacity and its proper speeds were determined by means of the slide-rules, and changes were then made in the countershaft and driving pulleys so as to run it to its proper speed. Tools, made of high-speed steel and of the proper shapes, were properly dressed, treated and ground. A large special slide-rule was then made, by means of which the exact speeds and feeds were indicated at which each kind of work could be done in the

1. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

shortest possible time in this particular lathe. After preparing in this way so that the workman should work according to the new method, one after another, pieces of work were finished in the lathe, corresponding to the work which had been done in our preliminary trials, and the gain in time made through running the machine according to scientific principles ranged from two and one-half times the speed in the slowest instance to nine times the speed in the highest." ¹

This illustration, however, makes it evident that when we pass from technical improvements of tools to improved methods of working, we open possibilities of opposition between the business and the human interest. An improvement in the shape or contour of the "cutting edge" for a particular material is an unqualified gain. So is a discovery as to the ways in which hardness or softness of metals affects the cutting rate. But when it is a question of evoking from the workman a higher price of movement to meet the requirements of the speeded-up machine, no such consistency of interests can be assumed. The fact that by selection, instruction, and minute supervision, workmen can be got to work successfully at the higher speed, and regard themselves as sufficiently compensated by a bonus of 35 per cent., does not settle the question of human values. So far as the selective process simply chooses the men most easily capable of working at a higher speed and of eliminating those who could not easily or possibly adapt themselves to it, no net increase of human cost is involved. But so far as the bonus and the "athletic" spirit which it is used to evoke,² induce workmen to give out an amount of muscular or nervous energy injurious to them in the long run, the human cost may greatly outweigh both the social value of the increased output and the utility to them of higher wages. How crucial is this question of speeding-up the human labour is well illustrated by the experiments in bricklaying, by means of which the bricklayers engaged on straight work were raised from an average of 120 bricks per man per hour to 350. By alterations of apparatus Mr. Gilbreth dispenses with certain movements which bricklayers formerly considered necessary, while saving time in the actual process of laying by using both hands at the same time, bricks being picked up with the left hand at the same instant that a trowel of mortar is seized with the right.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

2. "While one who is not experienced at making his men really enthusiastic in their work cannot appreciate how athletic contests will interest the men, it is the real secret of the success of our best superintendents. It not only reduces costs, but it makes for organization and thus saves foremen's time." F. G. Gilbreth, "Bricklaying System," p. 13.

"It is highly likely that many times during all of these years individual bricklayers have recognized the possibility of eliminating each of these unnecessary motions. But even if, in the past, he did invent each one of Mr. Gilbreth's improvements, no bricklayer could alone increase his speed through their adoption, because it will be remembered that in all cases several bricklayers work together in a row and that the walls all around a building must grow at the same rate of speed. No one bricklayer, then, can work much faster than the one next to him. Nor has any workman the authority to make other men co-operate with him to do faster work. It is only through *enforced* standardization of methods, *enforced* adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and *enforced* co-operation that this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of standards and of enforcing this co-operation rests with the *management* alone. The *management* must supply continually one or more teachers to show each new man the new and simpler motions, and the slower men must be constantly watched and helped until they have risen to their proper speed. All of those who, after proper teaching, either will not or cannot work in accordance with the new methods and at the higher speed, must be discharged by the *management*. The *management* must also recognize the broad fact that workmen will not submit to this more rigid standardization and will not work extra hard, unless they receive extra pay for doing it."¹

This makes it clear that, though part of the larger output, or increased speed, is got by improved arrangements or methods of work that need not tax the workers' powers, part of it does involve their working "extra hard." Not only a better direction but a larger amount of energy is required of them, with an increase of wear and tear and of fatigue. It is an unsettled point of great importance, how much of the enlarged output can be imputed to the former, how much to the latter. Even more important is the allusion in the passage just quoted to "the rigid standardization" to which workmen will not submit, unless they are well paid to do so. For this rigid standardization of the work involves a corresponding mechanization of the workmen. Men who formerly exercised a certain amount of personal choice in the details of their work, as regards action and time, must abandon this freedom and follow exactly the movements prescribed to them by the taskmaster with a chart and a stop-watch. He will prescribe the particular task for each, the tool he shall use, the way he shall use it, the intervals of work and rest, and will take close note of every failure to conform. The liberty, initiative, judgment, and responsibility of the individual workman are reduced to a minimum.

This is admitted by the advocates of Scientific Management, though in a qualified manner. One of the elements of success is said to be: "An almost equal division of the work and responsibility between the workman and the management. All day long the

1. "The Principles of Scientific Management," p. 83.

management work almost side by side with the men, helping, encouraging and smoothing the way for them, while in the past they stood on one side, gave the men but little help, and threw on to them the entire responsibility as to methods, implements, speed, and harmonious co-operation."¹ But in the broader discussion of the difference between the ordinary business method and Scientific Management, in the relation to the numerous little problems that arise in every kind of work, we are told that, "the underlying philosophy of this (ordinary) management necessarily leaves the solution of all these problems in the hands of each individual workman, while the philosophy of Scientific Management places their solution in the hands of the management."² Elsewhere³ it is stated that Scientific Management "involves the establishment of many rules, laws, and formulæ which replace the judgment of the individual workman."

Now in endeavouring to apply to this policy of Scientific Management a standard of human welfare, we are confronted by three questions:—

- (1) What is the effect of this policy upon the human costs of labour?
- (2) How far will any increase of human costs of labour be offset by the greater human utility of the higher wages they receive?
- (3) How far is any balance of human costs, which is imposed on special classes of producers, compensated by the increased wealth at the disposal of society at large?

There is some tendency among the advocates of Scientific Management to burke a full discussion of these issues by asserting that their policy is only a fuller and more rational application of that principle of division of labour which is by general consent the economic foundation of modern civilized society. If some sacrifice of individual freedom in industrial work is involved, it is assumed to be more than compensated by gains to society in which every individual, as a member of society, has his proper share.

But we cannot consent thus to "rush" the issue. For it may turn out that the new method, though but a stricter and finer application of the old, carries this economy so far that the increased human costs imposed upon the producer grow faster than the human gains which the increased productivity confers either upon him or upon society at large. In other words, the human indictment brought by the mid-Victorian humanists against the factory system of their day and rejected on a general survey of the

1. Taylor, p. 85.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

economic situation, might be validated by the increased standardization and specialization of labour under scientific management. For though the division of labour under modern capitalism in all its branches has narrowed the range of productive activity for the great bulk of workers, a survey of those activities shows that within their narrowing range there may and does survive a certain scope for skill, judgment, and initiative, a certain limited amount of liberty in detailed modes of workmanship. Moreover, the conditions of most organised work form a certain education in discipline and responsibility. It is only a small proportion of the workers who are converted into mere servants of the machine. Though large classes are engaged in monotonous routine, the paces and the detailed movements are not rigidly enforced upon them. Different workmen will be doing the same work in a slightly different way.

Now the standardization under the new method is expressly designed so as to extirpate these little personal equations of liberty and to reduce the labour of the ordinary employee to an automatic perfection of routine. It is, indeed, contended by Mr. Taylor that the knowledge of each man that he is working at his highest personal efficiency will be a satisfaction to him, that the attention he must pay to the detailed orders of the taskmaster will evoke intelligence and responsibility, and that his initiative in the way of suggesting improvements, which has hitherto been prized as an element of liberty and a source of industrial progress, can be conserved under scientific management. But a careful examination of the illustrations of the method compels our rejection of these claims. The knowledge of a routine worker that he is speeded up to his highest pitch by a method whose efficiency is prescribed by others, does not yield a sense of personal efficiency. Mere meticulous obedience is not a proper training in the discipline of a "person," and a workman operating under these conditions will not have the practical liberty for those little experiments in trial and error on his own account which make his suggestions of improvement fruitful.

Mr. Taylor, however, carries his defence so far as to deny all narrowing effects of subdivision of labour on the worker. Admitting that the workmen frequently say when they first come under the system, "Why, I am not allowed to think or move without someone interfering or doing it for me?" he seems to think the following answer satisfactory :—

"The same criticism and objection, however, can be raised against any other modern sub-division of labour. It does not follow, for example, that the modern surgeon is any more narrow or wooden a man than the early settler in this country. The frontiersman, however, had

to be not only a surgeon, but also an architect, house builder, lumberman, farmer, soldier, and doctor, and he had to settle his lawsuits with a gun. You would hardly say that the life of the modern surgeon is any more narrowing or that he is more of a wooden man than the frontiersman. The many problems to be met and solved by the surgeon are just as intricate and difficult and as developing and broadening in their way as were those of the frontiersman."¹

Now to this we can only reply, first that it is untrue that the surgeon's life on its productive side (the issue under discussion) is as broad and varied as that of the frontiersman. In the second place, even if we accepted the view that a narrow field of activity admitted of as much variety and interest as a wider field, provided liberty of action were equal in the two, that view is quite inapplicable to the case at issue. For there all liberty of action in the subdivided field of labour is excluded.

So far, then, as initiative, interest, variation, experiment, and personal responsibility are factors of human value, qualifying the human costs of labour it seems evident that Scientific Management involves a loss or injury to the workers. Are there, however, any personal considerations, apart from wages, that may be taken as an offset? Suppose that workers can be found of a dully docile character with a large supply of brute muscular energy, will any harm be done them by utilising them to carry pig-iron or to shovel earth under "scientific" supervision? Mr. Taylor has an interesting passage bearing on this question: "Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig-iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type."² These ox-like men it may be held, do not really suffer any injury, undergo any human cost, by having no opportunity furnished them for exercising faculties and activities of mind, which they do not possess and are unlikely to acquire. If then, in every grade of workers, there are to be found enough men who appear destined by nature for a rigidly mechanical task conducted under servile conditions, it may be thoroughly sound social economy to put them to perform all labour of such kind as is required for the supply of human needs.

This is a problem of applied psychology, or of psycho-physiology. Professor Münsterberg, in a recent volume³ makes a contribution towards its solution, and towards a finer art of Scientific Management than that which has been evolved by business men. For since all industry primarily involves the voluntary ordered

1. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

3. "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency." (See review, p. 266.)

application of human faculties to manual and mental actions, the psychologist must be in a position to give important advice in all economic operations. For he alone is qualified by scientific tests to discover and estimate the various mental capacities which count for success in industry, to ascertain how they co-operate and conflict, and how they may be best applied to the performance of the various operations in each process. Attention, memory, ideas, imagination, feeling, volition, suggestibility, ability to learn, ability to discriminate, judgment, space-sense, time-sense, and other mental qualities, enter in varying measures as factors of industrial ability. Economic psychology may, it is contended, increase the efficiency of industry in three ways.

"We ask how we can find the men whose mental qualities make them best fitted for the work they have to do; secondly, under what psychological conditions we can secure the greatest and most satisfactory output of work from every man; and finally, how we can produce most completely the influences on human minds which are desired in the interests of business. In other words, we ask how to find the best possible man, how to produce the best possible work, and how to secure the best possible effects."¹

The first of these services, fitting the man to the job, involves a double psychological inquiry, first into the vocational needs, and secondly into the personal ability of each applicant to meet these needs. We must examine the task to learn what combination of mental qualities in the employee is required to do it well, and we must examine each applicant for such work to learn whether he possesses the requisite qualities.

Two illustrations will serve to indicate what is meant. The problem of selecting fit motor-men for electric railways was brought to Professor Münsterberg's attention. To drive fast and at the same time avoid accidents were the requirements of the companies. Fitness for this purpose he found to centre in a single mental process:—

"I found this to be a particular complicated act of attention by which the manifoldness of objects, the pedestrians, the carriages, and the automobiles, are continuously observed with reference to their rapidity and direction in the quickly changing panorama of the streets. Moving figures come from the right and from the left towards and across the track, and are embedded in a stream of men and vehicles which moves parallel to the track. In the face of such manifoldness there are men whose impulses are almost inhibited and who instinctively desire to wait for the movement of the nearest objects; they would evidently be unfit for service, as they would drive the electric car far too slowly. There are others who, even with the car at full speed,

1. "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency," p. 23.

can adjust themselves for a time to the complex moving situation, but whose attention soon lapses, and while they are fixating a rather distant carriage, may overlook a pedestrian who carelessly crosses the track immediately in front of this car. In short, we have a great variety of mental types of this characteristic unified variety, which may be understood as a particular combination of attention and imagination."¹

An apparatus was devised, representing the psychological conditions involved in the actual problem, not a mere miniature, but an adaptation which should call out and test the same mental qualities. A number of actual motor-men were then carefully examined in the working of this apparatus so as to test the amounts of speed and accuracy and the relation between the two. Quantitative estimates were thus reached of fitness in working the apparatus, values being assigned respectively to speed and accuracy. In this way a psychological standard of fitness was attained, such as would be available for selecting applicants for the motor service.

So in ship-service, where everything may turn upon prompt and accurate handling of a sudden complicated emergency. Ship officers are found whom a sudden danger paralyses, or keeps vacillating until it is too late. Others, feeling only the urgency of prompt action, jump to a too hasty decision. The desirable type is "the men who in the unexpected situation quickly review the totality of the factors in their relative importance and with almost instinctive certainty immediately come to the same decision to which they would have arrived after great thought."² Here again it was possible to conduct a series of experiments, testing the mental processes and measuring the degrees of rapidity, correctness, and constancy.

Other tests can be applied for the qualities desirable in such work as the telephone service, in which memory, attention, intelligence, exactitude, and rapidity are involved. Sometimes the mental qualities can be separately tested, sometimes their inter-relation is such as to require a simultaneous testing. In a word, the simple practice of testing for colour blindness or deafness in the case of applicants to the railway services evidently admits of a very fruitful elaboration in all kinds of employment.

It is equally obvious that a good deal can be done to increase the productive efficiency of those who have been selected for any work, by methods of teaching that involve psychological guidance. In learning such processes as type-writing and telegraphy, for instance, much can be achieved by technical adjustments of movement such as we have already described, and by

1. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

considered adaptations of machine and materials to suit human faculties. But methods of improving memory and securing a more regular and accurate attention, of increasing the rapidity of repeated actions with the least nervous wear and tear, of educating delicacy of touch and sight for specific purposes, the utilization of rhythmic tendencies, the proper balance of intervals of work and rest, the influence of imitation and social co-operation in gang labour, and finally the effects of different quantities and modes of remuneration in evoking and maintaining the various factors of efficiency—all such considerations offer a fruitful field for psychological investigation.

Hence psychology, it is urged, may contribute greatly to productivity by finding the best man for each job and adjusting his mental equipment to conditions of work which in their turn can be modified to fit his powers. But, regarding production as designed to satisfy human demands, psychology can be utilised also to assist in getting the right quantities and qualities of goods to the right persons. Commercial organization exists for this purpose. It does study the wants and demands of consumers. But it might do so with more "science." Professor Münsterberg makes an exceedingly interesting study of the arts of advertising and of selling over the counter, to illustrate how much might be done by substituting experimental laws for instinctive and traditional practices. One comment upon this application of his science, however, is called for. Though the social-economic view would oblige the psychologist to approach the subject specifically from the standpoint of the consumer and the psychology of satisfactions in his standard of comfort, Professor Münsterberg virtually confines himself to the psychology of commerce and of marketing regarded from the standpoint of the manufacturer or merchant.

Thus psychology can be made to devise and prescribe economies of human power in industry which, like the technical improvements of Scientific Management, would seem to increase greatly the productivity of industry, turning out larger quantities, and perhaps better qualities of goods, with the same amount of labour.

What would be the human valuation of these processes of scientific economy? Assuming that this economy fructifies in an enlarging volume of wealth, it would appear to be accompanied by an increase of welfare, unless the human costs of labour were correspondingly increased, or the distribution of the larger volume of wealth were made so much more unequal that it furnished a smaller volume of utility in its consumption. Neither of these qualifications is, indeed, excluded by the terms of the economy. For each stroke of Scientific Management is primarily justified as a profit-making device, advantageous to the capitalist-

employer in a particular business. It enables him to turn out goods at a lower labour-cost and so to make a larger margin of profit on their sale. If we suppose this economy to be of wide or general adoption, it would be equivalent to an all-round increase in the technical efficiency of labour. Unless we suppose the aggregate quantity of production to be a fixed quantity (a supposition not in accordance with experience), it would seem to follow that at least as large a quantity of this more efficient labour would be employed in turning out an increased volume of goods. In that event it would be possible that the workers, as well as the capitalist employers, should enjoy a higher rate of remuneration. Whether they would do so, however, and to what extent, seems quite uncertain. For though the payment of a considerable bonus in addition to current wages was necessary in the experiments described by Mr. Taylor, in order to evoke from a particular group of workers submission to the new terms of work, it does not follow that, once adopted by all employers in the trade, the method would entail a continuance of this higher pay. For the pioneer firm admittedly pays the bonus partly in order to overcome the pains and scruples of workers subjected to a speeding-up system. If it did not pay a bonus, the workers would quit this employment for some other that was open to them. But if no other employment upon the old terms were open, this part of the bonus might be unnecessary as an inducement. Even that part of the bonus which seems to be directed to stimulate the ambition and energy of the individual worker, and to break up the habitual slackness of the group and its regulation stroke, would seem to stand on a precarious footing, when the new method of work was once well established and itself became a habit. Only that part, if any, of the bonus, or higher wage, which was necessary to replace the greater muscular or nervous wear and tear of the speeded-up and more automatic work, would necessarily survive. It would stand as a necessary cost of production. If, however, as Mr. Taylor and Prof. Münsterberg appear to hold, the scientific management need entail no such additional wear and tear, there seems no ground for holding that, after the method became general, any bonus to the workers would be necessary. And if it were unnecessary, it would not, indeed under competitive terms could not, be paid. On this hypothesis, the additional wealth created by the improved efficiency of the system would go entirely to capital. Indeed, so far as the determination were left to individual bargaining, this result would appear almost inevitable. For the greater average efficiency of labour would be equivalent to a larger supply of labour (though it might also mean a better quality), and since no immediate or corresponding increase of demand for labour need accrue, the price per unit

of labour would fall. This would mean that the labourer would get no higher payment for his higher productivity. Even if the increasing rate and amount of profits brought increased saving and larger masses of competing capital, it would still seem doubtful whether the aggregate demand for labour would be found to keep pace with the growth of the supply which scientific management plus psychological selection would yield.

Though, therefore, the aggregate product increased, it remains doubtful whether any considerable share of the increase must or would go to labour. But suppose that organization of labour or social intervention were able to secure some considerable rise of real wages from the enlarged product, so that as consumers the workers were better off, the human value of the process is not yet established. Two related questions still remain for settlement. First, that already tentatively raised, the question whether the workers may not suffer more from increased human costs of production under the new scientific *régime* than they gain in human abilities of consumption. Some of the "science" in its application would indeed appear to be wholly beneficial. The improved methods of selecting and of training labour, so as to get the best man for each job, and to enable him to do his work in the best way, is pure gain, provided that best way does not unduly strain his energy or dull his mind. Other elements of applied psychology are more doubtful in their net effect. The practices of scientific advertising and of suggestive selling have very little proved ability and are nearly as likely to be applied to force the wrong articles on the wrong purchasers as to distribute wealth along the lines of its maximum utility for consumption. The persons engaged for a livelihood in palming off goods on a public irrespective of any intrinsic merits they contain, pay a heavy toll in character for the work they are called upon to do.

But, turning to the main problem, there remains the issue of the increased mechanization, or standardization, of the worker under Scientific Management. Admitting that a certain amount of subdivision of labour, and of diminishing variety, interest and initiative, accruing therefrom, is justified in a human sense by the benefits of enhanced production, is there any limit to this economy, and if there be, is that limit transgressed under Scientific Management? The question does not admit perhaps of any general or certain answer. Suppose it be admitted, as I think it must, that every application of this Scientific Management does squeeze out of the labour-day some human interest, some call upon initiative, reason, judgment, responsibility, surviving under previous conditions even in the most routine and subdivided toil. Must we

necessarily regard this loss as a heavy increased human cost of labour? Surely it depends upon the particular labour in question. In some, perhaps most, branches of heavy routine toil, the shreds of human interest, the calls on personality, are usually so trifling that it seems absurd to take them into much account. The work of carrying pig-iron, or of shovelling continually the same material, contains so little scope for the play of initiative, responsibility, etc., that any such regimentation as is described can hardly be said to damage the quality of the work or the character of the worker as affected by his work. If a higher efficiency and a larger output can enable a smaller number of workmen to be kept on labour of so low a grade, there ought to be a net social gain. But there is another compensation possible for any loss of liberty, or increase of monotony, involved in Scientific Management. If it be accompanied by a shortening of the hours of labour, the damage inflicted by the rigour of mechanical discipline may be compensated by a larger leisure. This compensation, of course, is reduced or even nullified, if the greater intensity of labour in the shorter day takes more out of the man, as often happens, than was taken out before. But, assuming that this is not the case, and that for a longer dull routine work day is substituted a shorter but even more mechanical day, a net gain for labour is still possible. I am disposed to hold that a good case might be made out for Scientific Management as regards those orders of routine labour which, as ordinarily carried on, contain very little interest or humanity. Even then, however, there is a danger that deserves attention. If this regimentation can reduce the cost per unit of dull heavy muscular toil, as is likely, it may prevent the discovery and application of wholly mechanical substitutes for this work.

But the human economy is far more doubtful in the case of labour which, though subdivided and mainly of a routine character, still contains a margin for the display of skill, initiative and judgment. To remove these qualities altogether from such work and to vest them, as is proposed, not even in the overseers, but in a little clique of scientific experts, would mean the conversion of large bodies of skilled, intelligent workers into automatic drudges. The life and character of these men would suffer as an inevitable reaction of this drudgery, and it is doubtful whether a somewhat shortened work-day and somewhat higher wages would compensate such damage. While we may recognise the general desirability of division and specialisation of labour, some detailed liberty and flexibility should be left to the worker.

Indeed, were the full rigour of Scientific Management to be applied throughout the staple industries, not only would the human costs of labour appear to be enhanced, but progress in the industrial

arts itself would probably be damaged. For the whole strain of progress would be thrown upon the Scientific Management and the consulting psychologist. The large assistance given to technical invention by the observation and experiments of intelligent workmen, the constant flow of suggestion for detailed improvements, would cease. The elements of creative work still surviving in most routine labour would disappear. On the one hand, there would be small bodies of efficient taskmasters carefully administering the orders of expert managers, on the other, large masses of physically efficient but mentally inert executive machines. Though the productivity of existing industrial processes might be greatly increased by this economy, the future of industrial progress might be imperilled. For not only would the arts of invention and improvement be confined to the few, but the mechanization of the great mass of workmen would render them less capable of adapting their labour to any other method than that to which they had been drilled. Again, such automatism in the workers would react injuriously upon their character of consumers, damaging their capacity to get full human gain out of any higher remuneration that they might obtain. It would also injure them as citizens, disabling them from taking an intelligent part in the arts of political self-government. For industrial servitude is inimical to political liberty. It would become even more difficult than now for a majority of men, accustomed in their work-day to mechanical obedience, to stand up in their capacity of citizens against their industrial rulers when, as often happens upon critical occasions, political interests correspond with economic cleavages.

I would not dogmatise upon the necessity of these human disadvantages of Scientific Management. The more rigorous routine of the work-day might be adequately compensated by shorter hours, higher wages, increased opportunities for education, recreation, and home life. But there can be no security for adequate compensations of these orders under a scientific management directed primarily by private profit-making motives. For there is no guarantee that the larger profits to a business firm do not entail a damage to its employees, not offset by the bonus which they may obtain. Nor have we the required security that any social gain in the way of increased product and lower prices may not be cancelled by the human injury inflicted upon large bodies of workers and citizens by the more mechanical and servile conditions of their labour.

J. A. HOBSON.

NOTES ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN GREECE.¹

FEW parts of Europe have been more clearly influenced by geographical features in their development and history than the Balkan peninsula. The whole peninsula is divided into two parts by the north and south central range, consisting of the Shar mountains in the north, Grammos in the centre, and Pindus in the south. Throughout all history this range or line of ranges has proved the most formidable barrier to intercourse and trade; the passes through it are few, and although their difficulty is frequently exaggerated none is sufficiently easy to unite the districts on either side. To the west of the central range, on the Adriatic slope, the land is almost uniformly mountainous, but to the east, on the Aegean side, it is, as it were, broken up into a series of small plains divided from each other by mountain barriers, most of which, starting from or close to the central range, end upon the sea. Thus in the extreme north is the range of the Balkans proper, with their offshoot Rhodope; further south is the range that ends in Mt. Bermius by Verria, southward again the range of Olympus, and within Greece itself the ranges of Othrys and Oeba, which, breaking off from Pindus, extend down to the coast.

The effects of this mountain system are various, but among the chief perhaps are these: in the first place, north and south routes within the peninsula are limited and involve crossing a series of hills or mountains. Secondly, all routes from Europe into the peninsula are likewise limited in number, and there are in fact only two great highways for trade and commerce, one of which is to-day followed by the railway to Constantinople, and the other by the line that emerges by the Vardar valley at Salonica. On these two routes the development of the peninsula, and especially of the inland districts of it, depend to a very great extent. Sufficient account perhaps is not always taken in forming estimates of Balkan conditions of the great extent to which the whole region still depends on the rest of Europe for all that is called civilization. A national and independent civilization in the modern sense has not yet had time to develop, and, considering past history, it is quite impossible that it should. The Balkan peninsula generally is a region with a remote past—a very doubtful asset in many respects—and practically nothing between that past and the present day.

The third chief effect of the mountain system concerns Greece

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, February 24, 1913.

in particular. Lying to the south of the Salonica route, and having been up to the present separated from it by a strip of country, of no great width but still hilly in character, Greece has been far and away more isolated from Europe than the other Balkan states. There is no railway leading into Greece, nor any land route along which passes any appreciable amount of trade. All routes into Greece are still by sea, so that the country suffers, or has suffered, from the disadvantages of a land frontier without enjoying any compensating advantage from it. This isolation from Europe comes out in many ways, even in ordinary speech: to go from Greece to France, Italy, or Germany is "to go to Europe," and European is the normal term for goods not made in the country but of continental origin. In many respects, in fact, Greece is not a European country in the full sense at all.

This isolation and the quasi-insular position of the country as regards the rest of the continent has undoubtedly had great influence on its past development. On the one hand, combined with the natural agricultural poverty of the land, it has developed the seaport towns at the expense of the rest and made the Greek the natural trader of the Levant. Against this advantage there are certain disadvantages; for the same isolation is probably largely the reason why Greece after nearly 90 years of self-government has in many ways developed in a less stable manner and made less solid progress than Bulgaria. While Serbia and Bulgaria have had a European or western standard of efficiency to aim at, Greece has had none. It has been, for example, to the interest of Europe to see that an efficient line ran through Serbia and Bulgaria to Constantinople and Salonica; but except for the inhabitants of Greece, Greek railways are of practically no importance.

Within Greece itself the conditions of life in the villages vary considerably from district to district: the main division, however, is formed by the range of Othrys, which up to 1880 formed the northern boundary of the kingdom. To the south of this line the land is mainly in the possession of small proprietors, and the villages are "free," that is to say, they are not owned by large landowners. Village life nevertheless is very far from flourishing; the greatest prosperity perhaps is to be found in the currant region or in some of the best tobacco districts. The former of these crops, however, is not only limited by climatic conditions to a small tract of land along the shores of the Corinthian Gulf and to a few islands, but is further restricted by the exigencies of foreign trade. The tobacco cultivation also is not the cause of as much work or wealth within the country as might perhaps be assumed, for large quantities of the raw material are exported in particular to Egypt,

then blended with Turkish tobacco and put on the market as Egyptian. Thus it is only the actual growing of the crop that affects conditions within Greece. A number of reasons may be given to explain the failure of agriculture generally. The soil itself, though rich in parts, covers only a small fraction of the whole country; water is often scarce and irrigation necessary, and irrigation, owing to the deep-cut river beds, frequently very difficult. Agricultural methods and appliances are still of very primitive type, and up to only a few years ago taxation seemed in many ways to be so designed as to fall especially on the agricultural class. Quite recently, it is true, there have been signs of a marked improvement in this respect, but several years are needed before the results can be judged. Communications also are still poor; good roads and communications generally in a country such as Greece are difficult to acquire, but their present state is often unnecessarily bad. Roads in several cases have been half finished, or even finished in all respects except as regards bridges, and then abandoned; in other cases railways have been regarded as superseding not as supplementing roads. For example, there is no road as yet joining Corinth and Patras.

To these reasons, most of which are due to bad government in the past, another perhaps may be added. The Greek peasant, as compared for example with the Bulgarian, seems to possess no special aptitude for farming. This may be, and probably is to some extent, due to environment and the conditions to be faced, but apparently is not so entirely judging from parts of Macedonia where the two races live side by side on equal terms. The agricultural depression in Greece has been very largely the cause during recent years of emigration on a large scale. Emigration, of course, has affected to some extent all the Balkan states, but it has been more marked in the case of Greece than in any other state, and in south and central Greece more than in any other district. In the Peloponnese, especially in Arcadia, a poor district at best, it is no uncommon experience to find villages in which the population consists of old men, women, and children, most of the able-bodied population being away in America, and America in Greece means first and foremost the United States. In such cases there is naturally a general shortage of labour, in some instances sufficiently serious to cause the abandonment of fields. Emigration on this scale to America only began a comparatively few years ago, but before that time a considerable number annually used to find work in other parts of the Balkans and also in Roumania. The emigration statistics available are not altogether satisfactory, if they include, as they apparently do, Greeks from Macedonia and Epirus who cross the land frontier into Greece and sail from Greek

ports to avoid passport difficulties. Nevertheless the following figures will give a sufficiently accurate idea of the extent and rapid increase of emigration¹:

Year.	Number of Emigrants.	Year.	Number of Emigrants.
1887	313	1904	9,619
1890	1,105	1905	15,150
1896	2,175	1906	14,408
1900	3,771	1907	37,184
1901	5,910	1908	7,145
1902	8,104	1909	17,505
1903	14,090	—	—

Most of the emigrants seem to leave Greece when between 17 and 25 years old, and most eventually return. When in the States they find work in fruit shops and stalls, restaurants, on the railways, or in factories.² To a very great extent they keep close together. Thus in Nashua, New Hampshire, there are large colonies of Greek emigrants living as far as possible in a Greek manner and on Greek food; and again one village or group of villages in Greece will to a great extent emigrate to the same city or town. The time spent in America varies in each individual case, but of those who work in the factories, I believe, only a few stay more than four or five years without a break, though many go back again for a second spell. The explanation, I believe, is partly that a race accustomed to Greek life, and trying to live as far as possible in a Greek way when under American climatic conditions, cannot endure factory life for a longer period, and partly that the Greek emigrant, starting with little or no standard of comfort, will submit to worse conditions of labour than the northern emigrant. The amount of money saved by the emigrants naturally varies considerably and accurate information seems quite impossible to acquire, for a failure will reveal nothing and a successful emigrant will probably exaggerate his gains. There is, however, little doubt that a large amount is saved and sent or brought back into the country. Thus in 1902 the sums sent back through the post amounted to 70,000 francs, in 1904 to 700,000, in 1905 to 1,735,000, and in 1909 to 13,700,000.

The total effect of emigration on Greece is difficult to estimate. On the one hand it causes a deficiency of labour in the country; on the other hand, it brings in an appreciable amount of money; and of this money a considerable proportion is well spent, or at least spent with good intentions. The ordinary emigrant—I

1. cf. Struck, "Zur Landeskunde von Griechenland, p. 76 ff.

2. This and what follows is based on accounts from returned emigrants. The American side of the question might be very different.

exclude here the few exceptional successes whose generosity is well known—will help towards the erection of a school, bridge, or fountain in his own village. Large sums, too, have been given to the fleet and army from the same source. In a great number of cases the absence from home seems to encourage practical patriotism in a very real sense. In other ways also the returned emigrant is an important factor in the development of the country; but a distinction must be made between those who when away lived in close connection with their countrymen and those who were more or less isolated. The former class, which includes those especially who work in factories, derive far less benefit from their experience than the latter; for exceedingly few of them realise at all what western civilization means. Few learn much of the language, most very little, and a large number hardly a single word—a feature which by itself shows at once both how close they keep together when abroad, and also how little they can possibly enter into their surroundings. Those too who work at unskilled labour in the factories on their return have learnt no trade.

On the other hand, most acquire some sense of law and order and some few a definitely higher standard of comfort. Those, however, who escape the factories, if they also have the good fortune to be more or less isolated from their countrymen, are as a class greatly superior. Their experience is wider and they have a correspondingly wider outlook. The result is that they return home with some standard of efficiency and a wholesome discontent at the state of affairs in their own country. In fact they form the nucleus of a class—still very small—that will eventually prove to be of considerable value in supporting attempts at better government and administration. How long emigration to America will continue on a large scale is an open question. The cost of living in the States is increasing and the Greek drachma now is nearly at par, the rate of exchange being now 25 to the £ instead of over 30 as it was only a few years back. Both these changes make Greek emigration to America less profitable than it was. Still, even if emigration is rapidly to decline in the near future, its effect on the development of the country will probably ultimately be found to have been of great importance.

To the north of Othrys in Thessaly conditions in the villages are somewhat different, and emigration up to the present has perhaps had less effect. The "free" villages which own their own land are comparable with those in the south, excepting in the case of the newly-founded villages inhabited by Bulgarian refugees. A few years ago, during the Greek and Bulgarian troubles, a large number of refugees left Bulgaria for Greece. They were supported for some time at the expense of the Greek nation, and finally settled

in various parts of Thessaly in new villages built on land bought for them. The sites chosen for these villages were often most unsuitable; some, such as New Anchialos, were placed near marshes notorious for malaria, while others were placed too near existing villages. There was very little if any attempt made to open up new land, and the land purchased was often insufficient. In some cases a far greater number of houses were erected than would ever be required, and all were badly built. The result was that many of the refugees after a short trial of their new homes went back to Bulgaria, in many cases to work as labourers on the farms they once had owned. About two years ago the return movement had ceased, and apparently the refugees then left in Greece had made up their minds to stay. Local opinion, however, seemed very doubtful as to whether the refugee villages would succeed and many of their near neighbours naturally resent their presence.

A large part of the Thessalian plains, potentially one of the richest districts in Greece, is divided up into a number of large estates, and the villagers on these, paid usually on the *metayer* system, are for the most part in a worse plight than any elsewhere in the country. In 1880, when Thessaly became Greek, most of the estates changed from Turkish to Greek ownership; some, however, were broken up and the villages on them "freed," but of these some have now returned to their former condition. The process by which this was effected seems to have been as follows. Private individuals, often the local lawyer or doctor, lent money at high rates of interest to the newly freed villages on the security of their land, and then, taking advantage of a bad harvest, foreclosed. In this way the number of large estates has increased. The new Greek landlords were not in every way an improvement on their Turkish predecessors. They had no traditions behind them, and in common with nearly all their countrymen hated living on the land. At present hardly any live on their estates, and not a few never venture to visit them without a considerable bodyguard. About three years ago the miserable conditions of the peasantry on the estates provoked some agrarian riots. The actual rioting that occurred was perhaps somewhat exaggerated, but the reasons for it were minimized. Still the attention of the government was drawn to the question and remedial measures were at least discussed. The only solution seems to be gradual expropriation and agricultural reforms, measures everywhere difficult to carry out and needing a large expenditure and a continuity of policy. The agrarian question in Thessaly is already quite a serious matter and one which cannot be ignored for many years longer.

Another feature of the region north of Othrys is the decline of

certain towns and villages, in some cases almost amounting to extinction, during the last century. In south and central Greece during the same period, although progress has been naturally uneven, nearly every village is now in a better state than it was. In the north, however, though in many cases very rapid progress has been made, in others the reverse has taken place. This is true not only of the part under Greek rule but also of south Macedonia; thus Kallerytes, Syracu, Metzovo, the villages of the Zagori, Baba in Tempe, and many others are now far less prosperous than they were. Metzovo, for example, is only about half the size it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The fortunes of most if not all of these villages seem to have been closely connected with the rise and decline of the foreign trade of Janina. In the latter half of the eighteenth century Janina in Epirus was one of the most important towns in the south of the peninsula, and it had an export trade with several parts of Europe. Among the goods exported were cheeses, and woollen materials, in particular thick cloaks which were made in the Greek and Wallachian or Vlach villages in the hills. Of these villages Metzovo, being in the Zyghos pass that joins Epirus to Thessaly and Macedonia, became the most important, and early in the nineteenth century Metzovo merchants were established in several parts of Italy and as far afield as Austria. Besides being a centre of commerce Janina was also a centre of Hellenism, largely because Greek was essentially the trading language and Ali Pasha in his mixed kingdom of Albanians, Greeks, and Vlachs used Greek almost as an official language. Baba at the same period had a regular overland trade with Austria.

In the early years of the nineteenth century the foreign trade of Janina and of the surrounding district rapidly declined. The rule of Ali has much to answer for, but the Napoleonic wars were probably the main cause, and the increase of Manchester goods has prevented any recovery. Various local events have since had considerable effect. Frontier episodes have been innumerable; in 1854, for example, Metzovo was plundered twice within three weeks—once by Greek irregulars and once by Turks. Several thousand sheep from the same neighbourhood were driven off south in the same year. Between 1878 and 1880 brigandage on an unusual scale ruined what little prosperity the villages of the Zagori still possessed; and finally the new Greek frontier of 1880 practically put an end to all trade between Thessaly and Epirus over the Zyghos or Metzovo pass. Thus a large number of villages have never had a chance of recovering what they lost by the failure of Janina trade.

The villages most adversely affected by the 1880 frontier were a group of Vlach villages to the north of Metzovo. Originally

probably all nomadic shepherds the inhabitants for generations have had permanent villages and have largely adopted other trades and professions. At the same time, however, they preserved to some extent their nomadic habits and used to move down each winter into the Thessalian plains. Thus Velestino in Thessaly is still most inhabited in winter by Vlachs from Pindus, and many other colonies are to be found in the other Thessalian towns. The decline of Janina did not affect these Pindus Vlachs as much as their neighbours, as, thanks to the possession of forests, they continued to prosper on a trade in timber. The year 1854 proved disastrous to a large part of the population that relied entirely on flocks and herds, and the new frontier in 1880 divided their winter from their summer quarters. Many in consequence had to find other winter quarters north of the frontier; some settled permanently in Greece, and those who continued their old method of living had to face the expense of crossing the frontier twice each year. About the same time they were drawn into the vortex of typical Balkan politics, and the result has been that their villages have declined.

The effects of the recent war on the conditions above indicated cannot, of course, as yet be estimated. The new frontier is still undecided, and as, wherever it be drawn, it cannot follow with any exactitude the distribution of the various races, it must necessarily be a compromise. Macedonia, now as in Leake's day, north of the Haliacmon soon becomes a complicated mosaic of various races. Thus a few Bulgarian villages are south of Kastoria, Jenidje was a few years ago a notorious haunt of Greek and Bulgarian bands, Salonica is first and foremost a city of Spanish Jews, the peninsula of Chalcidike beyond is purely Greek, and Greek influence and population extend northwards but mainly on the coast and in the towns, while the villages and the interior are mostly Bulgarian. The Albanians in several places come eastwards of the central range, and though the Vlachs in the south are nearly all Hellenized, some in recent years have moved northward to escape being so. If, as seems probable from the geographical features of the district the interior will tend to dominate the coast, then Slav and Bulgarian influence will have a tendency to expand at the expense of Greek, which works from the coast inwards.

Without knowing where the frontier is to be drawn, it is perhaps possible to suggest a few of the effects additional territory in the north may have on the rest of Greece. Agriculturally the land to the north, if farmed, seems as good, if not better, than most of the land in Greece. The forests on Pindus alone will make a considerable difference to a land in which timber is scarce and of a poor quality. The re-opening of the Metzovo or Zyghos pass should improve communications and so help to counteract the effect of the 1880 frontier. The coast-line south of

Salonica is mostly poor and there are no good harbours. The main effect of additional territory in the north will be that it will stop the present isolation of Greece, and by joining it to the Vardar valley route unite the country more closely to the rest of Europe. Even now it seems not over sanguine to imagine that before many years pass the Greek and Salonica railways will have been united. Two routes for effecting this junction have often been discussed. One follows the coast along the Pierian plain and joins the Greek system at Tempe; the other keeping inland and passing close to Kozani, Safidje, and Elassona, is to join the Greek line at Larissa. Of these two projected routes the former is by far the easier and cheaper, but the latter would open a more important tract of country. The Haliacmon valley by Kozani is a naturally rich district; the Pierian plain in contrast is mostly a dismal waste. But whatever route is adopted, the fact of a railway from the continent into Greece at all will help to alter conditions throughout the whole country. This land route, too, in the future seems likely to be of greater importance to Greece than it would have been in the past. Hitherto the Greeks have enjoyed a practical monopoly of local Aegean trade, the possession of which has been the dominant factor in the development of the country, but with the arrival at last of the Bulgarians on the Aegean coast this monopoly may be assailed. Up to the present, it is true, the Bulgarians have done little as traders, but during the last few years signs of increasing interest on their part in commerce have been noticeable. The Bulgarians, too, have a reputation at least for being the one race in the Balkans that possesses the faculty for combination; and Greek sea trade, though at present very extensive, is remarkable for its lack of organization. Any competition, therefore, may be a serious thing and the development of the country districts of Greece become a more pressing need.

MAURICE S. THOMPSON.

THE STUDY OF HUMAN CHARACTER.¹

It is a curious circumstance how little the study of character has shared in the wonderful progress of science that has taken place in the last half-century. For it is a subject which is of the most profound interest and importance, in which the discovery of any great principle would be certain to excite universal attention. In 1861 Alexander Bain published a book entitled *The Study of Character* which was one of the least successful of all his works, and never reached a second edition. Somewhat earlier John Stuart Mill had planned a book on character (as I learn from his private letters); it was to have followed his *Logic*; but he found he could make nothing of the subject, and thereafter turned his attention to Political Economy. Already in the previous century Jean-Jacques Rousseau had likewise planned a work on character; but he too found the subject beyond his powers. Ribot and a few other modern writers in this country and in France have made some progress with the subject; but the fact remains that our knowledge is loose and disorganized, existing largely in aphorisms such as we find in Montaigne's essays, unco-ordinated by any fundamental principles, and therefore of little use in practical life.

The backwardness of knowledge in this sphere must be due to the existence of very special difficulties in the study of it: and accordingly I begin this paper with an account of the main difficulties which appear to me to stand in our way. First and most obvious is the absence of any advanced general psychology; and this, as I venture to believe, is due to the intrusion of metaphysical conceptions into what should be a purely scientific study. Not till spiritualistic conceptions are finally driven out, not until our outlook is completely materialistic, can we have a firm basis for the study of character. The experimental psychology of recent years is indeed purely materialistic: but up to the present time no broad general principles have emerged, though a vast mass of isolated observations have been recorded. But a still more fundamental difficulty lies in the innumerable prejudices and biasses of all kinds with which the student is brought in contact. As I shall hope shortly to show, the study of character is to a great extent the study of emotions: and we cannot study an emotion with the cold passivity that we can a mathematical formula or a logical syllogism. An emotion raises heat: our intellectual analysis requires us to be cold. Our task is like that of stoking a

1. A paper read before the Social Psychology Group of the Sociological Society, March 4, 1913.

furnace with a bar of ice: our implement of attack is rendered impotent by mere contact with the problem. And, finally, I must mention a third difficulty. The study of character, as I have already observed, is largely the study of emotions. The emotions by which men, in common with all other animals, are mainly driven are those which conserve individual life and those which conserve the species. But these latter—the reproductive emotions—rest under the ban of a conspiracy of silence. The reproductive emotions of the people are not reflected in their conversation or in their literature. This massive under-current of emotion only manifests itself here and there. Most people can and do go through the world without affording the least inkling of what their sexual life may be. Yet in most cases this sexual life is probably a more important factor in character-formation than any other single factor whatever. We have therefore to remember that a large proportion of human motives and activities originates from this unseen land, and is deceptive in appearance. This difficulty can only be diminished to some extent by mastering all that is known of the psychology of sex, and by studying the literature of other countries and other periods when such concealment was not the fashion.¹

From these preliminaries, I pass to the classification of the different kinds of human character. There appear to me to be two useful modes of classification: (1) that of general psychology, dividing the mind into intellect, feeling, and will. This I may call a vertical classification; and (2) a horizontal classification into acquirements and instincts. I propose to touch first upon this second division.

To what extent is a man's character the product of his environment? to what extent is it innate and due to his heredity? This is an old biological question, and we shall find that for different persons the answer is very different. Many people seem to be completely moulded by their environment, and everybody is so to some extent; we can usually recognize a soldier or a parson or a lawyer by the look of his face, and that environment which has expressed itself on his face has written itself far more deeply in the pliant substance of the brain, which underlies the mind. I may put the question somewhat differently. A man's activities are the resultant of two main sets of forces, the external and the internal. The former regulate purposive and intelligent actions: the latter are spontaneous or instinctive. One of the commonest of all errors

1. From this aspect, a very fruitful epoch is found in the French literature of the 18th century. Such a work, for instance, as *Les liaisons dangereuses* of Choderlos de La Clos contains a more profound analysis of human character than any other work with which I am acquainted.

in reading character is in overestimating the influence of the external forces at the expense of the internal. To take a concrete instance: we ask ourselves why X has performed some particular action. We commonly think the question answered when we are informed of the external events which led up to it. But a more fundamental answer would in many cases be, because it is the nature of X to perform such actions: though partly purposive, they are still more instinctive. What I mean is that the energy taken into the body as food has a tendency to discharge itself in particular directions: and that a man's entire life will be coloured by that tendency. He will be especially successful in pursuits demanding that kind of energy which his body-machine produces most abundantly: he will be likely to fail in pursuits which demand a kind of energy not easily manufactured by his body-machine. A number of instances will elucidate my meaning, and I will take one first from among the lower vertebrates.

If you are walking in the country in the summer-time and come suddenly upon a nest-full of young partridges, you will observe that the old mother partridge hobbles away with apparently broken wings. You, or your dog, think she may be easily caught; you go in pursuit, but she keeps just out of reach, till at length having led you half across a large field, she rises and flies away. Thereupon if you resemble an ordinary Christian, you will go home and relate to your admiring friends how you were cheated by a partridge, which shammed an injury to draw you away from its young. Now this is a type of a large part of erroneous reasoning about character. Any properly educated schoolboy would know by a glance at the size of a partridge's brain that it could not conceivably act in the highly anthropomorphic manner attributed to it. The incompetent observer credits the partridge with motives which its brain is too small by a hundredfold to entertain. The true explanation, of course, is that trailing of the wings is the normal mode of expression of emotion among birds, as anyone may see at this time of year among sparrows making love. The partridge in the case mentioned is half-paralyzed by the powerful emotion which seizes her, and does not recover sufficiently to fly away, until after she has moved some distance from the young. This purely fortuitous mode of expressing emotion may, of course, have been developed by natural selection; my point is that it is instinctive and spontaneous in character, not purposive as the uninitiated imagine.

And so it is with human conduct. Men do things in many cases not for the purposes they imagine, but because it is natural for them to do those things. Take, for instance, an association formed for charitable purposes, such as the relief of sickness. The ostensible motive of the members of the association is to do good; but the fundamental motive is nevertheless a blind impulsion of sympathetic

emotions straining to find relief in action. So it is with many political organizations. I was once on the committee of a political organization myself, formed for a purpose which never had the remotest chance of being attained. Once a fortnight we used to meet round a table and curse the Government for ignoring our schemes. What was the use of it? It had none, save this—that it relieved our feelings in a perfectly harmless way. It was the expression of a blind instinct to *do something*: not of a truly purposeful character. And so with a great part of human activities: they are not brought about with specific purposes, but are the blind product of our physiological organization.

Let me observe here that the principle I have indicated exhibits a great contrast between men and lower animals. The actions of a bird, for example, are almost exclusively instinctive: a man, on the contrary, has fewer instincts than any other creature. In the lower mammals the minute structure of the brain is predetermined at birth within very narrow limits. In man that predetermination is far less rigid and permits considerable fluctuations in future development. The human brain at birth is not indeed the *tabula rasa* alleged by Helvetius; but it approaches that ideal by comparison with the brain of other animals. A man is more purposive, more a product of environment, and less limited by heredity, than any other kind of beast.

It appears to be distinctive of genius that the factor of environment counts for less than among ordinary people and the congenital tendencies for more. A genius is born with a particular cast of mind of excessively strong hereditary quality. He views every occurrence from his own individual standpoint; and those subjects which interest him he pursues with a relentlessness far exceeding any concentration that could be brought about by an effort of will on the part of an ordinary man. Genius is a sort of *idée fixe*, so strongly implanted by heredity as to force itself to the front at every turn and become the guiding principle in life. But of course there are many other elements in genius: one of the most obvious being intellectual power. No amount of *idée fixe* will constitute a genius, unless the power of intellectual association is adequate. In other kinds of persons, it produces different qualities. Boyd Alexander was driven out to Africa by an *idée fixe* of this kind, practically against his will. If he had been intellectually disposed, he would have been a genius: as it was, he had the active temperament, and has come to be known as a great explorer. Lombroso's theory that genius is a form of degeneration is ridiculous, almost as ridiculous as his theory of criminology. I say almost, because, whereas his theory of the *delinquente nato* is radically erroneous, there is occasionally association between genius and degeneration. A strong natural bent in a certain direction is

likely to have perturbing effects on the remainder of the mind: these may be bad, but they may, on the contrary, be good, and I was interested to note the publication in Paris last year of a book by Drs. Rémond et Voivenel, to show that genius was not degeneration, but progeneration. One theory is about as good as the other: neither goes far into the matter: the element of genius which marks it off is that it is more instinctive and less acquired than average mental qualities. The man (whoever he may have been) who first said that genius was the capacity for taking pains came near the truth: it is really an instinct perpetually forcing the subject to do things or some particular thing that would be impossibly irksome to ordinary people.

Although I have barely had time to do more than touch upon the outlines of this method of viewing character, I am obliged to hasten forward to another method not less important,—to what I have described as the vertical classification of character. The fundamental principle of this classification is based upon a comparison of the different degrees to which the various elements in a man's character draw upon the sum-total of his vitality. People, of course, differ immensely in the quantity of their vitality; but however wide the range of variation may be, it has with everyone a limit that cannot be surpassed; and it follows that, the greater the drain upon their vitality due to one set of occupations, the less vitality will there remain for other occupations. But I will unfold this theory in the concrete.

Athletes are not as a rule scholars. If their vital energy flows to the muscles and to the body as a whole, there is so much the less available for the brain. I do not mean to deny that physical and mental pre-eminence may not co-exist: for there are some people of remarkable vitality who, when placed in a favourable *milieu*, may develop great power both of body and brain. Let me say once for all that the manifestations of human character are not governed by any few or simple principles, but by a large number of complex laws, each of which contributes to the resultant behaviour. All I am trying to do now is to state one of the most fundamental of these laws and to trace its effects in human conduct. In consequence of the numerous other intercurrent principles, there will always be many individual cases to which the fundamental principle does not seem to apply; but it suffices for the main induction that it should be found good when men are considered *en masse*: then the minor principles, so evident in single individuals, become eliminated and no longer obscure the result. There is then a general opposition between the muscular power of the athlete and the cerebral power of the scholar: the former boisterous, energetic, and healthy in colour, owing to the good supply of blood to the skin; the other shy in society, of inert

temperament and inclined to be pallid in skin-colour; which is by no means a sign of anæmia, but merely of a drain upon the blood-supply by the nervous system. If we could visualize the brains of the two, it would no doubt be that of the athlete which seemed anæmic.

This contrast between bodily and mental vitality is paralleled by an exactly similar contrast between the various departments of the mind. A man of very powerful intellect is *cæteris paribus* a man of low emotional endowments and low will-power. The contrast between intellect and will has often been noted by many observers. Shakespeare speaks of the "native hue of resolution sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought"; but, like every other ethological law, it is subject to numerous exceptions. Sir William Hamilton and James Mill were immensely active men; and so to a lesser degree was the younger Mill. A far clearer contrast exists between emotional and volitional power; and I shall now speak more immediately of the emotions.

There is, first, a massive contrast between the higher and the lower emotions which are called sensual; and, to begin at the beginning, there is the same contrast between the various types of sensuality. In general, there is an opposition between the sensuality of food and drink and the sensuality of sex: though here again, a man of strong vitality quite abandoned to sensualism may exhibit all shades to an exaggerated degree. But as a rule the drunkard is not the *coureur de femmes*: the connoisseur of food and drink is not the slave of sex; the pleasures of the stomach are in opposition to the other organic pleasures. The natural evolution of what the Germans call a *Lebemann* is from sexual sensuality to stomachic sensuality. As young men, they are seducers: and as the powers fail, their sensuality turns them to gourmands and wine-bibbers. This relation is particularly difficult to unravel, owing to the fact that sensualists in general are not controlled by ideas of morality, but have shaken off those checks which bind more normally constituted persons. They are out for pleasure, wherever and however they can find it; and superficially, therefore, there would appear to be an alliance between two modes of sensuality which are nevertheless in fundamental opposition.

As to the relation between sensuality and intellect, Shakespeare long ago noted the opposition:—

Fat paunches have lean pates, and dainty bits
Make rich the ribs, but bankrupt quite the wits.

It is by no means clear, however, that there is the same opposition between intellect and sexual sensuality. Brown-Séquard definitely recommended sexual hyperexcitation as a means of evoking genius, and his recommendation is, I believe, endorsed by Metchnikoff.

The probability is that the psychical contrast between sexuality and intellect exists; but that in this case the contrast is observed by the intercurrent of other more powerful organic laws, which may perhaps establish a connection between the two. The German psychiatrist Moebius holds that artistic leanings should probably be considered as secondary sexual characteristics. That the higher emotions are in opposition to the lower can admit of no question, although here again there is a new cause for obscurity. For the moral code of most people contains an ascetic element, requiring them to suppress and completely extinguish the lower emotions. The evil organic effects of such a course tell upon the whole nervous system, and produce a state of general *malaise* and dissatisfaction with life, which reacts disastrously upon the capacity for higher emotions. Nevertheless sensuality and falling in love are mutually exclusive. The sensualist cannot love, nor can he experience any of the higher emotions.

But the chief enemy of the emotions is the will: and I here use that word in its technical, not its popular sense. In popular language, a man is said to have a strong will when he has a habit of subordinating his immediate inclinations to more remote considerations. But in that sense, the will is really only one type of emotion. It is a mode of feeling which causes him to lean towards ultimate rather than proximate good. I here use the word will simply as the mental correlate of the process originating muscular activity; and when I affirm that the chief enemy of the emotions is the will, I mean only that muscular activity is the most certain and natural of all methods of dissipating an emotion. Let me turn once more to concrete examples.

The natural expression of pain is by vigorous muscular movement. The movement begins with the small and easily affected muscles of the larynx, which when accompanied by contractions of the chest and diaphragm produce cries. With increasing pain, the cries increase in vigour. At length the other muscles of the body share in the movement, and the whole frame may be contorted with violent muscular contractions. This lasts until the pain begins to paralyze and unconsciousness supervenes. Now these active movements accompanying pain are not fortuitous: they definitely give relief. Before the days of chloroform, surgeons used to encourage their patients to cry out. And it is the case, not only in this crude instance, but with all emotions of every kind, that the emotion tends to be dissipated by the performance of suitable muscular movements. Those emotions remain the deepest which are supported in silence. As Shakespeare says:—

Give sorrow words: the grief that does not speak
Whispers the o'erfraught heart, and bids it break.

Dante, too, wrote the line: "In tears his rage he spent." The same truth is embodied in numerous proverbs and popular sayings in many languages. Such, for instance, is the saying: "Still waters run deep." "Barking dogs don't bite," with its Italian equivalent, *Can che abbaia non morde*: since the emotion of anger is spent and dissipated by the active procedure of barking. Thus also we may notice that whenever a sudden unpleasant emotion is raised in the public mind, there is established a desire to "do something." Since it is often much better to do nothing, this blind effort of emotion to escape is often productive of ill-considered action and great consequent evil.

There is one other important method by which an emotion may be eradicated, and that is by its transformation into some other emotion of equal intensity. For the present purpose, emotions may be regarded as possessing a certain intensity and a certain quality. The quality is that designated by their names—anger, love, fear, etc. The intensity of an emotion is a joint product of the strength of the stimulus and the length of time during which it operates. Now it is in general true, as far as physiology goes, that any emotion can be transformed into any other emotion of equal intensity. Take, for instance, the emotion of love. It may be changed almost in a moment to one of hate, anger, jealousy, or grief of more or less equivalent intensity; it can also be worked off by muscular activity, but it cannot otherwise be annihilated. It is notorious that lovers' quarrels are unusually intense: the intensity of annoyance is equivalent to the intensity of their love. So also jealousy is proportioned to love, and the love which cannot be dissipated may at any moment be altered into jealousy. Grief, again, at the death of the loved one is psychologically the equivalent of the antecedent love. "Where joy most revels, grief doth most lament." We have also here the explanation of the fact that when two persons who are deeply in love are married and one of them dies, the survivor very commonly marries again within the year. By the death, the love of the survivor has undergone a change, not of intensity, but of kind. It has altered into grief: and the individual still remains for a long period the prey of a powerful emotion. The application of a suitable stimulus almost inevitably reconverts that emotion into love: and a failure to arouse new love points rather to the old one having been of low intensity, and quickly evaporated. There may, of course, be a grief so crushing as completely to wreck the nervous system and its power to support emotion, but this is only an example of those numerous intercurrent principles which conceal the operation of that whose effects we desire to trace. Again, when lovers' quarrels are not intense, their love is probably not intense: love may change to hatred, or to fear or to jealousy and back again to love, not less intense than

before. But if it falls to indifference, it will hardly ever recover. If there is no substitute to maintain the state of emotional tension, if a state of emotional quiescence supervenes, there is no longer any material for the rebuilding of the lost emotion; and momentary flashes in the pan are the utmost possible.

Egoism is an emotion which reappears under a great variety of forms, and which is specially interesting to study because it has no tendency to diminish, but, on the contrary, to increase with age. Ambition, vanity, jealousy, are the phases it commonly adopts: and the profound French saying that *La vanité est l'ennemi du bonheur* should be extended to this whole group of emotions, for no selfish man can be a happy man. Jealousy is produced by a coalescence of egoistic emotion with some other, very often love; and the intensity of the jealousy is proportional to the intensity of its component parts. Thus people are more apt to be jealous of the success of those they love than of those to whom they are indifferent; and this is the explanation of the fact that a prophet is least honoured in his own land. If someone else has succeeded in a sphere where we have failed, our jealousy of him is proportional to the amount of emotion with which we previously regarded him. If he was a close friend, it will be far greater than if he was a stranger: or let me say, it may be far greater. For our egoism may be so reduced that no jealousy at all arises: the whole emotion of friendship stands firm and untransformed; or part of it may be transformed to jealousy, leaving the other part still as friendship; or the whole emotion of friendship may be transformed; and in this case the jealousy will exceed anything that is possible in the case of a stranger. What sometimes occurs, in cases where both the egoism and friendship have been deep, is not a fusion between the two to form a definite degree of jealousy, but rapid transformations from one to the other: the jealousy reigning supreme for a period, and then suddenly yielding entirely to the friendship, producing a curiously unstable state of mind; but, throughout, the intensity of the emotion experienced undergoes no change: it only varies in quality.

Is it possible ever to take scientific action for the reduction of a noxious emotion of this kind? I have already pointed out that properly-chosen muscular effort is the best method of draining off an emotion. In the case of jealousy, that muscular effort directed in blows upon your successful friend's body would instantaneously relieve the tension. Fighting a man immediately and for some period relieves one of all hostile feelings with regard to him: and where people are very different in temperament, they may still remain very good friends if they have occasional fights not necessarily with fists but with words, in which they tell each other without restraint in as forcible language as possible exactly what

they think of each other. But if one of them does not retaliate but remains silent under insults, he is a man to be feared: his hostility will be enhanced by the observations of the other; and he may retain a lasting animosity which will escape some day in a torrential manner. In practical life we usually find that jealousy and similar feelings of animosity are worked off by talking scandal about the disliked individual, and generally depreciating him. If the scandal retailed is sufficiently intensive, it may relieve the scandal-monger of all hostile feelings towards his victim and lead to manifestations of friendship. And in general, when a man who bears a grudge against you suddenly becomes civil, it is very apt to be due to his having worked off his hostility by malice behind your back.

While on this subject of maliciousness, it is worth while to note that in the minds of a very large proportion of the luxurious and idle classes there exists a natural fund of malice against the world in general. Their remarks are more frequently of the nature of criticism and hostility to others than of praise of others. This is most especially the case with those who set up for being more moral and virtuous than other people. The malice which is natural to them as to others (and for which no social psychologist will blame them) is exasperated and enhanced by the continuous necessity of maintaining a show of love for others; and produces a fundement of malice which is apt to alienate their friends and relations. I myself take no interest in politics; but I often think that one of the most useful services of politicians is that of furnishing conspicuous public objects of execration, whereby the public can work off their malicious sentiments on these popular scapegoats, and be all the kinder and gentler in their private lives. The popular cry of degeneration is another product of a widespread emotion. Most people, unfortunately, are more or less disappointed in their lives: disappointment produces discontent: and discontent relieves itself by calling the age degenerate. I have in a published article shown that the cry of degeneracy in this country has maintained a pretty level intensity since the 5th century A.D. when Gildas tried to show that the British nation was physically deteriorating: that it is carried on by Shakespeare, Goethe, and nearly all the great writers in recent centuries: so I infer that people's discontent is not very different now from what it has always been.

I have notes of innumerable illustrations of the exchange of one emotion into another, and of their relief by muscular activity, but I have still other things to talk about, and will only select one, namely, the psychological effect of swearing. The occasions on which people swear are when an emotion is unexpectedly aroused and demands equally instant relief: as, for instance, when you

knock your head against a sharp corner. And it is to be noted that it is not a matter of indifference what words are used: swearing gives greater relief if the words used carry heavy emotional significance. A feeling of anger when raised is best allayed by inflicting pain, or by insulting somebody: and the relief is often obtained by depreciating reference to religious personalities, so that swearing comes almost to be synonymous with blaspheming. Undoubtedly it affords a real relief from the emotion.

The question whether an emotion may be transformed into intellection is one which I have studied less. According to Taine, Pascal escaped the pain of his toothache by solving the problem of the cycloid. It has been constantly said that disease may operate very favourably in calling out intellectual powers. Many of the leaders of the French Revolution suffered from complaints which, it has been alleged, lay at the base of their genius. Marat suffered from a skin disease, Robespierre from a liver, Couthon from disfigurement, Napoleon from cancer of the stomach, the effects of which are said to be traceable in his behaviour after 1802. Sterne, Keats, J. A. Symonds, J. S. Mill, Chopin, Rachel, Heine, Leopardi, and R. L. Stevenson were consumptive; Byron was club-footed; gout and stone have affected many of the greatest of English and French writers. Syphilitics include Nietzsche, Guy de Maupassant, Schumann, and possibly Schopenhauer. Epileptics include many great men of action such as Julius Cæsar, Mohammed, and St. Paul: also writers like Flaubert. In general, it seems possible that the only emotions which can very well be drawn upon for intellectual activity, are those which are painful in tone; and not acute but chronic. Melancholia is very commonly associated with genius. Whereas emotion tends to be dissipated by action, and whereas for achievements of every kind a certain driving force of emotion is a first essential, it follows clearly that those who are for ever dissipating their emotions in minor activities, are never likely to carry out any important achievement. Consequently the silent man very commonly is possessed of an unusual fund of power: his emotions remain boxed up without any drain. Thus Dante in his *Inferno* describes the philosophers and sages as

People with eyes grave and slow
In all whose seeming dwelt authority;
Seldom they spoke with voices mild and low.

Shakespeare over and over again observes this truth, and I may give a few citations:—

An oven that is stopped, or river stayed,
Burneth more hotly, swelleth with more rage:
So of concealed sorrow may be said:
Free vent of words love's fire doth assuage.

—(*Venus and Adonis*.)

In "The Two Gentlemen of Verona":

Fire that's closest kept burns most of all.

In "The Merry Wives of Windsor":

We do not act that often jest and laugh
Still swine eat all the draff.

There is also the Latin proverb: *Vir sapit qui pauca loquitur.*

I hope I have given a sufficient number of instances to illustrate my main proposition, which is to the effect that there exists in the human character a sort of correlation of mental forces, more or less analogous to the correlation which exists among physical forces.

I now wish to say a word or two as to the influence of time in the production of an emotion. I have pointed out that the quality of an emotion may be altered but not its intensity. Intensity can only be affected by action: and where, as very often happens, no suitable mode of activity is available, intensity can only alter by the progress of time. In general, an emotion is the more powerful the longer the evoking stimulus has been in operation. For example, light-headed people are very apt to make bosom friends after two or three days' acquaintance, but the emotion has no real intensity and may be dissipated by the least obstacle. Indeed the more intense it appears at first to be, the more certain is it to undergo reaction, for an intense and stable emotion of this kind can only be built up by gradual and slow degrees: "Violent delights have violent ends." The reason, if I may speak very vaguely, is that a stable emotion implies an underlying cerebral structure: and structure being an affair of growth, is consequently an affair of time. An emotion artificially cultivated, and without any real foundation in cerebral structure, is apt to undergo very extreme reactions: those whose education has been the most confined furnish the best material for future libertinism:—

The blood of youth burns not with such excess
As gravity's revolt to wantonness.

This truth applies, not only to individuals, but to societies. The rigid puritanism of the Commonwealth was followed by the riotous libertinism of the court of Charles II. The opposite may also be true. Archenholtz, a German writer on England, has drawn attention to the change which took place in the character of Charles James Fox, with a view to showing that there was a general deterioration in his moral character, when he abandoned the excesses of his youth and gave himself up to politics. I cannot go further into the influence of time on emotions, and conclude only that the stability and probable duration of an emotion is a function of the time which it has taken to develop.

I may say a few words in conclusion on the subject of social therapeutics. The subject has already been dealt with in an interesting manner by Mr. Stanley Bligh; and there are only two points which I wish to mention, as being specially connected with the principles above laid down, and as being very little noticed at the present time. The first is the general advantage of avoiding monotony in every sphere of life. Unstable and rapidly-transforming emotions commonly affect those whose lives are the most monotonous: great mental and emotional stability very commonly goes with a life of varied interests. Let me illustrate this, in the first place, with reference to food. If you invariably feed a dog on one food only, and it has no access to any other food, it dies of starvation. If you feed a child always on the same food, although consisting of exactly the right proportions of protein, carbohydrate, fat and salts, that child quickly pines away. The same truth has latterly been established with regard to ventilation, the fundamental principle of which is not to attain chemical purity (which is said to be a matter of comparative indifference), but to secure constant motion of the air and variety of temperature. The best diet is not attained by constant ingestion of chemically perfect food, any more than the best ventilation is attained by the constant breathing of chemically perfect air: the best is only attained by introducing a large and constant variety, and lapses from perfection are good in so far as the system reacts to them. The desire for uniform perfection has produced a disease in America, of which I only know the French name *bradyphagie*, which comes from eating too slowly, and which is cured by eating fast of substances not too easily digestible.

In short, all kinds of uniformity are deleterious, whether of food, drink, air, habitation, occupation and so on; and this is probably just the one slender basis of truth underlying the various modern hygienic fads. They all invite to a change; and that change, so long as it is only a change, is beneficial. The experience of a novel emotion has similarly a powerfully tonic mental effect. I need only refer to the marked improvement which marriage often works in young women. Zola, in *Lourdes*, mentions the enormous appetites which were displayed by those who came from a state of extreme religious exaltation; and there is no doubt that the evocation of a powerful emotion of religious, sexual, or any other character may possess so immensely invigorating an effect as to cure certain kinds of ailments. The pleasure felt in witnessing a tragedy is doubtless traceable in part to the stimulus of new emotion. The same holds with regard to funerals, which, as is well known, often have a beneficial mental effect on those who attend them. Among the Scotch and Irish, this is so much the case that a funeral is followed by a period of unusual gaiety

and social good spirits. Civilized life differs greatly from savage life in the paucity of material for emotion, for the savage is constantly under the influence of fear, pain, or other disagreeable emotion, which we have to a great extent banished, without substituting any kind of agreeable emotion of equivalent permanency or intensity. The emotional life tends to fall to an unwholesome dead-level of uniformity. The emotions are from another side constantly being sapped by intellectual effort, and it is probable that most of the ills specially associated with civilization are traceable to this cause.

The second therapeutic principle which I have to mention concerns the necessity for mental freedom and avoidance of a multiplicity of restrictions. Emotion is naturally relieved by action; and it is a very unwholesome state of mind in which emotions are permitted to sway backwards and forwards without any natural outlet. William James has indicated this evil in one of his works, and the chief cause is the artificiality and conventions of common life, which limit to a most unreasonable extent the power of the individual to do and say as nature prompts him. His outward life is not an accurate image of his inner emotional life: he is to that extent a liar and a pathological specimen. This demand for increased freedom has been the basis of all the most successful educational systems, those of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Herbert Spencer, Montessori. But unfortunately the doctrine of freedom is confused by most with the doctrine of licence: they cannot understand complete freedom for emotional outlet; since their own environment is so unnatural that their emotions are distorted and false, unable to stand the glare of daylight, and quite unrepresentable in public. There are some who teach that emotions should be suppressed, and seem to imagine naïvely enough that all one has got to do is to take a resolution not to "emote" any more in the various ways considered to be evil. It is scarcely possible to imagine a more ineffective way of trying to eradicate a bad habit of emotion. To suppress its outward manifestations is exactly the way to strengthen it the most, whilst driving it into other channels probably far more dangerous. Give it, on the contrary, free play: weaken its intensity by letting it talk and act so far as may be: get it off the chest: and meanwhile supply the stimulus to the new habit of emotion which you intend shall take its place.

HUGH S. ELLIOT.

THE UNCONSCIOUS REASON IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION.¹

IN the study of the origins of institutions two of the chief current methods may be distinguished as follows:

One explains them as results of the moral feelings of approbation or resentment called forth by acquiescence in, or opposition to, the fluid elements of the institution in question. Thus, the institution of property may be explained as a formulation of social feelings concerned with inchoate ideas of property. But this is to place an effect in the position of a cause. What we wish to discover is the process by which the institution was established and the nature of its elements. The method is a new variety of the old hypothesis that the fundamental institutions of mankind were the creation of the religious instinct.

Another method explains them as results of the conscious deliberations of primitive men in committee. There are some institutions, or certain fundamental principles of institutions, for which profound thinkers confess themselves unable to imagine any other solution. Such a one is the rule of exogamy, of marrying outside the family. This method of explaining the origin of institutions is a revival of the hypothesis of the Social Contract. Men, dissatisfied with "the state of nature," met together and deliberated. The result was the institution of government, of the State, the individual surrendering certain natural rights in order to live secure from other individuals' exercise of their natural rights. The theorists of the Social Contract might have applied their method to other institutions besides that of the State. They might have convened primitive men, dissatisfied with the health and physique of the race, and made them pass the law of exogamy, forbidding all promiscuity and in-breeding with their disastrous effects, and establishing the marriage and family system. And such an explanation is a typical case of the modern application of the method. If this explanation were correct we should have to admit that "there were giants in those days," for modern legislation, with all the traditions and resources of civilization to help it, cannot establish anything with a fraction of the permanence and stability which distinguish the acts of the primal parliament. The method in its modern form may admit the progressive creation of an institution by means of a series of legislative acts. But its essence is that institutions were deliberately considered,

1. Substance of a paper read before the Sociological Society, April 22, 1913.

discussed, and established—in the same way, for instance, as was the Constitution of the United States.

It makes one proviso, *viz.*, that although primitive men, like the savages of to-day, were as logical as we are, yet their premisses were often fanciful, irrational, or absurd. This proviso is important. The life of uncivilized societies is welded together by innumerable minor institutions, if we may so describe all habits and conventions which have a social meaning. And it is quite legitimate to argue by analogy from the minor to the major institutions. Now the former are explained by savages themselves as being due to this or that fanciful cause. The reasons given vary with the race, the tribe, and the individual. If granted, they each logically result in the fact to be explained, and the temptation arises in the mind of the sociologist to apply a similar process to the origin of the major institutions, for which also he finds many fanciful reasons suggested, directly or indirectly, by the savage philosopher. For instance, many savages explain the methodical scrupulousness of their domestic sanitation as being due to a fear of sorcerers, who, should they come into possession of any refuse, can injure the late owner by magical treatment of it. Hence the sociologist might infer that the moral institutions of decency, hygiene, and sanitation were originated, in the first instance, by the fear of witchcraft. Many races, again, practise the custom of lacerating and cutting their flesh when mourning for the dead. The idea which apparently explains this is that the blood serves as nutriment for the departed. Burial customs often show a desire to cripple or delude the dead, and so prevent him from finding the way back. The dead man is buried not in the hope of a glorious resurrection, but in the sure and certain belief that a gravestone is heavy enough to keep him down. From these suggestions the whole system of funeral rites and mourning ceremonies might be explained as due partly to sympathy with and partly to fear of the ghost. Again, since dramatic mummeries are often played after funerals, by way of pleasing the dead, and sham fights are performed by way of making him believe that his death (by sorcery) has been duly avenged by the kin, one might derive from the one fanciful reason the whole of the world's dramatic art, and from the other the whole of the world's athletic sports and games. At certain ceremonies held to celebrate the coming-of-age of youths and maidens, a drama is performed in which the candidates die and rise again. Hence all confirmation ceremonies might be regarded as based on the idea that a special supernatural danger threatens the novice, and that by pretending to die and to be born again and born different, he may escape it. The sanction of many tabus is the fear of the ghost who informs the tabu, who is called upon or actually put into the notice set up by the man who imposes the tabu. Hence it might be

supposed that all law is the result of the fear of ghostly enemies. Again, certain savage tribes regard their kings as a magical centre of force, whose behaviour and condition influence at every moment the progress of the crops and the state of trade. Hence the institution of monarchy may be traced to the magical personality of the primitive medicine-man. Instances might be multiplied indefinitely.

On the other hand, some writers have suggested the application to social history of physical or biological conceptions, not as explanations of the actual process of origin in this or that case, but as broad estimates of net results. Thus Sir George Darwin wrote:

"In the world of life the naturalist describes those forms which persist, as species; similarly the physicist speaks of stable configurations or modes of motion of matter; and the politician speaks of states. The idea at the base of all these conceptions is that of stability, or the power of resisting disintegration. The degree, in other words, of persistence or permanence of a species, of a configuration of matter, or of a State, depends on the perfection of its adaptation to its surrounding conditions. . . ."

A government-type possesses a certain degree of stability—to resist disintegrating influences such as may arise from wars, famines, and internal dissensions. This stability gradually rises to a maximum and gradually declines. The degree of stability at any epoch will depend on the fitness of some leading feature of the government to suit the slowly altering circumstances. A time arrives when the stability vanishes; there will then be some circumstance, apparently quite insignificant and almost unnoticed, which is such as to prevent the occurrence of anarchy. It starts the government on a new career of stability by imparting to it a new type.

Now a broad view of the origin of an institution might equally well be given by such physical analogies as are here used to describe its permanence and changes. Herbert Spencer has something of the kind when he speaks of society as a super-organic aggregate, whose units settle into place in a manner similar to the formation of a geological stratum or the settling of a cartload of bricks. Weismann speaks of adaptation in the organism, and of adaptation of the organism to its outer environment:—

"In the organism not only is every gland structurally adapted, down to the very minutest histological details, to its function, but the function is equally minutely adapted to the needs of the body. Every cell in the mucous lining of the intestine is exactly regulated in its relation to the different nutritive substances, and behaves in quite a different way towards the fats and towards nitrogenous substances or peptones. . . . The whole organism is made up of adaptations. In the same way the organism as a whole is adapted to the conditions of its life, and it is so at every stage of its evolution."

This analogy might be suitably applied to the structure of social institutions and of society in general; but it only gives a view of the *facts* of solidarity and co-operation; it does not explain how the units came to be fitted together. Stability and adaptation explain no origin, but they express very clearly the character of man's oldest social forms. The nearer we approach the primal stages of society the more clear-cut and the more firmly based are man's institutional structures; above all, the more *rational* do they appear to be in intention in results.

How are we to explain the origin of this rational and purposive framework of society: the origin of the primal law of exogamy, of tabus and penalties, of the family, the clan, the tribe and the nation; of division of labour, co-operation, barter, the monetary system, and so forth? The view that conscious reflection and discussion led to them is plainly absurd when applied to such an institution as the family. We cannot suppose that men consciously and deliberately invented it. The family is only to be explained as a mechanical result of physiological needs, and is an exact social parallel to any individual unconscious reaction, such as eating when hungry.

The explanation therefore which I submit, is that man's social institutions were built up, like those of ants, bees, and wasps, by reason or intelligence (or whatever it is to be styled) but not by *conscious* reason. It seems that, apart from the question of degree of mental refinement, the chief difference between the higher intelligence of man and the primates and the lower intelligences, is the possession of consciousness, whatever consciousness may be. High authorities regard the ant as an unconscious automaton: everything it does is purposive and rational, but it is not conscious. The wonderful social system of the ant must be equally a result of unconscious intelligence, the individual intelligences being forced by the interaction between each other and between the environment and themselves (as individuals and in the mass) to work together in a particular way.

There is, of course, no difference, except in the matter of consciousness and reflection, between the working of a man's brain and neuro-muscular system, and that of an ant's. It has been the tendency recently to trace purpose and intelligence right through organic life including the vegetable kingdom. But in the lower stages of mind purpose is not conscious, intelligence is not conscious. If acid is placed on the right flank of a frog whose brain has been removed, the frog rubs it off with its right foot. If the right leg is now cut off, the frog uses its left foot to get rid of the acid. This is choice, but it is not conscious choice, any more than it is conscious purpose. Man is the reasoning creature *par excellence*; but nine-tenths of the work of his mind is below

the threshold of consciousness; intuition is unconscious reasoning; impulsive action is unconscious response to stimulus. We know little of the vast multiplicity of mental operations that are in simultaneous interaction; only a fraction falls within our ken. Similarly we are unconscious of the work of the billions of cells which compose our body. They, like the nerves and muscles, form a vast social organism as truly a society as is any super-organic organism.

Again, the less conscious we are of the subject of intelligence or reasoning the more perfect is the result. The centipede in the story, reflecting on the order in which its feet were moving, found itself unable to walk. Consciousness inhibits a multitude of reactions, just as reflection and deliberation inhibit instincts. Here we have the difference between faith and reasonable opinion; they are the same product of one reason, but faith is more or less unconscious. The view that the great primal institutions were built up unconsciously is corroborated by the fact that the further back we trace social evolution the more unhesitatingly rigid is the structure of society. The average wild man of to-day makes a good answer to inquiries into origins by saying, "It was the custom of our fathers." He is more nearly right than those philosophers, savage and civilized, who explain them as deliberate inventions prompted by some irrational superstition. After the event, when men become conscious of the social world in which they live, they begin to speculate on its meaning, purpose, and origin, and naturally make wild guesses, consonant with the degree of knowledge attained.

Once for all we ought to get rid of the hypothesis that the social institutions of man were the result of irrational superstitions. They can only have developed from the inevitable interaction of units, with their identity and difference. In its main features the process was an adaptation of means to ends as mechanically logical (in a word, rational) as the biological adaptations in the individual, and the sequence of psychical reactions engineering the structure was as purposive and as unconscious as the chain instincts in the lowest animals and as the chain series of vegetable processes. It is impossible any longer to urge the metaphysical fallacy that rational sequences involve consciousness, or the sentimental fallacy that they are in any way more remarkable than the formation of chemical compounds. There is more trial and error about them, that is all. Such is no defect; it is the highest form of plastic adaptiveness. The same reasoning applies to the origin of primal inventions, such as the house, the boat, the hammer, and the bow—accident here, as there, always having its influence, but this also being controlled by law.

Two, among many other influences, may be noted—convergence

and imitation. Possibly mere physical similarity has had as much to do with making one language like another as has actual racial identity or borrowing. The notion of a hypothetical mother-tongue for the "Aryan" nations is no longer tenable. If two races widely separated have developed, by reason of their human identity, the same institutions, why should not such races develop similar tongues?

Imitation in children, as in certain animals, is a motor reaction of great significance. It has had a great work to do in moulding institutions and in perpetuating their form. One phase of it is ceremony, which is the language of institutions. A parallel phase is magic: imitating a phenomenon is as natural a psychical reaction as is talking about it. Here is the germ of magic and of ceremony alike. It follows that whatever social structure exists at a particular time and in particular conditions is inevitable, and therefore suited to the social needs which created it. How far, in the future, we are likely to succeed with conscious formation of institutions is an interesting question; but, just as in unconscious social evolution, so in this, the needs of the interacting units are the only stimulus for social reactions.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

MARGARET NOBLE (SISTER NIVEDITA).¹

It is now nearly ten years since there was published, under the title of *The Web of Indian Life*, a book which immediately found its appropriate public. In England and America it was recognised as belonging to that newer and finer type of interpretation as applied to the East of which our time has produced some noteworthy examples; in India it was welcomed as almost the first attempt on the part of an English writer to present the ethical and social ideals embodied in the Indian woman and family. Many among the readers of the book were aware that its author stood in a unique relation to the Indian people: that she had identified herself without reserve with their life and been dedicated wholly to their service; while not a few were assured that she was destined to carry forward the task thus brilliantly begun of revealing the inner side of Eastern society to the West. But this was not to be. Not quite two years ago she died, with her work in India, as it seemed to those who knew her best and had most reason to hope greatly, hardly more than envisaged and planned.

Margaret Noble, known for some twelve years to multitudes of people throughout India as Sister Nivedita, was of Irish parentage and birth, and was born at Dungannon, Co. Tyrone, in 1867. Very soon afterwards her father, Samuel Richmond Noble, entered the Lancashire Independent College, in preparation for the Congregational ministry, but did not live to fulfil his early promise. Margaret, his elder daughter, passed from school in the North of England to a teacher's training, and was fortunate enough to become acquainted in London with some of the most enthusiastic apostles of the New Education. Her practical experience was gained as teacher in various girls' schools, and more especially in association with a Dutch lady who had established in a suburb of South London a school of a thoroughly modern type. In 1892, being then in her twenty-fifth year, she opened at Wimbledon a school of her own in which she strove to give expression to the broad and fine conception of girls' education with which then and afterwards she was identified. At Wimbledon, too, she was the centre of a group of friends, eager inquirers into everything, given to the discussion of books, ethics, and society with the confident energy of youth, and beginning in several direc-

1. This brief account of a late valued member of the Sociological Society and her work appears as a memorial introduction to "Studies from an Eastern Home," a volume of Sister Nivedita's collected essays and sketches now being issued. It is reproduced here by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co.

tions social work which has since borne varied fruit. Always, however, with Margaret Noble, intellectual inquiry was immediately related to what she regarded as her proper work—education; and she was one of the most active of those, mostly, like herself, concerned with the newer applications of educational theory, who, twenty years or so ago, founded the Sesame Club, the earliest in this country of those social centres for men and women which have since so largely multiplied.

Busy with her school and kindred schemes, abounding in life, a keen reader and thinker, with a continually widening circle of friends—such she was in 1895, when there came into her life the influence which in a few months altered its whole current and purpose.

It was, as she has recorded in *The Master as I Saw Him*, at a drawing-room meeting in November of the year just mentioned that Margaret Noble for the first time met the Swami Vivekananda, who was recognised by many as a challenging figure in the London of that time. He had appeared before the Parliament of Religions, held during the Chicago Exhibition of 1893, as the first of the modern missionaries of Hinduism to the Western world. He was unknown and had come unheralded; but his discourse—the one incident of that curious assembly that is remembered to-day—was epoch-marking. From it must be dated the widespread interest in Indian thought and religion, and especially in the philosophy of Vedanta, which has been so unmistakable a feature of educated America during the past two decades.

You will hear from those who came within the scope of this masterful teacher's influence many differing estimates of the effect created by his personality and speech. Before leaving India, he had been known as the specially chosen disciple of Ramakrishna Paramahansa, the Bengali saint who had lived in a temple-garden at Dakshineswar, on the river a few miles above Calcutta, and whose life and sayings were made known to European readers through one of Max Müller's later books. To Sister Nivedita herself the life lived by Ramakrishna and extended and interpreted by his chief follower summed up the Hindu consciousness, and stood for the final proof of "the entire sufficiency of any single creed or conception to lead the soul to God as its true goal."

"Henceforth," she wrote, "it is not true that each form of life or worship is tolerated or understood by the Hindu mind: each form is justified, welcomed, set up for its passionate loving, for evermore. Henceforth, the supreme crime for any follower of any Indian sect, whether orthodox or modern, philosophic or popular, shall be the criticism of any other, as if it were without the bounds of the Eternal Faith."

But Ramakrishna was a pure devotee: his concern was simply the realisation in the individual of the Divine. Vivekananda was

a man of action. Not only did he carry westward the message of Vedantism, but he had dreams of a renewal of the life of India through the infusion of fresh knowledge and renascent ideals. He stood entirely aloof from politics: yet it is hardly surprising that his younger followers should have acclaimed him as something more than a teacher of Vedantism—as, in truth, the prophet of New India in a sense which, it seems quite certain, he never for a moment intended.

The Swami left America for England in August 1895, and a few weeks later he had begun lecturing in London. Miss Noble had few opportunities of hearing him before his return to America during the winter, but in the spring of 1896 he was back in London, and was holding a class in the house of an English friend in St. George's Road, near Victoria Station. There she was a constant and for a time a hostile and contentious hearer. Always passionately religious, she had in her girlhood become a member of the Anglican Church and was deeply responsive to its ritual and sentiment. But the doctrines of orthodoxy had long since ceased to hold her intelligence; and at twenty-eight, in the full tide of her manifold intellectual interests, she was, it may be supposed, as completely detached from the religious beliefs of her childhood as from the occult ideas by which at that time some among her friends were impressed. The message of Swami Vivekananda went to the mark, little as she recognised this at the time. She disputed his assertions, fought him in the discussion class, provided indeed the strongest antagonism which he had to meet at any of his London gatherings. But it is clear that from the first his influence was winning. About his teaching there was nothing that could be associated with any sect or special doctrine. Although himself obeying the impulse and fulfilling the purpose of his master Ramakrishna, he dealt always impersonally with the body of truth common to all religions, and dwelt upon the necessity, especially in the present stage of the world's history, for the exchange of ideals between peoples, and especially between East and West. He was, too, much more than a preacher. While glorifying the Indian past and the ancient contribution of his people to the intellectual wealth of the world, he was a man of modern outlook, incessantly framing concrete schemes for the social regeneration of India. He was bent upon the firm establishment of the Order of Ramakrishna, of which he was the head—an order which he designed not for contemplation alone, but for social service; he would, if he could, have commanded vast resources for educational enterprise; and he was resolved to initiate some definite agency for the education of Indian women. This last was the part of his programme which, from an early stage of their acquaintance, Swami Vivekananda seems to have marked out as the special work

of Margaret Noble; and before he left England, at the end of 1896, she had come to recognise the call. A year later she sailed for India, landed at Calcutta in the beginning of 1898, and made her home with some American friends at Belur, on the river a short distance from the city, where was established the headquarters of the Ramakrishna Mission. Soon after her arrival in Bengal she was admitted to the Order by the name of Nivedita (the Dedicated)—thereafter the name by which she was known, far beyond the bounds of her personal activity.

From May to October of her first year in India the Swami, Sister Nivedita, and three other Western women travelled together in the North-West, in Kumaon and Kashmir. The tour, which included a pilgrimage to the famous shrine of Amarnath, was rich in experience, afterwards recorded in *The Master as I Saw Him*. It gave her, as she said in that book, glimpses of "a great religious life of the ancient order, living itself out amidst the full and torturing consciousness of all the anomalies and perplexities of the modern transition." These fruitful journeyings ended in the autumn of 1898, and then it was that Sister Nivedita endeavoured to carry out her project for an Indian school in the Hindu quarter of Calcutta. For reasons which everyone who knows a little of the world of orthodox Hinduism will appreciate, the experiment was attended with much difficulty, and in the course of a few months it was abandoned in order that new means and opportunities might be found. In June 1899, accompanied by Vivekananda, Sister Nivedita left Calcutta for Europe, and during the autumn they were fellow-guests in the house of some invaluable American friends on the Hudson River. The Swami returned to India at the close of 1900. This period of a year and a half furnished Sister Nivedita with most of the opportunities of companionship and discussion which gave her the special point of view which for the rest of her life marked her interpretation of Indian life and thought. She remained in England until the beginning of 1902, when she resumed her work in Calcutta under conditions much more favourable to success than those which had accompanied its beginning. But the personal association from which it had sprung was then almost at an end. Swami Vivekananda died at Belur on July 4, 1902. A few months afterwards Sister Nivedita was joined by an American colleague, Miss Christine Greenstidel, and together they entered upon the work of enlarging the scope of the school in Bose Para Lane, Bagh Bazar. In the early part of the year 1905 a dangerous illness befel Sister Nivedita, and this was followed, in the autumn of 1906, by a long spell of malarial fever, the result of the visit of inquiry and service, described in this volume, which she paid during the rainy season of that year to Eastern Bengal, where the people were suffer-

ing miserably from famine and flood. The terrible strain of these two illnesses broke down her magnificent constitution, and physically she was never the same again. The last three years of her life were largely spent in England and America. She returned finally to India in the spring of 1911, and was staying for the customary autumn holiday at Darjeeling when, on October 13, she died—a fortnight before the close of her forty-fourth year. Indian friends only, and those the most devoted, were with her at the last; and the body was given to the fire with the Hindu rites of which she had so often spoken and written.

When people asked, as they constantly did, what Sister Nivedita was doing in India, her own answer was always simple. She was a teacher, and in India she was doing nothing else than applying the principles which she had learned from her own instructors in Europe. The Swami Vivekananda's practical aims had been predominantly educational, and his English disciple went to India primarily under the belief that her own part in the far-reaching work to which he had set his hand was to make a school, in an Indian home, where the methods and ideals of the modern educationist might be brought within the cloistral domain of the Eastern wife and mother. Beginning as a tiny kindergarten, the school grew steadily until it had a large attendance of little Hindu girls up to the marriageable age, and a still larger number of married women and widows. As conducted by Sister Nivedita and her colleague, the school involved no uprooting from familiar surroundings. Neither child nor woman was taken from her home into a foreign world; her schooling demanded only a daily migration from one home to another in the same lane or ward. The principle was, as Sister Nivedita herself expressed it, by means of familiar factors of her daily life so to educate the Indian girl as to enable her to realise those ends which are themselves integral aspirations of that life. There was no attempt to convert her to any religious or social system alien from her own; but rather, by means of her own customs and traditions, to develop her in harmony with Indian ideals, the teachers themselves following those ideals as far as they could be made practicable. It appeared to some that Sister Nivedita, alike in her school and in the *zenana*, was in certain respects a reactionary influence—upholding the *purdah* and child marriage and perpetual widowhood as institutions essential to the preservation of the society which she had learned to admire. But she was far indeed from seeking to maintain the old unchanged. "Under the old scheme," she said, "women found not only a discipline but a career"; yet she saw that this old scheme was a preparation and an opportunity fitted only to the soil in which it grew. To the Indian as to the European woman the modern

revolution has brought a narrowing of her lot, and has wrought havoc with the traditional skill in handicraft. "To-day every Indian woman can cook, and that well. But she cannot sew, and she has nothing but gossip and prayer, when the afternoon siesta is over, wherewith to occupy her leisure." Hence Sister Nivedita and her colleague found it necessary to teach the wives and widows needle-work of various kinds. But it may well be that they themselves learned more of the irresistible movement of the modern spirit in the orthodox world of Hinduism, when they found themselves met by an insistent demand from the young wives to be taught English so that they might become in some real sense the companions of their husbands.

The success that attended the Vivekananda school in Bagh Bazar was not of the resounding kind; but it was a most noteworthy sign of the times; and in the later years of Sister Nivedita's life it was prevented only by the narrow means possessed by the Sisters from developing into a great institution. Its influence, however, could never have been measured by the number of its pupils or the amount of regular teaching done within the modest rooms and courts which are described in the opening chapters of this book. How long it took Sister Nivedita to conquer the suspicions of the quiet, proud, and intensely self-respecting people of Bagh Bazar I have no means of knowing: I can speak only of what I saw when, some two or three years after she had made her home among them, I had opportunities of observing her among the surroundings into which she fitted so perfectly. She was then entirely accepted by her Hindu neighbours. All their doors were open to her. In the bazaars and lanes and by the riverside everybody knew her, and she would be saluted as she passed with an affectionate reverence which was beautiful and touching to see. The House of the Sisters was known of all; not as a school merely, but as a centre of unfailing friendliness and succour. The people remembered how, when the plague broke out among them, Sister Nivedita had joined with the brethren of the Order of Ramakrishna in a crusade of nursing and sanative cleansing. And in times when there was no spectacular call of pestilence or flood there went out from her little house a constant stream of social and personal service—for which, as Sister Nivedita always maintained, there was an ever-increasing call under the economic pressure upon the class which, with its more or less of English education, was rendering clerical and professional service to the ruling power.

Beginning thus, with the conviction that the European can work fruitfully in India only upon the basis of perfect co-operation with the children of the soil, Sister Nivedita was led to make the great renunciation. The land to whose service she had devoted herself made an overwhelming appeal to her—its history and thought, its

people and their life, its present state in subjection and social transition. There could be no partial surrender with her: she gave herself utterly. Accepting the lot of the Indian woman, living as her neighbours lived, in the little native house severely devoid of all inessentials, she worked among them in all seasons—when the splendid cold weather of Bengal gave place to the terrific heat, and this in turn to the rains which every year turned the narrow streets of the quarter into rivulets. "Never have I known such complete self-effacement," wrote her closest Indian woman friend:

"All the rare gifts that opened out a great career for her in the West she laid at the service of our motherland. . . . She had so completely identified herself with us that I never heard her use phrases like 'Indian need' or 'Indian women': it was always 'our need,' 'our women.' She was never as an outsider who came to help, but one of us who was striving and groping about to find salvation."¹

It needs not to be said that this was the secret of her extraordinary power. India instinctively understands every form of renunciation, and it would, I conceive, be impossible to exaggerate the impression made by this life of absolute sincerity and self-dedication, with its rejoicing acceptance of the austerity and simplicity of the old Indian order. But this, of course, was not all. No one who knows the India of the past decade will need to be told that the influence of her ideal and example went out from the little house in Bagh Bazar in ever-widening circles as the years went on. Sister Nivedita was the most fervent and convinced of Nationalists: the word continually on her lips was Nationality. She had unbounded faith in the reserve power of the Indian people, and her call to the younger generation was a ringing challenge to them to rise, not only to the height of the past, but to the demand of the future. Unsparing at times in criticism of the Indian character, she never bated a jot of her belief in the certainty of its triumph, and it went hard with anyone, European or Asiatic, who offered any kind of insult or disparagement to the people of her adoption. The beginning of her work in India coincided with a stage of extraordinary deadness in public and intellectual life. But the change was already on the way, and she had the joy of seeing the growth of a new spirit, the rapid formation of new ideals, the dawn, as she believed, of a renascent national life and power. The influences that have gone to the shaping of the New India are still obscure; but this may be said with complete assurance, that among them all there has been no single factor that has surpassed, or equalled, the character and life and words of Margaret Noble.

There were no rules of exclusion in the House of the Sisters, provided only that the privileged male visitor did not intrude

1. Mrs. J. C. Bose, in the *Modern Review* (Calcutta), November 1911.

during the hours given up to the orthodox Hindu ladies who came for tuition in needlework and English. And to one engaged throughout the week in the merciless daily labour that generally falls upon the Englishman in India, the Sundays in Bose Para Lane were a refreshment and a stimulus, the memory of which is never likely to pass away. Breakfast was served with the extreme of simplicity on the little verandah, and the group would not break up until long after the morning sun had become too hot for a comfortable journey back through the blazing streets. Her house was a wonderful rendezvous. Not often did one meet a Western visitor, save at those times when an English or American friend would be making a stay in Calcutta; but nowhere else, so far as my experience went, was there an opportunity of making acquaintance with so many interesting types of the Indian world. There would come members of Council and leaders in the public affairs of Bengal; Indian artists, men of letters, men of science; orators, teachers, journalists, students; frequently a travelled member of the Order of Ramakrishna, occasionally a wandering scholar, not seldom a public man or leader of religion from a far province. The experience was beyond expression delightful, and its influence you knew was to be felt among many lives.

There was a time, in the years which followed her return from the first of her long visits to the West, when it seemed likely that Sister Nivedita would develop into a regular and constant speaker. She gave frequent addresses, and not in Calcutta alone. In the autumn of 1902 she made a tour in Western India, where she lectured to large audiences. This was succeeded by a similar tour in the Madras Presidency during the same winter, and when at home she was constantly in request as a speaker at meetings large and small. Latterly, however, she showed a disposition to confine her activities to writing and to direct contact with those who were making towards the New India of which she dreamed. Many of her friends approved this change of plan; but it has always seemed to me that public speech gave her the opportunity most adapted to the delivery of her message. She varied greatly, it is true, on the platform. Always rather at the mercy of a too difficult thesis, given to the use of socio-philosophic terms, and following a too compressed method of exposition, she not infrequently soared beyond the comprehension of her audience. She spoke least successfully when under the strain of an important occasion; most brilliantly when responding to the immediate stimulus of a challenge in debate or of a suggestion or incident arising naturally in the meeting. One thinks of her at her best (and how often she was so!) addressing some crowded gathering in the years before her health was broken and before there came upon her that sense of "the petty done, the undone vast," in which latterly she seemed to

abide. And from a score or so of occasions, differing greatly in circumstances, I recall especially two as showing her in most characteristic fashion.

The first was during the rainy season of 1902, when she cut short a Sunday evening call at Bagh Bazar by saying that she was due at a lecture. She allowed me to accompany her, and we went to a Bengali school in the University quarter. The quadrangle was densely crowded with youths and men, and on a dais was seated, alongside the symbolic *tulsi* plant, a *Kathak* (one of the last survivals of the ancient minstrels), who as we entered began a recital from the Ramayana. For an hour or so he continued, declaiming and intoning, while his hearers listened enrapt and a friendly interpreter explained to me, the one outsider present, the movement of the story. When the recital was finished Sister Nivedita rose to speak, without any preliminary (she always disliked the intrusion of a chairman). She spoke, as always, from the feeling of the moment as regards the expression, from long reflection and conviction as regards the substance. And she began with a reference to the recital to which they had just been listening, pointing her moral swiftly and powerfully. Did they, she asked, think it was enough to learn and admire the ancient stories and to glory in the ideals which had inspired the men and women of early India? "Believe me, that is nothing. The Ramayana is not something that came once for all, from a society that is dead and gone; it is something springing ever from the living heart of a people. Our word to the young Indian to-day is: Make your own Ramayana, not in written stories, but in service and achievement for the motherland."

The other occasion, a year or two later, was one in which, at the first glance, she seemed extraordinarily "out of the picture." The hall of the Dalhousie Institute, Calcutta, was filled with a mixed audience, mostly Indian, for as odd a purpose as could well be imagined in that country—to hear a debate on Marriage *versus* Celibacy. The discussion had been arranged, as an anniversary treat, by the committee of a Bengali public library, and the last of the Military Members of the Viceroy's Council (Sir Edmond Elles) was in the chair. The case for celibacy was stated by the late Sir Edward Law, the Finance Minister; the case for marriage by an elderly Parsee member of the Indian Civil Service. Both openers gave play to the easy facetiousness which is commonly deemed appropriate to the public discussion of this and kindred subjects, and the meeting had reached a low ebb when, towards the end, Sir Edmond Elles called upon Sister Nivedita, who was seated on the platform with an English woman friend. She began slowly, with a courteous half-humorous rebuke to the chairman, and then in a few pointed and searching sentences outlined the conception of

wifehood as revealed in Eastern tradition. Developing this, and incidentally crushing some criticism by a previous speaker of the Western woman who makes a career for herself outside marriage, she gave a brilliant little exposition of the contrasted and complementary views of the place of woman as mother and as individual. It was marvellously skilful, complete, and convincing, and the whole thing occupied a bare ten minutes. But what interested one even more than the perfection of the speech was the way in which the tone of the meeting was transformed by the touchstone of her dominating spirit. Many times, before and after that, I heard her speak: to groups of students, or in the Calcutta Town Hall, before a great audience, on her one absorbing theme—the religion of Nationalism; to English gatherings in hall or church, or drawing-room. And I have thought, and still think, that her gift of speech was something which, when fully exercised, I have never known surpassed—so fine and sure was it in form, so deeply impassioned, of such flashing and undaunted sincerity.

It cannot, perhaps, be said that any of her books fully represent the strength and range of her mind, notwithstanding the fine literary faculty which was undoubtedly hers. As with her speaking so with her writing: it was most effective when it came out in attack or controversy. There are things buried in Indian newspapers and magazines which revealed an extraordinary power of direct and resonant expression, and a grip of argument and affairs which she would not have blamed one for praising as masculine. And yet her books, though so much less wonderful than herself, are surely destined for a larger public than they have yet reached. *Kali the Mother*, the little volume in which she gave the first fruits of her Indian studies under Vivekananda, showed something of her interpretative faculty, although its title and sentiment were startling to those English readers who knew only the ordinary European view of the "bloody goddess." Into *The Web of Indian Life* she put, as her friends knew, all the force of her mind and all the intensity of her faith. The result was moving and powerful if unequal: it gave an earnest of what the world might have expected from her had she lived to write the interpretation of Indian domestic life and of the social structure of Hinduism to which undoubtedly she would have devoted herself. Her later books display a steady advance in mastery of expression. In *Cradle Tales of Hinduism* she retold a number of the heroic stories of which she made constant use in her lessons and addresses, and in *The Master as I Saw Him*, the last to be published in her lifetime, she gave a picture of the Swami Vivekananda, as she had come to know him during the seven years of their association. The task of writing the Life of the teacher to whom she owed the purpose and direction of her own activity, she left to other hands.

No effort has been made in the foregoing rough sketch to portray the personality, the rare and splendid and dauntless spirit, that was Margaret Noble. To do this would be to attempt the impossible. So much of the reality as can be conveyed to those who did not know her will be contained in a collection of Letters and Memorials, which, it is hoped, may before long be brought together.

Nothing that she touched remained commonplace; her letters, much more than her books, disclose the genius and temper that were known to her friends and fellow-workers. Her dominant notes were clarity and sincerity and an incomparable vitality. She was of all the men and women one has known the most vividly alive. Having renounced all that most of us hold dearest, she had the right to be earnest and to demand earnestness; but not in the smallest degree did the overmastering purpose of her being remove her from the sphere of personal relations. At all times she toiled with an absolute concentration; her inner life was intense, austere, and deeply controlled. Yet never was anyone more wholly and exquisitely human, more lovely and spontaneous in the sharing of daily services and joys. Professor Geddes has recalled the infinite changefulness of her moods. They ran, in truth, the whole scale: from the fierceness and scorn of which Mr. Nevinson has spoken to a sparkling playfulness that made her, in India as in the West, the life and light of her circle. In matters of personal conduct as in weightier affairs of public or social activity, she was a priceless counsellor: so extraordinary in its rapidity and sureness was her judgment. And those to whom she gave the ennobling gift of her friendship knew her as the most perfect of comrades, while they hold the memory of her gift as this world's highest benediction. They think of her years of sustained and intense endeavour, of her open-eyed and impassioned search for truth, of the courage that never never quailed, the noble, compassionate heart; they think of her tending the victims of famine and plague, or ministering day by day among the humble folk with whom her lot was cast, putting heart into the helpless and defeated, showing to the young and perplexed the star of a glowing faith and purpose, royally spending all the powers of a rich intelligence and an overflowing humanity for all who called upon her in their need. And some among them count it the highest of all honours that they were permitted to share, in however imperfect a measure, the mind and confidence of this radiant child of God.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

A TRIBUTE FROM PROFESSOR GEDDES.

[Professor Geddes has written the following appreciation of Sister Nivedita, a portion only of which, with other tributes, accompanies the collection of "Studies from an Eastern Home."]

Our acquaintance began in New York early in 1900 and continued into intimacy and collaboration during the following summer, at that meeting of the International Association which became the Summer School of the Paris Exhibition of that in many ways memorable year. Actively occupied as a guide to many of its departments, and carrying on a peripatetic interpretation of them upon lines of regional and occupational evolution broadly akin to those of Le Play and his disciples, notably M. Demolins, (which had also been developing through our many Edinburgh summer meetings, with their regional surveys of country and town) I found no one who so rapidly and ardently seized upon these methods and delighted in every application of them. Retreating at times from the intricacies of the great city and its galleries of arts and industries, we would set out to seek for simpler correlations, such, for instance, as unified the admirable simplicity of the Swiss Village. We followed its melting snows and glacier-torrents down to the water-mills they turn, and the song-cycles these inspire; we came on to Swiss watch-making, or to coming electric power, and to the transformations these involve in turn. We looked at limestone peaks, and their high grassy meadows, their summer pasture and cheese, their mountain hospitalities and hotel-keepings, to understand their tourists, so carefully roped and herded, in ways natural to keepers of cattle, to whom these are but the latest variety, most profitable if most troublesome. And so on, even into individual developments of Swiss character and its expressions in history. Returning refreshed to the study of Paris, we carried our readings of simple rural and suburban fairs on into the World's Fair itself, and even into that strangely mingled medley of deteriorated rustic life with ever-renewing synergy of evolving arts, whose action and interaction so much make up the chequered life and history of the great city.

Eager to master these evolutionary methods, and to apply them to her own studies, to Indian problems therefore above all, yet also generously insistent towards my own even then too long deferred publication of examples of them, she settled above our home into an attic cell which suited at once her love of wide and lofty outlooks and her ascetic care of material simplicity; and there she worked, for strenuous weeks, at first on the elaboration of my too informal and colloquial presentments, then at definite essays of joint author-

ship, and towards a projected volume. Within our limits of time, necessarily narrow, we failed to satisfy our own and each other's critical strictness, and to meet standards of science and idealism we had fixed beyond our reach; hence our draft essays remained at various degrees of incompleteness. Yet the sharing of this disappointment gave no shock to our friendship: after all we had learned something together. She has generously recognised, at the opening of *The Web of Indian Life*, how thus coming "to understand a little of Europe indirectly gave me a method by which to interpret my Indian experiences"—while for my part I must no less recognise how her keener vision and more sympathetic and spiritual insight have carried her discernment of the rich and varied embroidery of the Indian web far beyond that simple texture of the underlying canvas, that of the material conditions of life, which it was my privilege, at the outset of our many conversations, to help her to lay hold upon.

Hence, in no spirit of mere personal dogmatism, nor solely in memory of our friendship, as continued after her return to India and to the end, I may recall my own *Letters to an Indian Friend*,¹ urging as a main task for Mr. Tata's project of a Research University for India, for which she had written for my suggestions, the needs and uses of Regional and Civic Surveys. For I submit to her friends and appreciators, in India as here, that they cannot fully appreciate Nivedita's career, still less carry on her constructive aims, without some corresponding grasp of the geographical outlooks and evolutionary methods which she so clearly held, and which indeed she was wont at times to proclaim as only second in their significance and value to the philosophic and the religious synthesis of her adopted order, and as an essential instrument of its social and educational purposes. These two perspectives, let us call them of Le Play and of Ramakrishna, became in her mind closely and vitally related, as fundamental and supreme, alike indispensable to the understanding of the social body and the social mind, their nature and their spirit. Here in fact is one of the main clues to her rare range of sympathy and understanding, at home as she could be either in Paris or in Calcutta, and to her essential life-pilgrimage, from West to East. For her work's sake therefore, let me recall from her own volume its underlying thread (p. 3):—

"The foundation stone of our knowledge of a people must be an understanding of their region. For social structure depends primarily upon labour and labour is necessarily determined by place. Thus we reach the secret of thought and ideals."

1. Communicated by her to the *Pioneer* (Allahabad), and in later form appearing in *East and West* (Bombay).

Or again (p. 7):—

"We see that the Indian organisation of life and of society is coherent and necessary, and that its methods and ideals having sprung directly from the soil, have a stability due to correspondence with their environment which is inconceivable to persons who are themselves content to be favoured members of most favoured nations."

Yet since so many there are, perhaps in East and West alike, who are apt to "despise the flower because its roots are in the earth," let me quote for illustration of her full position, a complementary word from a later writer, a widely divergent one, but who also reaches the altitude of regional survey and interpretation, geographic and historic, cosmic and human, material and spiritual, and this in distinct, yet plainly kindred ways, of travel, of reading, and of converse—Mr. Belloc:

"God forbid that any man should pretend that the material environment of mankind determines the destiny of mankind. . . . But it is true that the soul eagerly seeks for and receives the impressions of the world about it, and will be moved to a different creed or to a different poetry, according as the body perceives the sea or the hills."¹

To recover the sanity and the productiveness of our social life, in West and East alike, must we not therefore faithfully and fearlessly follow up both our objective and our subjective experiences, until they re-unite once more?

The whole personality of Nivedita—her face, her voice, her changing moods and daily life, were ever expressing this alternating reaction of outward environment and inward spirit which go on throughout the individual and social life. She was open at once to the concrete and the abstract, to the scientific and the philosophic, and her many moods were in perpetual interplay, sparkling with keen observation, humorous or poetic interpretation, or opal-like, suffused with mystic light, aflame with moral fire. All came out in her talks, her occasional lectures, each a striking improvisation, now in gentlest persuasiveness leading her audience into sympathetic understanding, even approval of some aspect or feature of Indian life unknown, or perhaps almost repellent, before; or again, bursting into indignant flash and veritable thunder upon our complacent and supercilious British philistinism.

With children she was at once a born teacher and a skilled. She would sit with them upon the floor in the firelight and tell them her "Cradle Tales of Hinduism," with a power and charm even excelling her written version of them, and thus touch this or that ardent

1. "Hills and the Sea," p. 179.

young soul to dream of following her to the utmost East. Or she might give them a literature lesson—say, on Shelley's "Skylark"—and here demand, and arouse, their observation and their imagination in touch with the poet's. This union of sense and symbol, which we too easily let slip apart, was ever with her. Thus of our many memory portraits, none comes back more vividly than of her in autumn twilight, now crooning, now chanting, the *Hymn to Agni* over the glowing, dying embers of a garden-fire. Strange though were the words, we still hear the refrain. It was the tongue, the music, of Orient in Occident, the expression of spirit in nature—a face, a voice, aglow with energy, at peace with Night.

P. GEDDES.

Obituary.

CANON BARNETT.

THE death of Canon Barnett has taken away one of the best known and best loved personalities from the field of social effort. He was known, and will be remembered, in all parts of the world as the initiator and founder of some of the most successful social movements for the improvement of conditions among the neglected classes of society. The Social Settlement is the child of his thought and action; country holidays for poor city children began when he conceived the idea of taking a dozen Whitechapel children with him into Devonshire, three years before he founded the Children's Country Holidays Fund; the people's picture gallery was the outcome of his determination to bring the best of art within the horizon of those whose power to appreciate was becoming atrophied merely because it was starved; councils of social welfare were formed in his brain long before he got the first one to work in Stepney; the Garden Suburb grew up because he and his wife dreamed of fairer dwelling-places for all, and would not let their dream end in anything short of reality. (His wife's dream and work, this; but no one who knew them would ever draw a line of separation between his thoughts and hers.)

Here are only a few of the achievements to which one can point and say with literal truth, "These were his doing." And they serve to illustrate one side of his personality,—that of the doer and reformer, original, determined, and intensely practical. But this is not the side which most reveals the man. It is true that his mind teemed with ideas,—seemingly impossible ideas, often, which he translated into actuality just because he would *not* recognize impossibility where any form of good was concerned. It is true that he achieved very great results, which remain as an heritage of opportunity and an example of good-will for all the world. But far finer than any achievement was the spirit which inspired both thought and action. *Why* did Samuel Barnett work and work and refuse to be discouraged in his attempts to make ideals real? Because he was ambitious? Because he wanted to achieve anything? Far less than most of us, I think. It was simply because he *cared* for people, for human beings, for his fellow members of society. In his attitude, and in the interpretation of his faith, he was the lineal descendant of the Christian Socialists of 1850,—even as Arnold Toynbee was, and, in a sense, the Settlement movement also. It was not an accident that a great part of the aim of

Toynbee Hall was to do just what the Working Men's College had done. The needs which Canon Barnett saw and felt were the needs which F. D. Maurice had seen and felt thirty years before.

And the same spirit was shown in the most marked characteristic of the man,—his intense feeling of brotherhood. He *knew* men and women were of one family with him : this was not a theory, but a simple and obvious fact. And his sympathy with them outran the ordinary limitations. It is interesting to remember that, just as Edward Thring made his school lead the educational world in the teaching and cultivation of music, though he himself was tone-deaf, even so Barnett set himself to bring the beauty of colour in art and nature within the reach of the very poor, though he himself could not even, by their colour, distinguish a penny from a halfpenny stamp. This power of sympathy ran through all he did. He had strong views, strong preferences. But, however much he disagreed, he could and did put himself in line with any other point of view, and feel the good in it, provided there was any good at all. With one thing only was he quite intolerant, and that was cynicism. It was not strange, therefore, that men and women of any age and class went to him for counsel as to an equal comrade. He was their equal comrade, always, however raw and crude and silly they might be. And his very powers of mind helped, and did not hinder, this sympathy. Perhaps the greatest of his powers was that of crystallizing in a phrase the feeling and thought which most of us spend pages to express. He was even called a phrase-maker,—rightly, provided one adds at once that in his case the phrase was only an incident in a long process of feeling, thought, and action. But this power he used most to help the thoughts of others. We went to him in a tangle, hardly knowing what we felt or meant. We came away clear, our decisions focussed by his simple yet profound suggestion.

One other characteristic added both to his power and to his loveliness. He was always young, and met every change of condition, every new combination of circumstances, with the vigour, freshness, and elasticity of youth. He was not afraid, therefore, to be inconsistent. His social and political views were not fixed, except in their moral foundations; he was a progressive as naturally as some people are conservatives. In his early days he was one of the keenest advocates of a strict administration of Poor Law relief, and of a very careful administration of charity. He never abandoned his advocacy of either; he held true to his own saying that "he who only feeds the poor is their greatest enemy." But in later days many of those with whom he had ranged himself in the seventies found him a strenuous opponent in matters of general policy. They went on, logically perhaps, to discourage state provision of pensions for the aged. He did not. They

opposed municipal provision of food for the children. He did not,—though he never ceased to insist that the care of citizen-neighbours must go hand in hand with the State's care, of the municipality's efficient provision,—and go far beyond it. It was perhaps to this elasticity of view, linked to an unchanging idealism, that his writings owed both their charm and their value. All he wrote fitted closely to the changing needs and sentiments of the day; but all he wrote or said added some new depth to the sentiment, and threw the need into a new light.

E. J. U.

DR. LESTER WARD.

Now that Dr. Lester Ward has passed away, one thinks with sorrow of that page in the *Dynamic Sociology* on which he recalls Comte's regrets as to the brevity of human life, and the continual breaks in the progress of the world which it occasions. To no one are the reflections which these complainings called forth more appropriate than to Dr. Ward himself. Of the inhumanities of nature on which he wrote so much, there is none so regrettable as that which condemns great men to spend half a lifetime in getting into the spirit of their work and acquiring the requisite knowledge for it, and then gives them so meagre a time to make use and reap the benefit of their labours. One feels keenly that, great as his achievements were, his seventy-one years were all too short for the researches he had to make and the thoughts he had to express. He kept up his studies and maintained his enthusiasms to the end, although he was far from well during his last session at Brown University, at which he had held the chair of Sociology since 1906. At the close of the classes for the Easter vacation he went to stay with his sister, Mrs. Comstock, in Washington; and there he died after a brief attack of heart trouble. Professor Ward will be missed by no one more than by his students, whom he was ever ready to help and encourage, and with whom he used to take long walks and hold interesting conversations. But he will be missed almost as much by members of the London Sociological Society, by the American Philosophic Society, the Anthropological, Biological, and Geological Societies of Washington, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the Association for the Advancement of Science, the International Geological Congress, the International Institute of Sociology, and a host of other learned societies of which he was a tireless and greatly honoured member.

His career was remarkably distinguished. It began with noble service in the Civil War, in which he sustained injuries that caused him much suffering throughout his life. From the close of the war until he accepted the professorship at Brown University he was in

the Government service, at first as Chief of the Division of Navigation and Immigration in the Treasury Department, and afterwards, successively, as Assistant Geologist, Chief Geologist, and Palæontologist of the United States Geological Survey. In spite of the heavy duties which fell to his share when he was in the Treasury Department, he found time to study at Columbia University and obtain the degrees, one after another, of B.A., LL.B., and M.A. It was in 1897, when his *Dynamic Sociology* and his *Psychic Factors of Civilization* had made his name famous all the world over, that his University conferred the degree of LL.D. on him. These, with the *Pure Sociology*, and the *Applied Sociology*, which followed in 1902 and 1906 respectively, form a cycle of works, exclusive of the other important books and the 500 odd pamphlets and encyclopædia articles that he wrote, which put him on a level with the greatest sociologists of his time. He is a writer for whom one can have not only a profound respect, but also a deep and sincere affection. When the first instalment of the twelve-volume work which was to have been the crown of his labours, and which will be largely autobiographical, comes out in the autumn, many sociologists in Great Britain will wake up to the fact that in his lifetime they ought to have given his books a much more generous recognition than these ever met with here. They will be truly sorry, when they read *Glances of the Cosmos*, that they did not express a more cordial appreciation of his great achievements within the brief and strenuous years when he could have enjoyed their goodwill and encouragement.

M. E. R.

LORD AVEBURY.

LORD AVEBURY, who died on May 28 in his 80th year, was the second president of the Sociological Society. He followed Mr. Bryce, and filled the office for the two years 1906-7, delivering a presidential address on March 20, 1907. He was interested in the Society from its foundation, and gave an address at the opening meeting of the sixth International Congress of Sociology in 1906. The extraordinary variety of his interests—scientific, social, and literary, to say nothing of his lifelong activity in the City and in Parliament—made it impossible for Lord Avebury to associate himself in any great degree with modern extensions of sociological inquiry; but it was an unquestionable advantage to the Society that in its early stages it should have had as its president an eminent representative of English public life who, besides being a great exponent of popular culture, was identified with some of the most beneficent social movements of the time.

REVIEWS.

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES.

AMERICAN HISTORY IN ITS GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS. By Ellen Churchill Semple. With Maps. Constable and Co. 12/6.

MISS SEMPLE'S book is to some extent liable to the imputation of being dumped goods. It is only now issued through an English publisher, though it has had circulation and esteem in America for full ten years. Of course it is better to get a good thing late than never, provided it be the kind of good thing that does not go bad—or imperceptibly lose its first best virtues, like ourselves—by keeping. At the same time, considering how many of the matters touched upon in the course of the work were in a clamantly transitional stage in 1902—even the Panama Canal, though amply discussed, is here only vaguely designated "the Isthmian canal," for obvious reasons—some recognition of the lapse of a decade might fitly have been offered in the form of a preface to this issue, an appendix, or a few notes at the end, none of which would have disturbed the text in the least. As it is, in addition to that uncertainty as to where the Canal was to be cut (a matter on which the most unposted reader has probably by this time gathered information for himself), such questions as the statehood of Oklahoma and the project for widening the Erie Canal are here presented as still on the knees of the gods. Above all, the coming of the vast national policy of Conservation—the greatest practical project that has ever occupied the mind of man—is but slightly and all unconsciously adumbrated in a couple of references at pages 335 and 418 respectively: the one to "the recently proposed scheme of a national system of irrigation," and the other to "a suggestion recently made by the president of a great north-western railroad system" for the deepening of the Mississippi from the Missouri to the Gulf. And here it may be remarked that had Miss Semple written her book after the Conservation ideal (which owes so much to the vision and advocacy of Mr. J. J. Hill, the railroad president in question) had been fully formulated, she would not have been so apt to regard the river-systems of America as a "back-number" among the transportation agencies of the nation. They are in fact beginning to be recognised as its most valuable neglected resource.

When all is said, these are small faults to quote in presence of the abundant merits of the book, both scientific and literary. Miss Semple is avowedly the pupil of those great masters of Anthro-po-geography, Rätzell and Shaler, but has an energy of mind and a range of knowledge which soon cancel for the reader any sense of her particular obligations. She is herself the author of some published studies which are classic for their subjects, especially one upon the historical influence of mountain-passes. And here it may be remarked that, throughout this book, the immediate topic from time to time supplies the occasion for an illuminating general excursion in which the influence of mountains as barriers, of seas as bringers-together, of rivers as pathways of exploration and extenders of settlement inward, and the political and social characteristics of different kinds of frontier, are all illustrated in a ranging view of what used to be called universal history.

Some of the inferences which she just stops short of drawing on certain of these occasions—in regard to India, for instance, or in regard to Canada—will, it is to be feared, somewhat disturb the good imperialist among ourselves, a personal type known not so much by its opinions as by its sensitiveness to alarms.

In about a score of chapters Miss Semple deals with the geographical factors which have moulded the social conditions or determined the predominant tendencies at different stages of American history. During colonial times these were mainly the sea, the rivers, and the mountains. The sea offered livelihood to the colonists in the north, and maintained for all the sense of connection with Europe. Of the rivers, again, the different types in north and south favoured strongly marked differences in production, methods of distribution, and manner of life, in the two regions. Finally, the Atlantic mountain range, by confining the English settlements within a comparatively narrow coastal strip, ensured for these communities concentrated living and collective social growth, in which no organic element or product of the parent civilization was lost. Here a contrast is well drawn between the good fortune of the English, thus held together and reserved for robust growth and great destinies, and that fatal facility with which the French, owing to their command of the St. Lawrence and the Lakes, quickly made their way into the heart of the continent and down to the Gulf, so losing their force in a diffusion of their numbers and in a certain degradation of the national type. It is possible, however, to attach too much importance to this diffusion as an historical factor. Perhaps, when all is said, the chief reason why France lost her American empire so easily was that the good French colonist in early Canada (and, whatever our parroted prejudices may instruct us to the contrary, the best of his kind was the best in the world) never had a chance. His wretched Government, near and distant, would not let him, but was a perfect mechanism of hindrances. The road to national ruin is paved by the good intentions of those who want to keep things right—and who assuredly end in making them tight—at every turn. "They grew through your neglect of them," cried Barré, speaking of the English colonists in a famous Parliamentary debate. In calmer surroundings, he might have generalized the taunt into a respectable philosophic utterance, and said that the forgetfulness of Rulers is the providence of God.

It is neither possible nor desirable to track the author through this closely-packed book with belated comments of agreement or dissent. Unless the critic did himself injustice, the marks of admiration alone would press heavily on the editorial provision of space. As particularly luminous may be instanced the sympathetic account of early western life; of the process of assimilation (ironically so called) on Spanish and Mexican borderlands; and, later on, of the long trekking movement to the Pacific by the Santa Fé and Oregon trails. What seems the one defect of any consequence in the book is that in her interpretation of the western movement the author hardly notices either the legend of the great American desert or the enactments (closely connected with belief in that legend) which for over fifty years fixed the western limit of the States at the bend of the Missouri. Yet these two facts, operating directly and indirectly, had more influence on the actual course of American history during the middle decades of the century than any other fact whatever save the existence of slavery. They determined, for instance, the way in which certain apical settlements were effected; the embarrassed relations of statesmen thereto;

and so onward to the final (yet how far from final!) awful mess of "bleeding Kansas," round which the clouds of war visibly begin to gather. For the rest, Miss Semple is a safe, an informing, and an illuminating guide, and gives a scientific and orderly aspect even to such seemingly wilful things as the location and growth of Cities, the progress of Railroads, and the distribution of Immigration, besides opening up highly interesting views (far, without being in the least far-fetched) into the probable rôle and destiny of the United States as a Pacific and Caribbean Power. In this connection it is worth noting that, wiser before the beginning of diplomacy and construction than statesmen after both were achieved, she assumed in 1902 that the Isthmian Canal would "constitute in effect a bit of American seaboard" (the context showing that American here means strictly United States) and that it would be fortified. It would be extremely interesting to consider the factors which may have determined this achievement in prevision. I can perceive three or four. But the most obvious of them is that she sees, judges, and writes not as the journalists, but as one having comprehension.

W. MACDONALD.

JOHN BRIGHT.

THE LIFE OF JOHN BRIGHT. By G. M. Trevelyan. Constable and Co., 1913. 15/- net.

MR. TREVELYAN has added to the reputation he had acquired in the fields of history and literary criticism by producing what will certainly be the standard biography of one of the greatest political figures of the Victorian era. If the comparative detachment of Bright from the main current of responsible statesmanship precluded any monumental tribute on the scale of Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, the work before us will at least stand comparison with the same writer's biography of Cobden. It is difficult indeed to imagine the task more successfully accomplished. If there is room for any disappointment it can only be that the public career of John Bright so overshadowed his private life that there has been little opportunity for those personal touches which reveal the inner man in his more intimate surroundings. But for this want the biographer is not to be held accountable. It was not the least of the sacrifices made by Bright to the interests of his country and humanity that he deliberately, though regretfully, cut himself off from home life and family ties for the greater part of each year through the long period of his strenuous activity in public affairs. The glimpses we get of his private relations are all of so pleasant a kind that we would fain have had more of them.

As an exponent of his hero's public life Mr. Trevelyan has achieved a notable success. The sympathy with his subject which, as he rightly says, is the prime requisite of an effective biography, is certainly not wanting, but it never seduces him from the attitude of an impartial historian and a sane critic of political movements and events. We can forgive the tenderness which has led him to refrain from any outspoken comment on the unfortunate anti-climax of the last phase in Bright's career. It would indeed have been a happy circumstance for his biographer, as well as for his own memory, if the public life of the great tribune had closed with the achievement of the ends to which his energies had been mainly directed. If his withdrawal from office after the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, when he had already exceeded his threescore years and ten, had been followed by his retirement from Parliament and the platform, we should

have been spared the spectacle of a declining vitality that sapped both his judgment and his courage. Of his attitude after this date on the question of Irish Home Rule it is enough to say that it gave the lie to the whole trend of his earlier influence alike in regard to the treatment of Ireland and to the cause of political freedom in general.

The effect of this biography is to place its subject on a higher pedestal than he has hitherto occupied in the eyes of most students of social and political movements. It is a not uncommon impression that while John Bright was distinguished for his personal integrity, his keen popular sympathies, his outspokenness, and his oratorical gifts, he was at the same time extreme in his views, impracticable in affairs, and lacking in breadth of view as well as in the refinements of culture. This volume has now made so one-sided and inadequate an estimate no longer possible. I cannot dwell here on all the many admirable qualities of Bright's mind and character which are now for the first time fully set forth in their proper light,—his rare and unflinching courage in expressing his convictions without regard to good or ill report, his singular freedom not only from all self-seeking but even from every thought of self, his moderation and generosity of temper in debate, the tact and good feeling with which he offered his counsel to those in power. I must be content with calling attention to the true significance of his career to students of social progress, as it is writ large in Mr. Trevelyan's excellent memoir. It is natural that the influence of a free lance in politics should escape full recognition even in his own generation, and still more in those that follow, especially when no writings, apart from the reports of speeches, are left behind in witness of it. We can now see clearly that in the great strides towards democratic government in this country that were made in the Victorian era the real pioneer was John Bright. Every one has known that his was the trumpet voice which roused the people; what has hitherto been less fully realised,—and indeed time was needed to justify his foresight—is that his was also the seeing eye. While Gladstone was long, very long, in finding himself, Bright, who had the advantage of being born of the people and of growing up in close contact with the sterner realities of life, perceived from the first that self-government in a modern State must mean government by the people as a whole, and that accordingly all political privilege was doomed. It was his life-work to make our electoral system truly representative of all classes of the community, and although at his death a good deal remained to be done, and a good deal still remains, he had the good fortune to see the greater part of the task accomplished. If, however, there are any who are accustomed to think of Bright as a man of one or two ideas which he preached in season and out of season, they will be disabused by a study of this volume. His true greatness lay in the certainty with which, from early manhood till the days when old age dimmed his vision, he read the signs of the times and chose the path that he felt to be right in the faith that the final issue would justify his choice. During the long weary years of waiting for the furtherance of the causes which he was the first to adopt he was ready to bring his unerring judgment to bear on all the social and political problems that presented themselves, and to give yeoman service in commending the solution that he desired. His battles for the repeal of the Corn Laws and for the cause of Free Trade generally, have not escaped recognition, but his efforts towards international peace have often been misrepresented as dictated by a doctrinaire and pusillanimous policy. Mr. Trevelyan has been able to show conclusively that Bright's attitude towards

the Jingoism of Palmerston and Beaconsfield was consistent and reasonable throughout, and that on the crucial questions of the wisdom and justice of the Crimean War and of the attitude of this country during the American Civil War Bright was wholly in the right, while Gladstone and most other accredited statesmen were in the wrong.

JAMES OLIPHANT.

THE MEANING OF DREAMS.

THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS. By Professor Dr. Sigmund Freud, LL.D.; translated by A. A. Brill, Ph.D., M.D. George Allen, 1913. 15/- net.

We heartily welcome this translation of the third edition of Professor Freud's well-known book,—a difficult task admirably accomplished. Freud's theory of dreams is, as he himself insists, the corner-stone of his psychiatric system, and proficiency in dream-interpretation the indispensable pre-requisite for success in treating hysterical patients. Many English students of psychology and psychiatry, who are already familiar with *Die Traumdeutung* in the original, will find the translation helpful, especially in the difficult but important final chapter dealing with the psychological theory of dreams; for others it will be the best possible introduction to the whole Freudian psychology, both theoretical and practical, and will, let us hope, mark the beginning of a new era in English psychiatry.

Put very briefly, Freud's dream-theory is that every dream is the disguised fulfilment of some repressed wish. Unimportant memories of the past, especially of the dream-day, woven together in apparently chance and incongruous order, form its "manifest content," but this manifest content is merely a disguise of certain "latent dream-thoughts" which are of the nature of wishes or desires. The manifest content is a distorted fulfilment of these desires, and it is because the desires are unacceptable to the ethical and conventional consciousness, figuratively known as the "censor," that the distortion is necessary. In more scientific language, dreams, like the symptoms of hysteria, are the result of a compromise between two fundamental forms of mental activity, the primary process and the secondary process. The primary process, which is limited to that of wishing, is original in the young child's mind, but almost from birth becomes overlaid by the workings of the secondary process. This latter brings with it inhibitions and repressions of the primary process. Hence there arises a fundamental distinction within the store of unconscious memories and impulses accumulated by the individual between those which have been repressed and those that have suffered no repression. The latter are called by Freud the *fore-conscious*, the former the *unconscious*. It is from these unconscious tendencies, rooted for the most part in the early years of childhood, that the wishes originate which obtain a secret and disguised fulfilment in the manifest contents of dreams. The dream is a compromise-formation resulting from the simultaneous activity of the primary with the secondary process. The secondary process, or the *fore-conscious*, is at night limited to the wish to sleep, the primary process corresponds to some wish or other of the unconscious that has been stirred into additional activity by the events of recent date, and the dream represents the simultaneous fulfilment of both wishes. In a perfectly analogous way the "symptom" of hysteric, be it anaesthesia or paralysis or of whatever nature, likewise represents the simultaneous fulfilment of a

forbidden wish from the unconscious and a wish, generally of the nature of a self-punishment, from the fore-unconscious.

How is the relation between the manifest and the latent content of a dream revealed? The answer is: by psycho-analysis, which is simply a method of free association. The different parts of the dream are taken in succession, and the dreamer records just what ideas occur to him in this connection, abandoning a critical or intellectual attitude of mind while doing so, and just allowing his associations to move in whatever direction they will. It is then found that these chains of free associations all converge to one system of dream-thought, which is of the nature of a forbidden wish.

We have given but the barest outline of Freud's central position. Any review of his book, which should be at all satisfactory, would have to be at least as long as the book itself. On every page he gives us new information and new ideas of the utmost suggestiveness. If some of them are open to criticism, this is not the place to deal with them. The important thing at present is really to understand Freud's views, and understanding can only come from a careful and sympathetic perusal of his books, especially of this one, "The Interpretation of Dreams," which we unhesitatingly recommend as one of the most important,—if not indeed the most important—book on psychology of recent years.

WILLIAM BROWN.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD.

PSYCHOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY. By Hugo Münsterberg. Constable, 1913. 6/-.

PROFESSOR MÜNSTERBERG's book describes the tentative beginning of a new science, which is destined, he suggests, to revolutionize industry through the application of the psychological experiment to "the purposes of commerce and industry, of business and the market in the widest sense of the word." At the outset, Professor Münsterberg deprecates any discussion of the ends to be attained. "Economic psychotechnics may serve certain ends of commerce and industry, but whether these ends are the best ones is not a care with which the psychologist has to be burdened." Technical science has to ascertain what are the most economical means to attain a particular end, not whether the end is desirable in itself. Three chief purposes of business life are here selected, and the means to reach them discussed: (1) to find the men best fitted for the work they have to do; (2) to devise psychological conditions under which the best possible work can be done; (3) to produce those influences on human minds which are desired in the interest of business. The first subject has to do with the selection of a vocation, and few of us who have any knowledge of life can quarrel with Professor Münsterberg's judgment that the present happy-go-lucky method of leaving it to chance, hoping that young people will somehow fall naturally into the place for which they are best fitted, is far from a success. In the first place, young people know very little of themselves or their capabilities, and often their natural advisers do not know much more; e.g. a boy may want to be a sailor, and be quite unaware that he is disqualified by, say, colour-blindness. A further reason for maladaptation is that the individual usually knows only the most external conditions of the vocations from which he chooses. "The inner labour, the inner values, and the inner difficulties and frictions are too often

unknown to those who decide for a vocation, and they are unable to correlate those essential factors of the life-calling with all that nature by inheritance, and society by surroundings and training, have planted and developed in their minds." (p. 33.) Apart from extremes of deficiency or over-development in particular functions,—attention, memory, will, sensory perceptions, &c.—"we find the broad region of the average minds with their numberless variations, and these variations are usually quite unknown to their possessors." At present society has no means of fitting the man to the job and the job to the man, but the drastic and cruelly wasteful one of throwing failures in the scrap-heap. "Social statistics show with an appalling clearness what a burden and what a danger to the social body is growing from the masses of those who do not succeed and who by their lack of success become discouraged and embittered. The social psychologist cannot resist the conviction that every single one could have found a place in which he could have achieved something of value for the commonwealth."

Whether the psychological laboratory can do all that Professor Münsterberg claims for its province, may perhaps be doubted by his less optimistic readers, but there need be no doubt that it can do a great deal. As an illustration of method he gives a description of the experiments made in testing the capacity of motor drivers on electric railways. It goes almost without saying that sharpness of vision and quickness of re-action to stimuli are absolutely indispensable qualifications, lacking which applicants are rejected at once. But among those who were accepted as motor-men, it was found that there was an extraordinary variety in capacity for avoiding accidents; some motor-men practically never have an accident, others often do. Professor Münsterberg's point is that the difference does not result from difference in care and attention; it results from a difference in mental structure and mental processes. The desirable motor-man is the one who is capable of a certain complicated act of attention which can seize and perceive all the moving panorama of the street, the pedestrians, and vehicles, with reference to their direction and rapidity, and can guide the car in harmony with this "complex moving situation." The account of the experiments desired to test this and other special capacities for special kinds of work, is highly interesting, but it would take too long to quote them here. The specially interesting conclusion that emerges from these experiments is that unfitness for one kind of industrial work by no means prevents the subject from being extremely successful in others. Young people who cannot, after long trial and with the best will, superintend certain automatic machines, may become expert at a more difficult class of work in the same establishment.

The book also deals with the new methods of Scientific Management, according to which the movements necessary in manual work are carefully computed and controlled, resulting in a saving in labour-cost that is almost unbelievable.

The third part of the book deals with the psychology of advertisement. This portion will probably, nay certainly, be read with mixed feelings by Professor Münsterberg's admirers. It is difficult not to feel that it is somewhat derogatory for a man of scientific eminence to spend time and thought and laboratory work on deciding what form of advertisement can make the most clamorous appeal to our wearied senses, and perhaps the mental discomfort produced by this portion may partly account for the bitter attacks the book has been subjected to—attacks which we are unable

to feel are justified on the whole. It is true, of course, that vocational guidance of the kind described might be "captured" by the employing class, supposing they had control of the educational machinery, and that Scientific Management might be used to crush all initiative and independence in the worker. Any labour-saving methods, such as the introduction of machinery, may in unfavourable circumstances be used against the working-classes, and for that matter any sort of power may be used against any one. The controversy at bottom is part of the whole struggle over the industrial revolution in the last 150 years, and once more reveals the curious absence of any accepted theory to guide us in the matter. We may all more or less agree that to increase the general wealth is good; we may agree emphatically that to increase wealth at the expense of human life is not good: the difficulty is in the application to particular instances. It is easier to understand the position of those who object to machinery, the factory, the whole industrial system root and branch, than that of those who accept the main lines of development, but draws the line at the ingenious methods of Mr. Gilbreth and Mr. Taylor. Is the perfect co-ordination of the movements made by a labourer lifting pigs more objectionable ethically than the less perfect co-ordination of movements by a girl cutting strips of steel for pens? Apart from the fact that as far as the evidence goes, the greater productivity results in considerably higher wages, there is the further consideration that scientific method and vocational guidance applied to minimise waste and fatigue, to economize effort and save friction, must indirectly at least benefit the working-classes, if only by reducing the terrible toll now paid in loss of life and health through overstrain, and the appalling poverty resulting from maladjustment and failure in occupations unsuitable to the individuals choosing them. In an interesting passage (p. 177) Professor Münsterberg points out incidentally how much carefully thought-out adjustment might do to save time and energy in household management.

B. L. HUTCHINS.

THE SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOUR.

THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR: Biological and Psychological Foundations. By Maurice Parmelee, PL.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913. 8/6 net.

THERE are two points in Dr. Parmelee's title which are significant of his attitude. He uses the term "behaviour" to denote the movements of animals considered from an objective, or external, standpoint; he qualifies it with the term "human" to bring out the continuity of all forms of behaviour. The aim of the book is "to lay the foundations for the study of human behaviour" by bringing together relevant data from the sciences of biology, psychology and sociology, and, in so doing, the author hopes to provide an introduction to the two latter sciences based upon a résumé of the fundamental facts and principles of the former. Insistence upon the continuity of evolution leads him to begin with a very brief account of the characteristics of matter in general and the composition of organic matter in particular, since, he urges, "mental and social phenomena have evolved in the course of organic evolution, and it is impossible to explain them fully except on the basis of the whole theory of organic evolution." (p. 72.) At first sight this may not appear sufficient reason for beginning a work on psychology with a dissertation on molecular forces, but the whole point of Dr. Parmelee's treatment is that, for the study of human behaviour,

the physico-chemical basis of mental phenomena is of the greatest significance.

There are three "forms of behaviour": (1) the tropism; (2) the reflex action; (3) the instinctive action. The tropism, that is the direct reactions of organisms to external forces, is characteristic of the lowest forms of organism; the reflex action, that is "the reaction of muscle or gland or other effector organ caused by a nervous stimulus," is strictly speaking possible only when a nervous system has been developed; the instinctive action is more complex than either and involves some outward form of manifestation. Dr. Parmelee's discussion of instinct will be of interest at the present time since so much attention is being given to the consideration of this question. After a brief survey of the most important theories of the nature of instinct—in which Bergson's view is referred to in a footnote—Dr. Parmelee proposes a new definition of instinct as "an inherited combination of reflexes which have been integrated by the central nervous system so as to cause an external activity of the organism which usually characterises the whole species and is usually adaptive." (p. 226.) The important point which he wishes to emphasize is that psychic or conscious processes are not necessarily involved in instinctive actions since the latter are themselves prior conditions of psychic phenomena.

All psychic characteristics have been developed from these three forms of behaviour each of which is external, that is to say is a "movement of an animal or part of an animal which is visible from the outside." There are however internal processes which "consisting of numerous minute and refined movements, most of which are within the nervous system, are usually called psycho-physical processes, and collectively they determine what are called mental phenomena." (p. 256.) Intelligence appears when, by means of associative memory, instinctive actions are varied and complicated by the memory of past reactions. Dr. Parmelee, whilst insisting upon the continuity of behaviour, is careful to point out that this must not be interpreted to imply that all organic matter is conscious, since we need this term to mark a stage in the evolution of behaviour, for consciousness exists only when "behaviour is influenced by ideas or by feelings." Ideas are described as generic memory images and the possibility of imageless thinking is denied. Feeling is reduced to sensation, or "certain aspects of certain kinds of sensations." (p. 297.) Finally, mind is defined as "a stage in the determination of certain kinds of behaviour" which stage "manifests itself to the person experiencing it in the form of images, ideas, feelings, emotions, etc., while its presence is made known to the observer by means of certain kinds of variations in behaviour." (p. 323.)

It is evident that in this work we have a thoroughgoing attempt to explain psychical process on the basis of physical phenomena, and to demonstrate the continuity of evolution as "a process flowing without a break"—a Bergsonian conception which the author endeavours to work out along strictly scientific lines. Although Dr. Parmelee does not wholly exclude the use of introspection in psychological investigation, he asserts that only if the method be in the main objective can the study of mental phenomena become thoroughly scientific. This adoption of a "purely objective standpoint" leads to Dr. Parmelee's rejection of spiritualist theories of consciousness on the ground that no "tangible evidence" can be adduced in their support. What, we may ask, is meant by "tangible evidence" in the case of consciousness? If more than a metaphor be

implied, surely the nature of consciousness is already prejudged. If the phrase is only a metaphor, then the rejection of spiritualist theories as to the nature of consciousness cannot be made offhand. In spite of the attempt to define consciousness in terms of behaviour, hence from the external standpoint, the author does not get rid of what are, presumably, subjective implications in the statement that "consciousness is a complex process made up of feelings and ideas which are unified by the sense of personality which may begin as a vague feeling, but which becomes in course of time a clear-cut idea." (p. 321.)

Within a short compass Dr. Parmelee has covered an enormous field. Many points of interest such as his criticism of current theories of feeling, instinct, the nature of self-consciousness and personality, etc., cannot be noticed here. A question of importance for students of the social sciences arises in the discussion of man's superiority over the lower animals. Dr. Parmelee attributes man's superior intelligence to the superiority of some of his senses, to his action-system which renders possible an unusually large number of varied movements, and to his extended association areas which make complicated connections between sensations, images and movements possible. Man is thus able to enter into more complete communication with his fellows than is the case with any other species, and hence he is able to perfect a society. Nevertheless, society is not peculiar to man for "social evolution is a part of the general evolutionary process" and its beginnings are found at much lower levels. In support of this a short account of insect and vertebrate societies up to primitive man is given, followed by a brief discussion of the factors of social evolution which, Dr. Parmelee points out, are far more complex than the upholders of the instinctive or of the emotional origin of society would have us believe. The book, which is described as the first of a series that is to deal with the evolution of human culture, contains much that is of interest to psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists even although we may not be able to accept all the conclusions reached, and may doubt whether all mental phenomena can be reduced to "terms of behaviour" according to the author's definition of the word. There are some useful diagrams and an excellent bibliography which will prove serviceable to readers interested in pursuing the subject further. L. S. STEBBING.

DR. JEVONS ON PERSONALITY.

PERSONALITY. By F. B. Jevons, Litt.D. London: Methuen, 1913. 2/6 net. FOUR lectures given by Dr. Jevons at Oxford last summer in the Vacation Term for Biblical Study dealt with the problem of Personality, and these form the basis of the present volume. That there is a problem of personality is not always admitted by the plain man to whom his own existence is that of which he is most assured. Yet not only does psychology not prove the existence of the self, but some psychologists claim definitely to have disproved it. Such a denial involves the admission, so Dr. Jevons contends, that there are no persons, human or divine, and commits the man who denies it to the statement "I do not exist." The arguments adduced in disproof of the self must therefore be examined.

Recent attempts to prove that in a pre-animistic stage primitive man explained the unforeseen and the unexpected by reference to an impersonal power are shown to be absurd, since there can be no conception of a power that is impersonal except on the basis of some vague idea of personality.

That is to say, power as used in the primitive explanation of phenomena implies personality, and moreover the former conception is excluded by science just as much as the latter. But although science can do without the conception of personality, it is not possible for the psychologist to get rid of the "self." Hume's famous argument which resolves the self into a "bundle or collection of different perceptions" is shown to involve the existence of "myself" who cannot be any of the distinct perceptions but must be the 'uniting thread,' that is, the self. To say that "I" can "catch perceptions" is to say that "I" exist. So, too, James in denying the thinker is bound to assert the thinker. Starting from the sense of personal identity, he concludes that there is neither identity nor personality but a series of passing thoughts from which the self is only a mistaken inference. But, Dr. Jevons points out, James begs the whole question at the outset by assuming that "a thought can happen or exist without any thinking subject or person." (p. 60.) There is again a similar confusion in Bergson's argument that "there are changes but no things which change," and the inference, drawn from it, that there are no persons who change, since throughout he presupposes the self in his postulate of attention as a fact, whilst admitting both a subject and an object of attention. But there cannot be the one without the other. Dr. Jevons accuses M. Bergson of "closing his eyes to half of the fact that has to be taken into account" (p. 103) when he argues that to exist is to change, for, Dr. Jevons replies, change implies as its correlative persistence through change, and in that persistence consists personal identity. Further, because Bergson fails to combine consciousness and free will in a unity of personality, the conception of free will loses its significance and can mean only incessant change.

In the concluding chapter Dr. Jevons presents his own view of personality as "the striving towards unity and coherence," to use Bosanquet's phrase, which he adopts. There is no individual if by that be meant an *individuum* capable of solitary existence. A person is not a closed system but is "both the subject who knows others and an object of knowledge to others" and "as a centre or focus of knowledge, as a subject who knows, a person is for ever different from all other persons." But the bond between persons cannot be merely the intellectual bond of knowledge but is "the relation of love which exists between, or rather unites, two subjects." (p. 156.) Hence arises a more important question than the old question of the possibility of knowledge, viz., the question "What is implied by the existence of love?" The reply to this need not take us beyond the bounds of logic for love "is the mainspring of logic" as Dr. Bosanquet has recently urged. Many are the problems which emerge in this short treatment of the fundamental problem of personality. Although it does not seem to the present writer that Dr. Jevons's refutation either of Hume's or of James's arguments is the most conclusive possible, nevertheless his defence of personality in the light of Bosanquet's recent treatment of the principle of individuality is both interesting and suggestive. L.S.S.

RURAL ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By R. H. Tawney. Longmans, 1912. 9/- net.

The rewriting of English history is now being consciously pursued, not merely because new materials have accumulated but rather because the

materials old and new are being looked at from new angles. The present generation of students has learnt that there is no real science of history, since, collect the facts with whatever meticulous care one may, the interpretation of those facts is very largely dependent on the student's own political, social, and moral prepossessions. Nobody who reads Mr. Tawney's volume will have any doubt that a writer, with a different outlook on the world than his, would have made a very different book from the same materials. Mr. Tawney is one of the moving spirits of the Workers' Educational Association—this book is dedicated to the President and Secretary of the Society—and he has the quick sympathy with the disinherited, the scepticism with regard to conventional economic ideals, the high intolerance of certain formulas, which one is accustomed to associate with that rapidly expanding movement. These prepossessions help to determine the atmosphere of Mr. Tawney's mind, and he has a style which, on the whole, renders it with much force. Occasionally he is movingly eloquent, occasionally he is rather dryly metaphysical, most often he borrows the persuasiveness which makes even Maitland's rashest theory irresistible for the time. But it would be doing the greatest injustice to Mr. Tawney not to add that he has built upon a foundation of solid research. Very much labour as well as very shrewd and bold speculation went to make this new picture of a tragedy of English rural life.

There has been much dispute as to the effect of "enclosures" in the sixteenth century, as to the extent to which they were carried out, as to their causes and as to their bearing upon economic ideas. Mr. Tawney follows Mr. Leadam and Professor Gay in holding that the movement was strongest in the Midlands and Eastern Counties, and least strong in the South-West and in the North. He brings out more clearly than other writers have done that voluntary and slow enclosure, as opposed to enforced and sudden enclosure, is much older than the sixteenth century and had already largely transformed Kent and Essex. The difference between the two processes is that the one was the work of the tenants and was adjusted to the needs of the old rural economy, while the other was the work of the landlords and broke up the old rural economy. No writer has explained as clearly as Mr. Tawney why even the partial enclosure by compulsion from above of the waste and the substitution of pasture for corn-growing on a manor wrecked the whole agricultural routine.

Mr. Tawney adds little to our knowledge of the causes which brought about the enclosing movement by the landlords, though he is justly sceptical when he is told, that it was an inevitable economic development. He lays more stress than his predecessors, but not more than is necessary, upon the influence of political forces. He appreciates that the Tudor "despotism," however well-intentioned, was very ineffectual where social matters were concerned, and that the Reformation gave the land-owning classes great and steadily increasing weight with the central authority, at the very time that new appetites were breaking up old traditions of social responsibility.

But by far the most original and valuable part of Mr. Tawney's book is his examination into the means by which the landlords enforced their will. What power had the lord of a manor to evict old tenants or alter their status in order to make room for new tenants and new economic arrangements? It is well known that the courts for a long time would protect the rights of a freeholder; it is also well known that the Court of Chancery would, in the sixteenth century, protect some customary titles.

Two questions, therefore, arise :—in what cases could the customary tenant count upon the protection of the courts, and on what terms was the land held by the small tenants? Numerous small holders were tenants as well as leaseholders. These could be evicted or rack-rented without difficulty and the landlord could take to himself the whole of the unearned increment which custom had hitherto in practice divided between him and his tenants. The custom by which a copyholder held might give an estate of inheritance or only one for lives or years; it might have fixed the copyholder's payments or left them at the will of the lord. The protection of the court, which undertook no more than to enforce custom, would be absolute if the estate were of inheritance and the payments fixed; in the other cases the landlord could bring irresistible pressure to bear upon the tenant. Mr. Tawney is led by an examination of many manorial surveys to conclude that copyholds for life or lives were more usual than copyholds of inheritance, whilst fixed fines were the exception and variable fines the general rule. The courts, therefore, were no great bulwark to the tenant and no serious obstacle to the landlord.

Mr. Tawney resists the theory that the statistical evidence, so far as such exists, convicts the contemporary pamphleteers of exaggerating the importance of the change. He points out that a small quantitative change in a closely organised interdependent society would have a much more serious qualitative effect than a larger quantitative change in our modern loosely-jointed society. The evidence of those who suffered, and who felt their sufferings strongly enough to take to armed rebellion, and the evidence of legislative and executive attempts at remedial measures, show how big an event the sixteenth century enclosures were; bigger, Mr. Tawney contends, than those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which it made possible. He promises us, in a future volume, an exposition of the economic ideas which went to ruin in the process; and to that every reader of the present book will look forward.

H. SACHER.

A WILTSHIRE VILLAGE. By Alfred Williams. London: Duckworth and Co., 1913.

THERE was once a farm-boy who saved his pocket-money, threepence a week, till he had enough to buy a telescope. It was quite certain that such a boy would not remain on the land. But though he has worked for many years in the town, he has never ceased to love the country, to keep a tender remembrance for the old village of the days of his youth, for the beauty and the simple pleasures of the countryside. He has already given us "Songs in Wiltshire," and now we have the annals of his native village, its work and play, joy and sorrow, the village school, the long life of labour, and the workhouse that is so often its end. Through all the good and evil, he never deviates from his belief in the essential superiority of country over town life. It is possible that a lover of the town might make out as good a case, or even a better one, for those great centres of civilization so fertile in energy, so stimulating to social action. The villagers, as Mr. Williams says, are averse to the combinations that are so easy to the town workmen. But for a true picture, the painter must be in sympathy with his subject. It is because the author loves the country and its people, that his book is at once so useful and so interesting.

Those who look on the village labourers as mere clods, without individuality and abject in their servitude, will soon be undeceived. On

the contrary, farm work and country life tend to produce strongly-marked and even eccentric characters, especially among the old people who grew up in the days before schools were universal, and when the influence of town standards was less. Nor were they without independence: "village folk never were so generally abject and slavishly obedient to every precept and nod of the 'maaster' as is generally represented." Such changes as have occurred, and they have been many, do not strike our author as in general changes for the better. The old simple sports are passing away. Many of the old fairs have gone. Those who affected a superiority of taste and were possessed with means of indulging it,

"did not like the noise of the crowd; they said it was hateful and abominable, pure barbarism; it was time it was put a stop to; . . . That anyone is better off by the change materially, is hard to realize; they are certainly not more religious, moral, sober, honest, or industrious either; though very likely some of them are become more prosaic, long-faced, moody, and dull as a consequence. The old sports and festivals used to brighten up the year for farm-people, and if they were rude and simple, noisy and boisterous, they served their purpose very well, and were always hailed with unfeigned joy and delight."

On the other hand, "the percentage of worshippers in villages, as in towns, is on the wane; there is a tragic falling off in numbers at church and chapel too." "Pseudo-democratic institutions, County, Urban, and District Councils," with rules only fitted for towns, have injured the labourer by destroying many of the small cottages. Education, as given in the villages, is suited for clerks and teachers, but not for those who are to work on the land. And the population is steadily drifting away.

How to remedy these evils is a difficult problem. In the schools, Mr. Williams would "teach briefly the account of the faithful great men of all ages and nationalities who have helped to make the world what it is," and also the lessons of the trees and flowers. But he does not believe that education will cure the evil. The great cause of depopulation "is the insufficiency of remuneration and of leisure; the hours are too long and the money is too small." Unless these things are changed, rural depopulation will continue.

S. H. SWINNY.

ETHNO-PSYCHOLOGISCHE STUDIEN AN SÜDSEEVÖLKERN AUF DEM BISMARCK-ARCHIPEL UND DEN SALOMO-INSELN. By Dr. Richard Thurnwald. Zeitschr. für angewandte Psychologie, 6, 1913. 9 marks.

THOSE who are interested in experimental and comparative psychology should study the investigations of Dr. Thurnwald in Melanesia. The results of his experiments in colour perception and designation of colours coincided with those of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits (*Reports*, II, pt. 1). In counting the natives could not grasp more than four at once; thus 5 was reckoned as 2+3, or less often 4+1, or counted up one by one. The numerals reflect the mode of counting; odd numbers are more difficult than even. The greater portion of the paper is occupied by an analysis of native drawings and artistic expression. Forms are often represented which we term geometric; for the native it is nothing of the sort, these apparently geometrical forms are simplified representations of actual things, of which only the essentials are expressed, but similar geometric patterns among different peoples usually have different interpretations. An object is delineated in the aspect in which it usually appears

to the person, but some phase, characteristic position or organ is usually emphasised. Dr. Thurnwald gave the natives cones, pyramids, cubes, etc., to draw, and he describes their attempts at translating three dimensions into two. Whole figures of living persons are seldom represented for fear of magic, but exception is made in the case of the magic-proof white man, alien Chinese, and spiritual beings. Great importance is paid to certain organs and parts of the body, especially the face, eyes, and teeth, which become independent symbols for qualities. Only eyes are shown in the face of some men in a boat, as these only are used when fishing. Spirits which have predominating organs may have the rest of their body neglected or omitted, thus one has only eyes and teeth. Eyes and teeth thus symbolised occur in tatu patterns and decorative designs. The general conclusions are of interest, but only one or two can be noted here. No attempt is made in native art at bringing objects into a right relation, *i.e.*, perspective—which is intelligible in our pictures. Nor does it attempt what cannot be interpreted, it is not purely formal and æsthetic, but must always convey something, and with this end in view one aspect of the object is emphasised. In plastic art, improved implements, *e.g.* iron instead of stone or shell, give rougher not finer results. Artistic pleasure in form or colour is quite in the background. The memoir is enriched by 230 illustrations. A.C.H.

GREEK DIVINATION. By W. R. Halliday, B.A., B. Litt. Macmillan, 1913. 5/- net.

SINCE Bouché-Leclercq wrote his classic study of divination, the anthropological method has revolutionized our views of the evolution of religion and social habit. Mr. Halliday has done well to apply the results of modern research to this ancient institution. As an institution it was considerable; there has been nothing like it since medieval priestcraft practised similar principles under a different name and a different dispensation. We no longer see anything of augury except in the purlieus of theosophy and spiritualism. But the great and permanent idea of Luck still pervades human thought and action. As a concept of continuity in environmental influence the idea of Luck deserves more study than it has received. It is prominent in primitive mentality; it is implicit in modern. At each of these extreme stages, its manifestations are unorganised more or less, but of similar form in action. In between these stages occur the organised systems of divination, priestly and social, prophecy, ordeal and omen.

Mr. Halliday's chief defect is that he ignores this great human idea of Luck. He rightly points out that we can no longer ascribe divination to a divine revelation, nor even assume that it is an arbitrary invention based upon a mistaken process of reasoning. But he misses the point when he ascribes the origin of augury to a degradation of magic, and its form to the "sub-rites" of sacrifice. Rightly, perhaps, he accepts the view that magic did not develop "as a quasi-science which misapplied the categories of cause and effect." But in insisting on the importance of personality, "meaning," and the setting in motion of a non-natural power, he accepts too blindly the vague psychology of the latest theorists, who have invested the pre-Olympian stage of religion with a sentimental mysticism, which is, if anything, less convincing than the old Frazerian rationalism. Mr. Halliday's other weakness seems to be a too easy adoption of the

hypothesis "similar conditions, similar results." He argues that divinatory systems, however artificial and elaborate, may be evolved independently. But ancient divination, like ancient civilization, was admittedly full of borrowed elements, and on the whole it is probable that it was passed along from this civilization to that, from the Babylonian, for instance, like any other invention. The book is a mine of classical data, but the "Magical papyri" have been only perfunctorily examined.

A.E.C.

CITIZENS MADE AND REMADE: An Interpretation of the Significance and Influence of the George Junior Republic. By William R. George and Lyman Beecher Stowe. London: Constable and Co.; Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913. 5/- net.

THIS is a book for educators and politicians (in the true sense), no less than for penologists, as will be seen from the following passage (pp. 263-4) which fairly sums up its argument:—

"The fullest possible opportunity for apprenticeship in citizenship should be given before the full responsibilities of adult citizenship fall upon the individual. This apprenticeship may or may not pay particular regard to training in the forms and procedure of democratic government. Whether it does or not is a detail. On the other hand, it must regard the development of self-expression in each individual, together with the development of social expression in all the individuals. This is fundamental. Finally, all such agencies should conform to the great and greatly neglected truth that people, whether old or young, can only learn to do by doing; can only learn to live by living. These fundamental principles should be applied not only to all agencies for the training of children,—for the making of citizens,—but to all those likewise for the reformation of adults—for the remaking of citizens. Prisons such as now exist should ultimately be entirely abolished, and for them should be substituted reformatory republics."

Mr. George's collaborator, who has reserved some of the chapters to his own pen, has been able to write more freely on some of Mr. George's experiences than Mr. George did in his previous book on the Junior Republic, and we have here a very interesting account of how the first George Junior Republic came to be and of some phases of its growth. What may be called the philosophy of the movement is rather more fully worked out, and the application of like principles to schools is also dealt with. Various difficult problems connected with the subject are faced; for example (p. 121):—

"To separate the sexes is to create conditions entirely unnatural and abnormal. To teach them to live together, without prudery on the one hand, or licentiousness on the other, is to solve instead of evading one of the most difficult problems of life. . . . Were the boys and girls separated the solution of this problem would not even be attempted. As it is, it is frankly faced and successfully solved in about ninety-nine cases out of one hundred. While the dangers of congregation are great they are not as great, measured in terms of the welfare of the individual, as the dangers of segregation. In too many cases such dangers are measured in terms of the welfare of an institution, which is a very different matter."

The authors are careful to guard against certain misconceptions with regard to their ideals of self-government. They say, for instance (p. 215) :—

"Wherever the pupils are given a share in the active management of their own affairs in *some conscious and tangible manner*, there are the principles of self-government being applied, whatever the outward form. This definition, broad as it is, is not broad enough to include monitorial systems as generally understood. The delegation of authority by the autocrat in control to certain selected lieutenants among the students not only is not self-government, but involves principles diametrically opposed."

The indictment of the prison system is trenchant and, to some readers at least, will be convincing. It would be a pleasure to quote several passages on this subject, but for sociologists it would perhaps be more interesting to continue the quotation with which this notice began (pp. 264-5) :—

"When all schools and all other agencies for the training of children shall have been placed upon a democratic, upon a self-governing basis, and when all institutions for the reformation of misfit adults shall have been placed upon a like basis, and when there shall have been established Junior Republics in every State of the Union, then, and not till then, will there be furnished training for democratic citizenship sufficiently vital and sufficiently widespread to provide a full and fair test for our democracy."

The authors repudiate the idea of punishment and are all for the reformation of criminals. But reformation spells responsibility, the very opposite of the prison principle, for they say (p. 169) :—"It is both humiliating and demoralizing for any class of persons to be looked upon as irresponsible."

A.St.J.

THE FAMILY: AN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL STUDY. By Chas. F. Thwing and Carrie F. B. Thwing. Revised and enlarged edition. Boston: Lothrop, 1913. \$1.60.

THIS is a reprint of an unpretending, sane, and useful monograph, revised and brought up to date after twenty-seven years by the survivor of the two authors. The evolution of the family is succinctly described from pre-historic times onwards, among the Greeks, Romans, and Jews, the early Christians in the Middle Ages, and in modern times. It is noticeable that the authors, who regard the subjection of women as unjust and out of date, and believe the modern family can be more stably built upon the equal partnership of husband and wife, are careful to point out that this means increased responsibility, as well as better status, for the woman. The book is clearly and simply written, and will be useful both to those who lack time or money for the many large treatises of recent years, as well as to those who use it as an introduction to more far-reaching studies.

B.L.H.

ENGLISH LIFE AND MANNERS IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES. By A. Abram, D.Sc. Lond., F.R.Hist.S. George Routledge and Sons. 6s.

OFFICIAL histories do not tell us much about the daily life of our remoter ancestors. We hear very little about how they secured their water supply,

under what conditions they bought and sold, what precautions they took to secure the very modest degree of public health that seemed to them possible, and how they travelled from place to place. This information and much else, in so far as the later fourteenth and the fifteenth century are concerned, Miss Abram seeks to supply. She has gone for her information less to purely literary sources than to civic and family records, to illustrated manuscripts, and to Acts of Parliament and commercial treaties. The result is a rather bewildering maze of disjointed facts, from which, however, there emerges a definite picture of the everyday life of the time. We realise the difficulties of the health authority which had to fine Robert Smith of Beverley for refusing to remove his dead pig from the common street, and feel a great deal of sympathy with the woman who was healed of "passiouns in hir heed manie divers" by cauterizing with a hot iron. On the housing question it is interesting to find a Gloucester builder willing in 1483 to put up a decent house of "standard werke" and "all the timbers of oak" for £14. The brief comparison and generalisations in national character then and now with which the book concludes contain some debatable statements. Can it be fairly said that we ourselves "do not show any general tendency to lawlessness, and have not inherited our ancestors' credulity or their morbid gloom, probably because they were not inherent characteristics of our race?"

M.B.

THE REAL DEMOCRACY: First essays of the Rota Club. By J. E. F. Mann, N. J. Sievers, and R. W. T. Cox. Longmans, 1913. 4/6 net.

THE Rota Club essays, as the dedication suggests, owe their existence to the influence exerted by Mr. Belloc over groups of clever young men from his own university days to the present time. While the capitalist system of industry is vigorously attacked on the one hand, collectivist and syndicalist proposals of reform get very short shrift on the other. The writers are stronger in attack than in construction, and when they come to practical proposals for so vast a change, they are somewhat vague and indefinite. We are told that property must be kept distributed; the City-States of the future must be societies of producers, and these associations are apparently to be modelled on the co-operative productive ideals of the mid-nineteenth century Christian Socialists, "consumers' co-operation" being banned by these writers because it pre-supposes the continuance of the wage-system. One may entirely agree with the Rota Club that the existing "productives," as they are commonly though somewhat inaccurately called,—viz. factories that are worked co-operatively on a self-governing principle—are of great interest from their successful avoidance of parasitism and sweating, and the wholesome social tone they are able to maintain, and they seem to have valuable lessons to teach the administrator of the future. But it is difficult for them to extend their field of operations very far without becoming themselves employers of outside labour, in which case the whole principle of self-government is given away, and an oligarchy set up. On the other hand, the strict maintenance of the self-governing idea, though successful in isolated cases, results usually in a certain inelasticity which makes it doubtful (to put it very mildly), whether this particular type could ever cover the vast field of modern industry. It is noticeable that the writers give no attention to the position of the industrial woman. How is the woman wage-earner to be fitted into the ideal society of craftsmen and associated producers? The

authors are curiously uneven in style; but as a whole the book is worth reading, and should be read, partly for its excellent introductory historical sketch by Mr. Sievers, generally for its fresh and unconventional attitude.

B.L.H.

MÉCANISME ET LIMITES DE L'ASSOCIATION HUMAINE. By J. Novicow. Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale. Paris: Giard and Brière, 1912. 2 francs.

THIS little book is marked in every page by the clear exposition, the trenchant brevity, the ardent love of human liberty and of international peace that characterised its author, whose death has left a void that will not soon be filled. In some respects Professor Novicow anticipated Mr. Norman Angell's line of argument, affirming both here and in earlier works that Europe is an economic unit. His reasoning has therefore all the strength of an appeal to real and definite interests. It has on the other hand the weakness that results from the omission of other elements. When he instances the spread of the French language in Russia during the eighteenth century as a result of the large circulation therein of Frenchmen and French goods, he passes over the other reasons that gave French its prestige, and he does not explain how it came about that the spread of the language was less in some countries where the contacts were even more numerous. In the book before us there is another and a more serious fault in method. The brevity and completeness of deduction had great charms for Professor Novicow, and having traced all civilization and organization to exchange, he proceeds to pass judgment on all social processes according as they increase or decrease the amount and intensity of life. He has no difficulty in showing that conquest, slavery, despotism are really forms of dissociation and diminish this intensity, while exchange and association increase it. He is less happy when, quite incidentally, he classes socialism with conquest as a form of spoliation.

S. H. SWINNY.

INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS. By William S. Stevens. New York: Macmillan, 1913.

MR. STEVENS has produced, in his survey of industrial combinations, not so much a book as a collection of material for the use of students. He begins by giving specimens of early pooling agreements, adopted to maintain prices, to equalize losses and profits, to divide output and to limit production. The earliest recorded pool dates from 1860. The pool was "only a gentlemen's agreement, unenforceable through the courts." It was followed by trusts, such as the Standard Oil trust of 1879. Public opinion was soon aroused, and there followed a series of national and state laws and judicial decisions, mostly against trusts, sometimes ordering their dissolution, the efficacy of which has been very often questioned. Factors' agreements, patent monopolies, interlocking companies ("holding" companies) and international agreements have developed rapidly in the last thirty years; and of these the patent monopoly is the only one which has been thoroughly endorsed by the law courts. Besides printing all the most important specimens of such agreements, Mr. Stevens devotes much space to the records of witnesses as to the methods used in establishing trusts. These are often illegal and immoral, e.g. the methods of discriminating railway rates, unfair underselling, delivering worthless

goods, blocking contracts of competitors, etc., executed by "ways and means departments" or "knock-out men," the agents of the great trusts. The book concludes with proposals for dealing with the trust problem, made by ex-President Taft, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, and various senators and judges.

J.A.F.

GROUPS IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM.

THE GROWTH OF GROUPS IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM. By R. E. Lloyd. Longmans, 1912. 5/- net.

MR. LLOYD'S title is liable to mislead the social student. It sets in motion an extremely suggestive line of thought, opening up the value and the need of a study of the origins of social effort; of why animals and men come to associate in groups. The book therefore might be a study of sociology at a level below that, in time, of the study of the herd and its manner of acting as a herd. As a matter of fact, it does not deal with this subject. Mr. Lloyd takes the word "group" as being nearly synonymous with the word "variety" in biology; and by group he means individuals having like characteristics but of a stage not sufficiently clearly marked off to be considered as species. Thus, instead of studying the growth of species and their origins, he seeks to carry the thought down to less marked characteristics that varieties in a species possess and study how these varieties originate. I feel a little regret that some such title as "The Growth of Varieties in the Animal Kingdom" had not been taken rather than the one chosen by the author, since group is a word having such a distinctively social import. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the idea raised in the book is one of great scientific value.

It is quite true that no biologist can at present give a satisfactory definition of species, the word never having recovered from Darwin's attack upon it; but all students would agree that it has some meaning, at present only ill-defined. It is certainly scientific to study just how varieties come to be formed in the hope that by doing so clearer ideas of species will at last be obtained. This is Mr. Lloyd's central notion and its value in current scientific thought can hardly be questioned. The book has no index; and as its treatment of its subject is discursive, and for this reason not always easy to follow, this is not only a defect, as it must always be, but a somewhat grave one. It is fair, however, to say that the last three pages are devoted to a short summary, and these if read first will afford the reader a clearer idea of the main theme. The difficulty is that the summary displays a certain bias which the substance of the book has not justified. The opening statement of the first chapter, "The method of the origin of species is still an open question," and the first words of the summary, "The aim of this small book is to lessen the belief in natural selection as a creative agency," show a desire in the author rather than a demonstration. This is the one really radical fault of the book; it is too obviously partizan and the study is far too slight to be considered a real attack on Darwinian principles. Such an attack would need to meet the immense array of facts provided by Darwin for the world, facts which few opponents of Darwinism seem to be acquainted with at first hand; and it would not only have to explain the significance of struggle and competition in life as an insistent reality and seeming principle, explaining even the significance of disease, but also to develop some new thought disclosing a meaning still deeper than the Darwinian one and including it. But no

hint, either of this fuller criticism of the facts in support of Darwin's principle or of the kind of principle that must include and supersede it, is given. Lloyd Morgan many years ago showed that definite variability is not only possible but inevitable under certain environmental conditions, and Professor Bateson has himself accepted the principle of natural selection in its wider import. A book analysing the exact significance of Mendelism and its relation to the principle of selection is undoubtedly much needed, but it must not assume the views of the Mendelians to be sound and those of the Darwinians to be unsound; it must carefully examine each side and trace its relative importance. This Mr. Lloyd has not done. None the less, the book is interesting because it suggests three very important biological needs of research at the present time: (1) the importance of understanding how definite varieties arise, and whether Mendelism in a state of nature or without men's guidance is a partial or complete explanation of their origin and to this extent a participator in the origin of species; (2) a re-study of the whole Darwinian field; (3) a careful inquiry tracing the relationship of Mendelian phenomena as a whole to the Darwinian principle of organic evolution and devolution. One hopes that Mr. Lloyd may one day extend and revise his study, so as to give in a realised form what is interestingly foreshadowed here. The volume has some useful and attractive illustrations.

J. LIONEL TAYLER.

THE SYSTEM OF THE VEDANTA. By Paul Deussen. Authorised translation by Charles Johnson. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1912. \$3.00 net.

PROFESSOR DEUSSEN's study of Vedanta is a systematic statement of the system contained in the *Brahma-Sûtras* and the commentary of Sankaracharya, its greatest master. There is no need at this late date to commend Professor Deussen's work, which has for many years been accepted as a classic contribution to the study of early Indian philosophy. Mr. Johnson, a former member of the Bengal Civil Service, has expended great labour on the translation. The appendix contains a short survey of the Vedanta system, a glossary, and a full index of all the quotations. The Open Court Publishing Company has given the volume an attractive format.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. By C. R. Henderson. Second edition. The University of Chicago Press. 8/- net.

MR. HENDERSON's account of American industrial insurance is an English version of a book originally issued in German five years ago. It is packed with information on all forms of protective insurance and compensation so far initiated in the United States, by trade unions, firms and corporations, municipalities and the states. Various special plans are summarised in the appendix, and there is a bibliography of four pages.

THE MODERN WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT. By Dr. Kaethe Schirmacher. New York: The Macmillan Co. 6/6 net.

DR. SCHIRMACHER's book, translated from the second German edition by Dr. Carl Eckhardt, was when published seven years ago the only accessible account of the woman's movement in nearly all parts of the world, and it

contains enough information to make it still useful, although the reader wanting a fairly full statement of the facts about any one country would need to turn elsewhere. Things have moved fast in England since the book was written, and so far as the movement in this country is concerned the book has little value. The author, too, would have been well advised to omit Asia from her purview, since she is clearly without even the most elementary knowledge of Eastern civilisations. The section on India is absurd; and of China Dr. Schirmacher says: "The Chinese woman of the lower classes has the same status as the Mohammedan woman—ostensible freedom of movement and hard work." That is a sufficiently accurate summary of the position of the woman of the lower classes in the West.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. By Frederic J. Haskin. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1912. 4/6 net.

It cannot be pretended that even educated people in this country know as a rule much about the actual administration of the United States. Accordingly Mr. Haskin's book should be useful, despite its superficial and excessively journalistic treatment. It contains a short account of the many state departments, including such especially American developments as the inter-state commerce commission, the Panama Canal, and the great department of Agriculture which in so many ways leads the world.

PROTESTANTISM AND PROGRESS. By Ernst Troeltsch. London: Williams and Norgate. 3/6 net.

IN the October 1912 number of this Review we published an estimate, from the pen of Professor Hermann Levy, of Troeltsch's large and important volume dealing with a part of that subject which has lately been added to the treatise, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. The small volume dealing with a part of that subject, which has lately been added to the Crown Theological Library will serve to introduce the theories of Professor Troeltsch to the English public. It is described as an historical study of the relation of Protestantism to the modern world, and it discusses in a highly suggestive fashion the working out of Calvinistic ethics in modern industrial society. The translation has been competently done by Mr. W. Montgomery.

CHILDREN'S PLAY AND ITS PLACE IN EDUCATION. By Walter Wood. Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1913. 3/6 net.

MR. WALTER WOOD gives in this manual a good summary of the educational attitude towards children's play from the days of ancient Greek culture to the present period of Montessori methods. His discussion of the play theories leaves the reader with the conviction that science stands as yet at the threshold of an unconquered realm, and with the certitude that educators, proceeding on the present lines of advance, will increasingly make use of the child's play activities in the school. Of especial value is the chapter on the playground movement in America. The experiences here recounted throw a fresh light on the attempts made in this country

towards obtaining an adequate provision for children's recreation. The book, although dealing popularly rather than scientifically with the subject of children's play, is well worth the attention of students of civics and education.

THE YEAR BOOK OF SOCIAL PROGRESS FOR 1912. London: Nelson, 1913.
2/- net.

THIS volume provides in convenient form a summary of the advance of social progress, giving an account of all legislation, reports of Royal Commissions and voluntary activities during the past year. It includes a list and description of the work of the principal institutions of social study throughout the United Kingdom and gives a useful though not quite adequate bibliography at the close of each subject under discussion. The introduction, "On Social Study," by Professor W. J. Ashley, throws out excellent suggestions as to the training necessary for effective participation in social service.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

FRENCH.

In the Supplement of *LE MUSÉE SOCIAL* for March we are told that it was Cavour who first used the term *houille blanche* for water power as it is utilized for industrial purposes. The essay is called by that name, and is the work of M. Cahen, of the *Sud Electrique*. He gives a comprehensive account of the electrical industries of France which offers no difficulties to the unprofessional reader, who will learn from it that France has made more progress in the use of hydraulic power than any other country in Europe but Norway. M. Cahen's own name for "white coal" is Antæus; and he suggests that in the year 3000 when England, perchance, is borrowing power from Scandinavia by means of submarine cables, this giant will be perpetually renewing his native strength in the service of France in the very act of spending it.—The May Supplement, by Mlle. A. Tougard de Boismilon, is a history of trade-unionism among women in the textile industries of this country; and the April number is a treatise by M. G. Valran on *La femme française et la femme musulmane en Tunisie*. The methods by which the Frenchwoman is educating the girls of the colony seems to be Fabian in the original sense of the word. The chief way in which she is benefiting the people, and at the same time promoting French interests, is that of providing the westernized men with wives who will understand them without destroying the Mahomedan ideal of feminine incompetence, which has hitherto been cherished even in regard to household lore.

The first place in *LA REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE* for March is accorded to an article on *L'idée de Dieu et l'Athéisme*, in which M. Belot points out that corporate life to-day, whether tribal or international, is the outcome of economic necessities and scientific interests, whereas in bygone times it was maintained, with more or less partiality and imperfection, by various "doxies," of which the belief in God is the last and most durable relic. From the possibility that sooner or later this too may perish, he does not augur the sundering of the moral bonds of society in the future: for he shows that social machinery and the spread of knowledge secure faithfulness to contracts and respect for the rights for others more effectually than did oath-taking and religious obligation in the past; and that since the conception of God rests on no experimental datum it takes a different form in every mind which entertains it, and people therefore tend to suppose that God does whatever they want him to do. Thus arises "a singular passion for doing God's business for him without consulting him, and of constantly putting oneself in his place as judge, legislator, and executant." M. Belot's own criterion of moral dignity is "absolute respect for freedom of thought in the search for truth, and the sincerity with oneself by which one makes honesty possible for everyone else." He contends that adherence to this principle may lead to affirmation, but cannot lead to denial, of the existence of God. He deprecates "every systematic impoverishment of our nature and all arbitrary narrowing of our spiritual horizon," and pleads persuasively for the value and beauty of

"lay morality." The article is important because of its sound psychology. The psycho-analysts are proving that both the vices and the heroisms of men are due, not to heavenly powers, but to personal ambitions and family affections. The reader should study the essay side by side with Dr. Bernard Hart's little book on "The Psychology of Insanity." He would then see that intrinsically, though not professedly or formally, M. Belot is a psycho-analyst, and a good one.—Turning to the May number we pass from the positive outlook to the normative standpoint from which M. d'Hautefeuille studies social facts. His article is entitled *Sur la Vie intérieure*, and its argument is that moral superiority is the outcome of meditation; that one's knowledge, both of oneself and of others, is derived from contemplation, not from commerce with the world: and that the wicked and the ambitious have no ideals, no appreciation of realities as distinguished from things and facts—in a word, no "interior life." As a protest against the tendency to suppose that a rapid succession of precepts constitutes knowledge, the article is refreshing; but it will hardly induce the sociologist to adopt the reflective process which it recommends. In that case his mind would eventually become what Vernon Lee calls, in reference to the mental condition of the mystic, "an emotionally irradiated void." In both issues there are other papers which will interest the sociologist—in the May number, *Esthétique et Sociologie*, by M. Gastinel; in the April number, *Platon et la science sociale*, by M. Robin, and *Paul Tannery, historien de la science antique*, by M. Rivaud.

The April and May numbers of L'ACTION NATIONALE are both monographic. The subject of the latter is the increase of armaments in Germany and France. That of the former is the colonial policy of the French as it is realized in the government of their Indo-Chinese territory, which is half as large again as France itself. The notes under the heading *Le mois* should be useful alike to politicians, economists, and sociologists, for they contain a brief record of the current parliamentary work of all the chief countries of the world.

Also received:—*La Science Sociale*, (April, May); *Revue internationale de sociologie*, (March, April, May); *Bulletin de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay*, No. 26; *Le Musée social, Annales*, (March, April, May); *Bulletin de la Statistique générale de la France*, (April).

GERMAN.

Many pages in the current number of the *VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE* are given to Dr. Barth's discourse on "Nationality and its Sociological Significance" that was cut short at the Second Congress of the German Sociological Society because it brought forward value judgments, which the members have pledged themselves to exclude from their deliberations. He attributes three instincts to mankind—the gregarious, the sexual and the parental; and, using simple language and proceeding in his exposition by the easy transitions which make his writing so pleasant and illuminative, he shows how these have given rise to different sentiments of nationality at one epoch after another of the world's history. He traces the idea of nationality from the consciousness of blood relationship through that of

membership in larger and larger groups of humanity, demonstrating how it waned under the influence of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages and of the physiocrats and the believers in natural rights and natural religion in the eighteenth century, but grew and became strong in the nineteenth century in the form of the doctrine that might is right. He thinks that although this national egotism has led to a salutary equalizing process among the peoples of Europe, it has brought about the oppression of weaker communities in the colonies. The normative part of the paper to which Dr. Barth's fellow sociologists objected comes at the end, where he adumbrates the ideal of a state which will give the people so much freedom for self-realization, and will diffuse knowledge and culture so widely, that they will serve it with the good-will which, according to Kant, is the only unconditional good that humanity enjoys. This enlightened patriotism, Dr. Barth believes, would in time give rise to internationality of the best type, which would be a realization of Fichte's vision of a world-community, of the fabric of which the present states are only the scaffolding. This number contains also the continuation of Dr. Richard Horn's treatise on *Psychische Kausalität*, in which he tries to solve the puzzle of the relation between our logical, æsthetic, and ethical judgments and the system of energy within which, according to the psychologist, the whole drama of our mental life is enacted. He brings a purposive ghost on to the scenes, which recalls Professor Münsterberg's mystic ego, to work all this machinery, but afterwards dismisses him and closes his article with a question: "Are we justified in assuming that there is any causal nexus at all between two acts of consciousness, or, in more general terms, between two sets of psychic phenomena?"

The Sociological Society has received several issues of the *POLITISCH-ANTHROPOLOGISCHE REVUE*. It is a well-printed, shilling monthly now in its thirteenth year, and sets forth the ideal of high thinking and plain living in the interests of German nationality. In the May number there is a report of a speech in which Dr. Heinrich Kraeger said that what her child is to a woman that his country is to a man. That comparison is an accurate indication of the trend of the articles and the purpose of the writers, and furnishes an explanation of both the faults and the excellence of the review. The leading article in this number is the work of Dr. Schmidt-Gibichenfels himself. It is a protest, written with almost truculent earnestness, against the policy which is calculated to give the advantage in the struggle for national existence on the Continent rather to the Slav than the German branch of the race which has peopled Northern Europe. He criticises the French for leaguering themselves with the Russians, and deeply deplores the industrial movement which has checked the expansion of the distinctively German population towards the East and South-East. He tells us that the higher birth-rate and lower culture of the Slav are a danger not only to Germany but to all Europe; and that if the Slavs eventually prevail and the Germans go under, the fateful time will surely come, when the various peoples of that wide domain "would be ready to go down on their knees and dig the earth with their nails if they thought that by so doing they could restore her ancient power to the German Empire. The national vanity of the French, and the pride of the English in their conquests and colonies, may lead them to spurn the idea; but true it is that the fate of Europe and European civilization stands or falls with that of the German state and people." But the author himself

shows that the Slavs are not insusceptible to culture, and other writers, notably Dr. Auerbach of Elizabetgrad, have shown that many sections of them are restricting their birth-rate: and under these circumstances the powers of Europe will not be contemplating the above described operation just yet. The subjects of the other papers, three in number, are the Russification of Finland, the distribution of the primates, and *dementia paralytica* as a result of town civilization: while the June issue contains an essay on monarchy, by the Editor, in which some readers will think they detect the influence of Nietzsche; and papers on diet by Professor Holle, on the classification of the races of mankind by Herr Maurus Horst, and on temperament by Dr. Ludwig Klages, the author of *Prinzipien der Charakterologie*. Readers will wonder, perhaps, how the Editor brings about the association between politics and anthropology which is the *raison d'être* of the magazine. His explanation of the synthesis is that "the political constitution of a society is the necessary condition under which the characteristics and capabilities of mankind attain their full development."

ITALIAN.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA, March-April, 1913. Signor F. Savorgnan contributes an article on the denominational factor in marriage selection. Individuals who profess the same faith are much more likely to marry within than without their denomination, but this "denominational homogeneity" tends to decrease. Among the Jews it is decreasing more slowly than in the other religions, and the author discusses the historical reasons for the difference, and the difficulties placed in the way of mixed marriages both by Jewish tradition and by the Catholic Church. The paper is lavishly illustrated with mathematical diagrams. —A paper by Signor Caristia deals with the democratic movement in Italy at the end of the eighteenth century. The enthusiastic hopes and lofty ideals generated by the French revolution, and the tragic bitterness of their disappointment give dramatic interest to a well-written and even fascinating paper. —Signor Boldrini discusses the use of statistical method in regard to the subject of working-class consumption with special reference to the generalization known as Engel's law, viz., that the poorer the family, the greater the proportion of expenditure that must be devoted to food. The paper may usefully be read along with a recent English document on the same subject —Mr. Kolthammer's monograph on "Working-class Taxation," the first publication of the Tata Foundation at the London School of Economics.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE, March, 1913. Avvocato Carlo Santucci reminds his readers that 1913 is the sixteenth centenary of the Peace of the Church, in other words, of the Edict of Milan promulgated by Constantine and Licinius, an edict which though not absolutely the first granting toleration to the Christian religion, was the first to recognize the corporate existence of the Church as the organ of monotheistic religion, and thus to lay down the lines of those relations between Church and State which were destined to form so large a part of the political life of the Empire, and of other Catholic and non-Catholic States. The author points out that the edict indicates the growing influence of the Christian spirit on social life by abolishing some barbarous

and cruel punishments, and by including measures for the protection of the young, for the progressive diminution of slavery, and the strengthening of the family.—Signor Bonolis contributes a third instalment of his work on the Medieval Maritime law of the Adriatic, and Signor Branzoli-Zappi discusses various forms of co-operation as possible remedies for the present high prices obtaining in Rome.—In the April number Signor Palmieri discusses the probable effects of the Greco-Bulgarian conflict on the relations of the Catholic Church in the East.—Signor Caristia writes on the Centenary of A. F. Ozanam.—Dr. Leone Minervini urges the extension, more particularly in Italy, of preventive methods in dealing with disease. Adopting the view that national wealth consists not only in agricultural acreage, minerals, industrial reserves, imports and exports, but also in the number of healthy citizens with strong arms and active brains, he points out the economic loss caused to a country by disease (especially endemic scourges such as tuberculosis and malaria), estimating in terms of money how much each inhabitant at given periods of life has cost his community, what financial loss his death therefore means to that community, and calculating from published statistics what a modern state can be forced to spend in treating the victims of tuberculosis, malaria or epidemics. He argues from ascertained facts how much cheaper and easier is prevention than cure—"Pulmonary tuberculosis is easily preventable, difficult to treat, rarely curable," he says—and pleads for more systematic governmental study of social hygiene, together with immediate application of knowledge already acquired in that field.

In the May number Signor Vuoli states the case for the extension of compulsory insurance against industrial accidents to the class of agricultural workers, and gives an historical account of the development of workmen's compensation and of the industrial insurance law of 1904.—Signor Toniolo contributes the first portion of a study (from the Catholic point of view) of the immense social changes and problems involved in the reign of Constantine. This is a brilliant paper, showing deep enthusiasm for a great subject. Constantine's reign is described as "a turning-point, after which history is no longer concerned with the conflict between Paganism and Christianity, but with two immensely complex facts of political and social life and culture; on the one hand, the long drawn-out decay of the Western Empire, the symbol of the civilization of the past; on the other, the developing organisation of a new and living order, the Christian idea, or Catholicism," under which "the citizen might indeed owe his substance and even his life to the state, but was free in his soul to serve the moral order that controls the universe."

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

THE ROUND TABLE (June) contains an able and unprejudiced article on "Ministers and the Stock Exchange." The opinions both of the Press and of the City are fully dealt with and the whole article is marked by a fairness of view and soundness of judgment that all will welcome. The writer realises that the particulars of the recent investigations not only concern the characters of certain Ministers, but involve principles of the gravest importance which lie at the very root of the success or failure of all democratic government. An article on "The Ethics of Empire" deals with an interesting subject from many points of view, and a section of the

number devoted to political apathy, the discouragement of all parties, and the want of dramatic antagonism discusses thoughtfully a subject of considerable importance at the present time.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW (March (with Supplement) and June). In the March number Mr. Brookmire's article on "The Method of Business Forecasting, Based on Fundamental Statistics" deals with a subject on the true comprehension of which depend not only individual fortunes but also the general stability and prosperity of the world. Although nearly all success in business has been due in some degree to the ability to forecast the future trend of the influences of supply and demand, the matter is so complex that even the ablest writers must feel their task an uncertain one. Attempts, however, are always of the greatest value and, while realizing the importance of Mr. Jevons's views of the influence of crops, Mr. Brookmire devotes considerable space to a discussion of the even more complex influences of banking and political conditions. The Supplement to the March number maintains an unusually high standard dealing practically and suggestively with economic subjects which in the hands of English writers are often apt to become too purely theoretical. In the June number Mr. de Roode's article on "Pensions as Wages" is of great interest and Mr. Irving Fisher's paper on "'The Equation of Exchange' for 1912 and Forecast" contains a symbolic table which should be helpful to economic students. As usual the collection of reviews of current books is excellent and comprehensive.

ECONOMIC JOURNAL (June) contains several interesting articles, Professor Ashley's "Comparative Economic History and the English Landlord" and Mr. Stamp's "Incidence of Increment Duties" being of importance at the present time.

SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE (April, May, June). In the May number there is an excellent appreciation of Livingstone by Professor Gregory, and also articles on Livingstone from the scientific point of view by Professor Alexander Galt and from a biographical standpoint by Sir Harry Johnston. The June number contains a further article on Livingstone by Sir Harry Johnston and an able paper by Professor Jean Brunhes on "The Specific Characteristics and Complex Character of the Subject-Matter of Human Geography."

TOWN PLANNING REVIEW (April) is an excellent number. Mr. Adshead's article on "Equestrian Statues" is well illustrated by examples showing both the dignity of repose and the energy of movement. The series of articles, including one by Mr. Raymond Unwin, on "The Municipal Ownership of Land" are of great value, and Mr. Patrick Abercrombie's article on "The Square House" is both well written and well illustrated.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (May) contains a good article by Mr. Taussig on "The Plan for a Compensated Dollar" and one on "The Dominance of the National Union in American Labour Organization" which should interest students of the comparative methods of labour unions here and in the United States.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (March and May). In the March number Mr. Willcox's "Social Statistics as an Aid to the Courts" suggests the necessary parallelism between law and sociology: it is probable that most people will agree with Mr. Willcox's view that the difference between the mind of the lawyer and the social investigator is too widely marked. Among many other articles Mr. Stanley Hall's "Social Phases of Psychology" is of especial importance.—In the May number Mr. Ward makes an excellent attempt in "Eugenics, Euthemics, and Endemics" to divide the worthless and temporary ideas of Eugenists from those which will have a permanent and lasting influence on society.

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (June). Mr. W. A. Dunning in his article on "The German Idealists" treats the important, and perhaps rather neglected, subject of the influence of philosophy of politics. It is probably because so much of our philosophy is unconscious that we fail to realize its bearing on the political movements of the day. The "Record of Political Events" at the end is well written and well arranged.

ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (March and May). The March number deals with Prison Labour. Most of the articles are too short, but taken as a whole they are an excellent attempt to present the necessary importance of the two dual factors of prison life ("stern justice and gentle sympathy") in relation to each other. The May issue deals with County Government. The articles are longer and therefore more valuable. Mr. Gans's comments on "The Powers, Temperament, and Limitations of the Public Prosecutor" should be taken as a serious warning of very real evils and dangers.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS (April). In an article on "The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism" Mr. Lovejoy attempts to show how far, if at all, M. Bergson's philosophy is anti-intellectual. Although there is much that appears new Mr. Lovejoy sees in the Bergsonian philosophy a great deal that reflects many ancient and modern thinkers, among the latter being Whitman and Nietzsche. Miss M. E. Robinson has a well-written article on "The Sociological Era" with some thoughtful remarks on the education of children.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

On April 22 (evening) Mr. A. E. Crawley read the paper on "The Unconscious Reason in Social Evolution," which appears in this number. Mr. J. A. Hobson was in the chair.

On May 7, at an additional afternoon meeting, Dr. Harold Mann, Principal of the Government Agricultural College, Poona, read a paper on "The Untouchables of an Indian City." Lord Sydenham, ex-Governor of Bombay, was in the chair.

On May 20 (evening) Dr. W. H. R. Rivers read a paper on "Survivals in Sociology"; Professor Hobhouse presiding.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- "Real Democracy." First Essays of the Rota Club by J. E. F. Mann, N. J. Sievers and R. W. T. Cox. Longmans. 4/6 net.
- Wingfield-Stratford, Esmé. "History of English Patriotism." 2 vols. Lane. 25/- net.
- Weyl, Walter. "The New Democracy." New York: Macmillan Co., 1912. 8/6 net.
- Alden, Percy. "Democratic England." New York: Macmillan Co., 1912. 6/6 net.
- Levy, Hermann. "Economic Liberalism." Macmillan. 4/6 net.
- Johns Hopkins University Studies. Series xxxi. No. 1. "The Land System in Maryland: 1720—1765." Clarence P. Gould. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Cooper, Sir W. E. "England's Fatal Land Policy." C. A. Pearson. 2/6 net.
- Wolff, Henry W. "Co-operation in Agriculture." P. S. King and Co., 1912. 6/-.
- Brooks, J. G. "American Syndicalism. The I.W.W." New York: Macmillan Co. 5/6 net.
- Murdoch, John G. "Economics as the Basis of Living Ethics." Troy: Allen Book Co. \$2.00 net.
- Rowntree, B. S., and Kendall, May. "How the Labourer Lives." Nelson. 2/- net.
- Hourwich, Isaac A. "Immigration and Labour." New York and London: Putnam's Sons. 10/6 net.
- "Report of the Commission on the Support of Dependent Minor Children of Widowed Mothers. January 1913." The Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Boston.
- Jevons, F. B. "Personality." Methuen. 2/6 net.
- Lee, Gerald Stanley. "Crowds." Methuen. 6/-.
- Tarbell, Ida M. "The Business of Being a Woman." New York: Macmillan Co. 5/6 net.
- Heape, Walter. "Sex Antagonism." Constable. 7/6 net.
- Hartley, C. Gasquoine. "The Truth about Woman." Eveleigh Nash. 7/6 net.
- de Vuyst, P. (translated by Nora Hunter). "Woman's Place in Rural Economy." Blackie. 3/6 net.
- Finot, Jean (translated by Mary J. Safford). "Problems of the Sexes." David Nutt. 12/6 net.
- Vynne, Nora. "So is it with the Damsel." Stanley Paul. 6/-.
- Külpe, Oswald (translated from the fifth German edition by M. L. and G. T. W. Patrick). "The Philosophy of the Present in Germany." George Allen. 3/6 net.
- Lichtenberger, Henri (translated from the French by A. Ludovici). "The Evolution of Modern Germany." Constable. 10/6 net.
- Phillips, Lady. "A Friendly Germany. Why Not?" Constable. 2/6 net.
- Brereton, Cloudesley. "Studies in Foreign Education." Harrap. 5/- net.

- Wood, Walter. "Children's Play and its Place in Education." Kegan Paul; and Routledge. 3/6 net.
- McKeever, W. A. "The Training of the Boy." New York: Macmillan Co. 6/6 net.
- Maurice, C. Edmond. "Life of Octavia Hill." Macmillan. 16/- net.
- Trevelyan, G. M. "The Life of John Bright." Constable. 15/- net.
- Brawley, B. G. "A Short History of the American Negro." New York: Macmillan Co. 5/6 net.
- Ruppin, Dr. Arthur (translated from the German by Margery Bentwich). "The Jews of To-day." G. Bell. 6/- net.
- Abram, A. "English Life and Manners in the Later Middle Ages." Illustrated. Routledge. 6/-.
- Friedländer, L. (translated by A. B. Gough). "Roman Life and Manners." Vol. IV. Appendices and Notes (from the sixth edition). Routledge. 10/-.
- Tod, N. M. "International Arbitration among the Greeks." Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8/6 net.
- "International Congress of Historical Studies. London, 1913. Presidential Address." The Right Hon. James Bryce. (With an Introduction by A. W. Ward.) Oxford: University Press. 1/- net.
- Bryce, James. "University and Historical Addresses." London and New York: Macmillan. 8/6 net.
- Holsti, Rudolf. "The Relation of War to the Origin of the State." Helsingfors: Helsingfors New Printing Co.
- Weaver, E. E. (with an Introduction by Stanley Hall). "Mind and Health. With an Examination of some Systems of Divine Healing." New York: Macmillan Co. 8/6 net.
- Marriott, J. A. R. (Introduction by). "The French Revolution of 1848 in its Economic Aspect. Vol. I. Louis Blanc's 'Organisation du Travail.' Vol. II. Emile Thomas's 'Histoire des Ateliers nationaux.'" Oxford: Clarendon Press. 5/- net.
- Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale. L. "La Culture morale aux divers Degrés de l'Enseignement public." Arthur Baner. Paris: Giard et Brière. 6 and 7 francs.
- Bochard, A. "Les Lois de la Sociologie économique." Paris: Rivière. 8 francs.
- Tönnies, Dr. F. "Die Entwicklung der Sozialen Frage." Berlin: G. J. Göschen. 90 pf.
- Chatterton-Hill, G. "Individuum und Staat." Tübingen: Mohr. Mk. 5.

PAMPHLETS.

- Ratan Tata Foundation. "Memoranda on Problems of Poverty. No. 1. Some Notes on the Incidence of Taxation on the Working-class Family." By F. W. Kolthammer. London School of Economics.
- Gini, Dr. Corrado. "The Contributions of Demography to Eugenics." London: Printed by Knight and Co.